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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The

purpose

interrelationships
independent

of this
among

Lithuania

thesis

is

to

military,

the

the

during

systematically study the

politics,

authoritarian

and

society

regime of

in

President

Antanas Smetona, 1926-1940.
The military, which brought Smetona to power in a coup d'etat,
played a leading role in politics and permeated society.

In turn, the

military became

by societal

vicissitudes.

politicized
The

problem

and,
must

further,
be

was affected

addressed

in

order

to

fully

understand socio-political dynamics in Lithuania at that crucial point
in its political, historical,

and socio-cultural development.

It is

this kind of systematic study which the academic community lacks, in
either the English or Lithuanian languages.

It is thus the aim of this

thesis to fill the scholarly vacuum.
The

issues involved, of course, have been addressed by many

individuals: scholars, participants, observers.

However, these merely

provide pieces of a grand puzzle which no one has yet constructed.

The

problems with these pieces are as follows:
1) They are often quite small, sometimes just a few sentences in
a book or article, which are minimally comprehensible when not viewed in
the general context of events.
2) Bias takes two forms.

2

FIGURE 1.1:

MAP OF THE BALTIC AREA

Source: John Alexander Swettenham. The Tragedy of the Baltic States: A
Report Compiled From Official Documents and Eyewitnesses' Reports (New
York: Praege:r, 1954), faces title page.

3

A) Memoirs, biographies and historical accounts are often
written by participants or other individuals who maintain an interest in
seeing that information is presented in a light favorable to themselves
or their faction.
B) Some accounts of Lithuanian affairs during the period
of independence are written by Soviet scholars who paint a fascist
portrait of the country in order to discredit the regime, the individuals involved, and help legitimize Soviet occupation.
These

factors

create

obstacles

which

obscure

objectivity.

Objectivity can be created, however, by piecing many of these diverse -and sometimes contradictory -- pieces together.

Research to date has

demonstrated that truthful accounts can be synthesized when critically
examining large quantities of data.
The

sources

utilized

memoirs, and documents.

are

books,

articles,

biographies

and

Because data is scattered in small quantities,

a broad base had to be established and the sources carefully studied.
This is reflected in the notes.
citations.
sources.

Some of them contain a number of

This is because scattered information is distilled from many
If each source were cited individually, some passages would

contain a note for every sentence.
It was decided that the scope of the thesis would be limited to
the military per se.

The National Guard, a civilian militia, and other

parallel and auxiliary organizations are mentioned throughout the course
of the study, but are not treated separately.
unwieldly should they be included.

The thesis would become

They are best left to a separate, or

4

broader, work. 1 Nevertheless, the thesis should be able to stand on its
own as a self-contained entity.

The events of 1926-1940 should be

understandable without an extensive knowledge of Lithuanian politics and
history preceding or following that period.

It would serve no purpose

to produce another general summary of Lithuanian history, such as are
found at the beginning of most monographs.

Instead, those with interest

in the topic are encouraged to consult Appendix A, which is reproduced
from another work and summarizes pre-coup events in Lithuania.
While the bulk of the thesis serves as an interpret! ve case
study,

it

commences

with

general

propositions

relations and their adaption to Lithuania.

of

civil-military

It is this subject which the

following chapter addresses.

1cf. bibliography for sources on the National Guard.

CHAPTER II
GENERAL PROPOSITIONS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
A. HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL OVERVIEW
Though

the

systematic

scholarly

study

of

civil-military

relations is relatively new, the matter has been the topic of discourse
and writing for centuries.

For example, in the Republic, Plato writes

much of civil-military relationships and politico-military affairs.

He

also discusses at length the utilization of military education to serve
and guard the state. 1

In one passage, Socrates says to Glaucon:

If a man appears hard to bewitch and graceful in everything, a good
guardian of himself and the music he was learning, proving himself to
possess rhythm and harmony on all these occasions -- such a man would
certainly be most useful to himself and the city. And the one who on
each occasion, among the children and youths and among the men, is
tested and comes through untainted, must be appointed ruler of the
city and guardian; and he must be given honors, both while living and
when dead, and must be allotted the greatest prizes in burial and the
other memorials.
And the man who's not of this sort must be
rejected. 2
Chapter

five

entitled

"The

of

Gibbon's Decline
Growth

of

and

Military

Fall of the
Autocracy

and

Roman
the

Orientalism: The Sale of the Empire by the Praetorians.
Septimi us

Severus."

It deals with the period

Empire is
Influx

of

The Rise of

1 93-197 A. D. 3

Some

----------------1

see especially Plato, The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom
(New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 91 [412c] - 102 [424d].
2Plato, p. 93 [413e -414a].

3see Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,
abridgement by D.M. Low (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1960), pp.
56-62.
5

6

excerpts from this chapter follow:
The Praetorian bands • • • licentious fury was the first symptom ot
the decline of the Roman empire • • • • They derived their institution
from Augustus. That crafty tyrant, sensible that laws might colour,
but that arms alone could maintain, his usurped dominion, had gradually formed this powerful body of guards, in constant readiness to
protect his person, to awe the senate, and either to prevent or to
crush the first motions of rebellion.
He distingui!hed these favoured troops by a double pay and superior privileges.
By thus introducing the Praetorian guards as it were into the palace
and the senate, the emporers taught them to perceive their own
strength, and the weakness of the civil government; to view the vices
of their masters with familiar contempt. • • • The firmest and bestestablished princes were obliged to mix blandishments with commands,
rewards with punishments, to flatter their pride, indulge their
pleasures, connive at their irregularities, and to purchase their
precarious faith by a liberal donnative. • • • Their consent was
essentially necessary in the appointment of an emporer. • • • The
fierce Praetorians increased their weight by throwin~ like the
barbarian conqueror of Rome, their swords into the scale.
An

analogy to the Lithuanian coup· of 1926, discussed in the following

chapter, may also be drawn from Gibbon:
The senate was commanded to assemble. • • • After Julian had filled
the senate-house with armed soldiers, he expatiated on the freedom of
his election, his own eminent virtues, and his full assurance of the
affections of the senate. • •• Yet it was observed that, after the
crowd of flatterers dispersed, and left him to darkness, solitude,
and terrible reflection, he passed a sleepless night; revolving most
probably in his mind his own rash folly, the fate of his virtuous
predecessor, and the doubtful, and dangerous tenure of an empire
which had not been acquired by merit, but purchased by money. He had
. ·. reason to tremble.
On the throne of the world he found himself
··without a friend, and even an adherent. 6
Machiavelli, who claimed that "where there are good arms there

----------------4

Gibbon, p. 56.

5Gibbon, p. 57.

Gibbon's emphasis.

6Gibbon, pp. 58-59.

7
are bound to be good laws," 7 devoted section fourteen of The Prince to
There, among other things, tte

the "military duties of the prince."
writes:

A prince • • • should have no other object, no other thought, no
other subject of study, than war, its rules and disciplines • • • • A
prince who knows riothing of warfare •
can't hope for respect from
his soldiers or put any trust in them.

e.

Laying

the

foundation

for

a

perspective

which

would

be

capitalized on by the communist successors and critics of the Smetana
regime, Lenin wrote:
The centralized state power that is peculiar to bourgeoise society
came into being in the period of the fall of absolutism.
Two
institutions are most characteristic of this state machine: the
bureaucracy and the standing army.
In their works, Marx and Engels
repeatedly show that it is the bourgeoisie with whom these
institutions are connected by thousands of threads.
The
bureaucracy and the standing army are a "parasite" on the body of
bourgeois society -- a parasite created by the internal antagonisms
which rend that society, but still a parasite, "choking" all its
vital pores.
In particular, it is precisely the petty
bourgeoisie that is attracted to.the side of the big bourgeoisie and
is subordinated to it to a large extent by means of this apparatus,
which provides the upper strata of the peasantry, small artisans,
tradesmen and the like with comparatively comfortable~ quiet and
respectable jobs, raising their holders above the people.
Iskenderov also quotes Lenin with regard to military intervention in the
political realm:

"'The army cannot be, never was,

and never will be

neutral. '" 1O

----------------7

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. and ed. Robert M. Adams
(New York: Norton, 1977), chap XII, p. 35.
8Machiavelli, chap. XIV, p. 42.

9Vladimir Lenin, "State and Revolution: The Marxist Teaching on
the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution," in
Essential Works of Marxism, ed. Arthur P. Mendel (New York: Bantam,
1979), pp. 122-123. Lenin's emphasis.
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Modern events demonstrate the intertwining of politics and the
President George Washington personally conmanded troops in

military.

the field during the Whiskey Rebellion.

During the American Civil War,

Abraham Lincoln was, for all practical purposes, military dictator or
the Union.
actions.

He consulted with senior officers and decided military

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) of the People's Republic of

China is an excellent example of a politicized military establishment.
Since internal and external security issues are vitally important to
China, the PLA is very much involved in policy debates. 11
B. THE MILITARY MIND:

CONSERVATIVE REALISM

In order to more fully comprehend civil-military relations, it
is necessary to delve into the military mind.

It is often characterized

as having a perspective of conservative realism, which arises from
pessimistic Hobbesian philosophy regarding human nature.
form,

Hobbesian

conservative

realism

constant conflict -- a conflict
international

relations.

dictates

found

Because

man

that

In capsule

people

are

in

in contemporary domestic and
is

naturally

selfish,

the

Leviathan must establish order from aboye, by coercion, if necessary.
Swords cannot be beaten into ploughshares. 12
10A. Iskenderov, 11 The Army, Poli tics, and the People," in The
Military and Modernization, ed. Henry Bienen (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton,
1971), p. 150. .
11 James R. Townsend, Politics in China, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1980), pp. 91-92. See Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and
Coercion in the Developing Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1977), pp. 151-182 for the importance of the military in
contemporary developing nations.
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Hobbesian natural equality results in diffidence and desire for
This inevitably leads to conflict and

the same object by many men.
war.

Because all men are equal, a power must be created which can

overawe all into submission. 13

"During the time men 1i ve without a

common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which
is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man." 14
Needless to say, war precludes all else, such as industry, art, and
productivity.

In order to remedy this situation, Hobbes concludes:

Considering what value men are naturally apt to set upon themselves,
what respect they look for from others, and how little they value
other men from whence continually arise among them emulation,
quarrels, factions, and at last war, to the destroying of one another
and diminution of their strength against a common enemy - it is
necessary that there be laws of honor and a public rate of the worth
of such men as have deserved or are able to deserve well of the
commonwealth, and that there be force in the hands of some or other
to put those laws in execution. 15
The implications for authority, power, and coercion are obvious.
cannot

envision

simultaneously

a
be

society

which

founded

upon

is

able

orderly,

to

peacefully

procedural

Hobbes

exist

and

consensus

and

compromise.

Also obvious is the sanctioning of authoritarian systems,

which

preferable

are

to

debilitating

socio-political

conflict:

"Sovereign power not so hurtful as the want of it, and the hurt proceeds

----------------12

sam C. Sarkesian, lecture, Department of Political Science,
Loyola University of Chicago, 11 November 1981.
13Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Indianapolis: Library of Liberal
Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, 1980), part I, chap. 13, pp. 105-106.
14Hobbes, part I, chap. 13, p. 106.
15Hobbes, part II, chap. 18, p. 149.
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for the greatest part from not submitting readily to a less." 16
With this assumption in mind, the professional military man is
suspicious

of

political

activity,

finding self-serving elements in

bargaining, negotiation, consensus-building, and compromise.

Order and

stability, instead, are the highest priorities for the military man.

He

equates these qualities with the effectiveness of any given political•
order.

What he views as bickering, graft, and corruption give way to an

engineering
obedience. 17

approach,

emphasizing

discipline,

skill,

loyalty,

and

C. Wright Mills states the case in the following fashion:

Inside their often trim bureaucracy, where everything seems under
neat control, army officers have felt that "politics" is a dirty,
uncertain, and ungentlemanly kind of game; and in terms of their
status code, they have often felt that ,%oliticians were unqualified
creatures inhabiting an uncertain world.
Civilian

standards

are .inferior

to

military

authority, patriotism, duty, and self-sacrifice.
human

nature

is

not

perfectible

and

violence

order,

respect

for

Taken to its extreme,
is

thus

inevitable:

"Violence is the final arbiter of human relations. 111 9
Huntington offers

a

succinct

summary of the conservatively

realistic military mind:
The military ethic emphasizes the permanence, irrationality,
weakness, and evil in human nature.
It stresses the supremacy of
16 Hobbes, part II, chap. 18, p. 151.
17sarkesian, lecture, 11 November 1981.
18c. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1980), p.174.
19Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier:
Political Portrait (New York: -'Free Press, 1971), p. 21i2.

A Social and
Also 248-249.
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society .over the individual and the importance of order,. hierarchy,
and di vision of function.
It stresses the continuity and value of
history.
rt accepts the nation state as the highest form of
political organization and :recognizes the continuing likelihood of
wars among nation states. It emphasizes the importance of power in
international :relations and warns of the dangers to state security.
It holds that the security of the state depends upon the creation and
maintenance of strong military forces.
It urges the limitation of
state action to the direct interests of the state, the restriction of
extensive commitments, and the undesirability of bellicose or
adventurous policies.
It holds that war is the instrument of
politics, that the military are the servants of the statesman, and
that civilian control is essential of military professionalism. It
exalts obedience as the highest virtue of military men. The military
ethic is thus pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined,
power-oriented,
nationalistic,
militaristic,
pacifist,
and
instrumentalist in its view of the military profession. It is, in
brief, realistic and conse:rvative. 20
C.

THE MILITARY PROFESSION
How

does
One

reality?

finds

professionalism.
military.
standard

this

philosophical
the

answer

in

perspective
military

translate

characteristics

into
and

Sarkesian lists six general characteristics of the

The first
operating

is bureaucracy.

regular relationships,

and possesses

autonomy regarding internal matters such as promotions.

The second is

hierarchy.

procedures,

The military is governed by

There is a table of organization founded upon a top-down

system of authority.

Third is the profession.

society regardless of financial reward.
demanding expertise and constant education.

The military serves

It is a total social system
Fourth, the sole client of

the military is the state, with the former subordinate to the latter.

20

sa~uel P. Hunti,ngton, The Soldier and the State: The Theory

and Politics of
79.

Civil-~!litary

Relations (New York: Vintage, 1957), p.
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Fifth, military professionalism holds a member to ultimate liability,
that is, the possibility of giving one's life while serving for the sole
client.

Finally, absolute institutional and professional loyalty takes

precedence over the individua1. 21
Huntington
different
expertise.

fashion,

categorizes
though

with

military
the

professionalism

same

basic

ideas.

slightly
First

is

The military professional possesses specialized knowledge

and skills from prolonged education and experience.

He is an expert in

what Harold Laswell terms the "management of violence."
subdivided into the contemporary land,

sea,

remain

and

a

in

specialist,

constant

drill

This is .further

or air specialist.
practice

are

To

necessary.

Finally, military expertise is universal; all professionals are alike
regardless of the particular state they serve.
Second in the Huntington typology is military responsibility
within a social context.
society;

his

services

The client of a professional in any field is
are

essential

to

its

existence.

Social

responsibility -- the maintenance of military security in this case -distinguishes professionals from those with mere intellectual skills.
Strictly speaking, the professional must be devoted to what he is doing

21 sarkesian, lecture, 9 November 1981. For a short discussion
of military professionalism see Amos A. Jordan, Jr., "Officer
Education," in ~~_?Okr of Military Institutions, ed. Roger W. Little(Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1971), pp. 211-213.
A longer discussion is
found in Jacques van Doorn, The Soldier and Social Change (Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage, 1975), pp. 29-41>.
Teitler devotes an entire book to
the origins of professionalism.
He writes that instrumental armed
conflict since the seventeenth century forced the establishment of a
professional officer corps.
See G. Teitler, The Genesis of the
Professional Officers' C9rp~ (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1977), pp. 3-5.
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and

not

performing

solely for

material

gain.

Further,

the

state

regulates and monopolizes the military profession to assure that its
power is utilized solely for socially approved purposes.

This sense of

social obligation and responsibility is based, finally, on long-standing
custom and tradition.
The third characteristic of military professionalism according
to Huntington is corporateness.

In addition to the sense of organic

unity among military professionals, there is also a consciousness of
being separate from society.
standards

to

insure

The profession itself applies and enforces

status and

distinction

from

the

layman.

The

commission is to an officer what a medical license is to a physician.
Rank, which brings appropriate privileges, functions, and duties,
determined by one's peers.

is

"Entrance into this unit is restricted to

those with the requisite education and training and is usually permitted
only at the lowest level of professional competence." 22
In sum,

the military professional is

unlike the warrior of

previous ages, for whom military activity was a part-time undertaking, a
hobby, or a mercenary service for booty.

The military professional, the

officer, must today be compared with the physician and the attorney.

He

is not an amateur practicing a trade or craft, but possesses a "higher
calling." 2 3

22 Huntington, p. 16.
See pp. 8-18 for the full treatment of
this tripartite typology.
Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 220
discusses brotherhood and the military community.
23Huntington pp. 7-8.
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D.

THE MILITARY AND POLITICS
The military professional, though, does not exist unto himself,

but

must

relate

politicians.

with

his

client,

that

is,

the

state

and

its

Inevitably, the question of properly relating politics

with military professionalism arises.

The Western tradition holds that

civil authority is superior to that of the military.
according to theory,

obeys and serves

the

The military,

state without question,

regardless of its changing political makeup:
The effectiveness of civilian political control over the military is
dependent only to a small extent upon the political beliefs held by
the military profession. Yet, a democratic political system assumes
that its military officers are positively committed to, if not
enthusiasti~ about,
the merits of civilian supremacy and civilian
leadership. 4
As

discussed

above,

though,

the

tension

between

the

civilian and

military minds can render this balancing act difficult.
Huntington

attempts

to

address

this

tension.

He

first

recognizes the crux of the problem of civil-military relations when
describing the conflict between two imperatives faced by the military.
The first

is

the functional

threats to the state.

imperative,

which deals with external

The second is the societal imperative, which

arises from social forces, ideologies, and domestic institutions.
other words,

while attempting to carry out its

In

primary duties of

protecting the state and the citizenry, the military must also deal with
the context from which it emerges and within which it must serve.

There

is a constant battle for attention which each imperative demands of the
24 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 253.
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military professional.

Further, adjustment and balance between them is

not automatic and inevitable; here a fine line must be tread.

For

example, if the societal imperative consumes a disproportionate amount
of

the

military's

resources

and

time,

it

is

less

capable of

the

functional imperative, leaving the state more vulnerable to external
attack. 25

The officer corps is central to this dichotomy:

The principal focus of civil-military relations is the relation of
the officer corps to the state. Here the conflict between functional
and societal pressures comes to a head.
The officer corps is the
active directing element of the military structure and is responsible
for the military security of society.
The state is the active
directing element of society and is responsible for the allocation of
resources among important values including military security.
The
social and economic relations between the military and the rest of
society normally refl.Bct the political relations between the officer
corps and the state.26
Huntington discovers the solution in "objective civilian control," which
maximizes

military

professionalism.

Subjective

civilian

control

ci vilianizes the military and injects social and political elements,
rendering it less professional.

Civil control is merely of instrumental

value to civilian groups, and no independent military sphere exists.
Objective civilian control, on the other hand, demands an autonomous
military profession.
of the state.

The military is "militarized" and becomes a tool

There is no military participation in politics; the

military is politically neutral and sterile.
civilian governing group.

It obeys any legitimate

In sum, low military political power and high

military professional power insure both civil authority and military
25 Huntington, p. 2.
26 Huntington, p. 3.
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security. 27

This, however, does not solve the civil-military dichotomy

once and for all, for fundamental tensions will always exist and must
constantly be managed:
The professional man who pursues the values of professional
competence and obedience and the political man who pursues power as
an end in itself are two distinct types. Yet elements of both exist
in most human beings and in every group. The tension between the
two, consequently, can never be rem§ved; it can only be ordered so as
to make it more or less endurable. 2
Janowitz does not make distinctions as neatly as Huntington:
According to the definitions of military honor, the professional
soldier is "above politics" in domestic affairs. In an authoritarian
society -- monarchical or totalitarian -- to be above politics means
that the officer is committed to the status quo. Under democratic
theory, the "above politics" formula requires that, in domestic
politics, generals and.admirals do not attach themselves to political
parties or overtly display partisanship. Furthermore, military men
are civil servants, so that elected leaders are assured of the
military's partisan neutrality. 2 9
For Janowitz, to be "above politics" does not necessarily mean being
non-political.
civilian

Indeed an officer need not politically agree with his

superiors,·

directives.

though

he

must

execute

military-related

The political beliefs of any military establishment are

long-term phenomena arising from socio-pol! tical factors, recruitment,

27Huntington, pp. 80-85.
28Huntington, p. 95.
29Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 233. Huntington tends
to deal with the icfeal, that is, two separate civil and military
spheres.
Janowitz, on the other hand, appears to take a more
sociological "is" approach, which recognizes the need for civilian
control while simultaneously contending that the two spheres must share
fundamental views.
The officer corps must reflect society, including
politically.
I am indebted to Dr. John Allen Williams of Loyola
University of Chicago for this distinction.
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and education.
corps,

It would be unrealistic to expect an apolitical officer

recognizing that "for all professional officers, there is a

special gap between private and expressed beliefs.30
E.

THE MILITARY INTERVENES
Yet,

experience dictates that the military has on countless
I

occasions become actively involved in politics, assuming various roles
as political governors and actors.

There is, of course, a moral barrier

against usurpation where a long tradition of civil supremacy exists,
though no civilian group can hope to match the cohesion, size, and arms
of the military should it choose to intervene.3 1

This is especially

true in non-Western and/or developing systems where the boundaries of
military and society have yet to be concretized:
Military might is likely to be a decisive factor in politics in a
society where there are no crystallized and universally accepted
beliefs about the legitimacy of power: where there are doubts and
disagreements about who should occ®y the positions of command and
what orders he is entitled to give.3 2
In such a context, the military is still developing its own professional
dimensions and attitudes toward politics.

Further, where there is less

institutionalization in general, authority is less apt to be accepted as

30Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 235. Sam S. Sarkesian
echoes the belief that the military is never apolitical. The Western
tradition claims that apolitical equals professional.
For Sarkesian,
non-partisan equals professional. Lectures, autumn 1983.
31Eric A. Nordlinger, So~~~ in Politics: Military Coups and
Governments (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 93-94.
32 stanislav Andreski, Military Organizatiol!__and Society, 2nd
rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 105-106.
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legitimate. 33
Military intervention usually occurs during a political crisis,
such as perceived failure in governmental performance regarding the
management of internal disorder.

This loss of legitimacy is perhaps the

reason most intervention occurs.

Disgruntled officers find their excuse

here.

The defense and enhancement of military corporate interests may

also be a factor.

Intense domestic disturbances inevitably spill over

into the military and politicize it, especially if it is utilized as a
para-police force to maintain law and order.

After some time of such

activity, the military may assume that since it possesses the power to
prop up an ailing regime, it also possesses the power to alter it.

In

developing systems, the prestige and functioning of the state are linked
to that of the military.

If these factors are low vis-a-vis the civil

government, the military has an interest in taking corrective action.
Since the military represents the power, sovereignty, and honor of the
nation, the attitude may be that what is good for the military is good
for the country.34
Now that the military has intervened,
praetorianism is initiated.

a variable period of

Nordlinger defines praetorianism as "a

33sarkesian, lectures, 13, 16 November 1981.
34These thoughts are distilled from Crane Brinton, The Anato~
of Revolution, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: Vintage, 1965), p. 3;
Nordlinger pp. 63-66; Monte Palmer, Dilemmas of Political Develop_ment:
_An Introduction to the Poli tics of the Developing Areas, 2nd ed.
(Itasca, IL: Peacock, 1980), pp. 216-217; Amos Perlmutter, Modern
Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 54-55; Sarkesian, lectures, autumn
1981, 1983.
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situation in which military officers are major or predominant political
actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force."35

He goes

on to posit three levels of military intervention, which are found in
Table 2. 1:

TABLE 2.1: THE LEVELS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION
Moderators

Guardians

Rulers

Extent of power

Veto group

Governmental
control

Regime
dominance

Political and economic
objectives

Preserve
status quo

Preserve
status quo
and/or
correct
malpractices
and
deficiencies

Effect political
change and sometimes
socioeconomic
change

Source: Nordlinger, p. 22.

The

military

finds

political events.

at

least

three

basic

methods

for

controlling

After the initial shock of intervention, the easiest

level of rule is the first,

that of being a moderating veto group

without dealing with day-to-day administrative and political matters.
Guardians and rulers, on the other hand, are the "men in mufti" who take
an activist political stance.
that

competitive

and

eliminated. 36
35Nordlinger, p. 2.

In all cases, though, Nordlinger holds

meaningful

participatory

structures

are

20
Perlmutter takes an especially dim view of military intervention
authoritarianism,

concomitant

its

and

on

both

practical

and

philosophical planes:
The symbiotic, conflictual, and cooperative relationship between
civilian and military elites clearly typifies the era of the central
state,
the ·grand
organization,
the
hegemonic
party,
the
interventionist military, all of which operate at the ex~ense of the
society, the individual; and genuine political pluralism. 7
Others assume a mixed stance with regard to intervention.
claims

that

the

impact

of

military

rule

in

the

Sarkesian

short-run

is

advantageous, bringing with it law and order, stability, security, and a
respite .from debilitating confrontation.
the

preconditions

However,

in

the

military

means.

for

the

long-run,
The

Indeed, the military may set

establishment
political

military

mind,

compatible with the polttical arena.

or

return

issues

cannot

as

discussed

of

democracy.

be managed with
above,

is

not

Further, because it must operate

within the same environment, the military often performs no better or
worse than its civilian predecessors.

If the military must remain

central to politics -- by its own judgement or that of others -- it is
best to rule .for approximately two years, then return to the barracks
and act as a veto group.

If it remains any longer it becomes embroiled

in the same problems which beset its predecessors -- and led to their
downfall at the hands of the very people now under domestic political
attack.38
36Nordlinger, p. 7.
37Perlmutter, p. 62.
38sarkesian, lectures, autumn 1981, 1983.
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F.

PROPOSITIONS VIS-A-VIS LITHUANIA
In any field, theory is supposed to transcend spatio-temporal

parameters.

Keeping in mind the above discussion, it is now necessary

to turn to civil-military relations in Lithuania under President Antanas
Smetona.

While details differ from case study to case study, there is

often a

good

deal

of

similarity among

underpinnings and general propositions.
different.

them regarding theoretical

The case dealt with here is no

It is possible to view Lithuania not merely in itself, but

in terms of its relationship to theory and other contexts.

This can be

seen in the succeeding chapters, for example, especially in the sections
dealing with politico-military affairs and political socialization.
Arend Lijphart writes that there are six types of case studies
in

the

subdiscipline

interpretive,

case,

comparative

hypothesis-generating,

infirming, and deviant.39
as interpretive.

of

politics:

atheoretical,

theory-confirming,

theory-

This particular study may best be classified

Such case studies display primary interest in the

utilizing established theoretical

strive to formulate general theory:

propositions.

They do not

"In these studies, a generalization

is applied to a specific case with the aim of throwing light on the case
rather than of improving the generalization in any way.
studies in 'applied science. rn40
---------~-------

Hence they are

While far from perfect, it is at least·

39Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative
Method," American P~11t;,.~1-~cience Review, 65 (September 1971),
691-693.
40 Lijphart, p. 692.
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hoped that some light may be shed on the often tense relationship
between politics and the military in Smetona's Lithuania. 41
The reader must be cautioned not

to apply Western liberal

standards to interwar East-Central Europe.

The region had never had

such a tradition, be it political, social, or economic.

It should not

be expected, therefore, that the military accept civilian superiority as
i

it exists in the contemporary West.

The new post-Versailles nations of

that area were still developing relationships and borders among its
various institutions.
comprehend what

its

In this sense,
role

the military did not really

should be vis-a-vis

politics.

It often

overstepped its proper boundaries according to Western standards, thus
assisting the growth of authoritarian regimes.

Lithuania is one of

several examples of this phenomenon. 42
It should also be stressed, though, that interwar Lithuania was
not a developing system, as that term is used in contemporary scholarly
discourse.

While it was a reconstituted nation, carved out of the

defunct czarist empire, it possessed attributes which distinguish it
41 Case studies of all six types abound in the field of civilmili tary relations.
One comparative study which is perhaps best
described as a cross between interpretive and hypothesis-generating is
Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Toward
a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems, 11
American Political Sciep_sie Review, 76, 4 (December 1982), 778-789.
42 Perlmutter, p. 51 and Sarkesian, lecture, 6 November 1981
discuss the fundamental linkage between the modern authoritarian state
and the military. When the Lithuanian coup occured in December 1926,
many Lithuanian-Americans who had supported the new state morally and
materially became disenchanted. This was an example of Western liberal
standards of military conduct being applied to a non-Western, nonliberal context.
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from today's sub-Saharan nations, for example.

There was an intense

feeling of nationalism which found its roots in the Lithuanian kingdom
of the thirteenth century, and which had been growing since the latter
half

of

the

renaissance.

nineteenth

centry

during

the

Lithuanian

national

While possessing ethnic and religious minorities, there

were no major cleavages to be found as arise from the haphazardly drawn
boundaries of the old colonial empires.
infrastructure

and

educational

system,

refinement during the independence era.

There was also a developed
which

continued

growth

and

,While primarily an agrarian

country, Lithuania was nevertheless able to export agricultural goods
and develop light industry.

Thus while not a fully developed liberal

Western system, Lithuania leaned further toward that pole than toward
contemporary

developing

systems.

The

behavior

of

the

Lithuanian

military, however, did in some respects resemble that found in those
systems today.
Civil-military relations in independent Lithuania must not be
studied merely from a

domestic perspective.

There were legitimate

external factors requiring the military to be in .the forefront of public
affairs.

The country was located at a crucial and vulnerable juncture

of Eastern

Eur~pe.

and Poland.

There. were dangers from

tb~

Soviet Union, Germany,

As such, national security was very much on the minds of

politicians and citizens alike.
What also brought the military into public affairs was the
juxtaposition

of· the

professional ·military

mind. and ·the

volatile

political situation of 1926, both prior to and following the elections
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of the third Seimas on 8-10 May.

As the following chapter explains, the

elections were polarizing in that the new Social Democratic-Peasant
Populist coalition began instituting democratic reforms after six years
of conservative Christian Democratic rule and a bitter campaign.
perceived

these

debilitating.

moves

to

the

"left"

Violent clashes occured.

as

politically

and

Many

socially

Lithuania, which did not have a

democratic tradition, simply could not adapt to the sudden political
change.

New civil liberties were quickly taken advantage of by radical

elements.

It was obvious to many -- including army officers -- that the

consensus and compromise needed for a successful democracy necessarily
led

to degeneration and disorder.

The coup of 17 December 1926,

sponsored and encouraged by the minority Nationalist Association, was an
attempt

at

creating

a

Lithuanian

Leviathan

to

accordance with norms of the military mind.

restore

order

in

Hobbesian conservative

realism was the philosophy of the Lithuanian officer corps -- as it is,
to a greater or lesser extent, that of any corps.
Huntington posited two imperatives, functional and societal, in
describing the tension between purely external military matters and the
socio-economic-pol! ti cal context.

This same tension was present in

Lithuania during the Smetona regime and immediately preceding it, that
is,

the

unstable

seven

month

tenure

administration and the third Seimas.
politicization of
objective

civilian

of

as

a

Grinius-Slezevicius

This, too, is the arena where the

the military is easiest.
control

the

remedy.

Huntington recommended
However,

such

military

neutrality and sterility vis-a-vis politics did not exist under Smetona,
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though Commander-in-Chief General Stasys Rastikis would make efforts to
De facto, even if it would have supposedly

achieve such conditions.

been neutral, the Lithuanian army was a prop to the status quo as long
as

Smetona

ruled,

for

he

initially

assumed

power

through

extra-

constitutional means. 43
The behavior of the Lithuanian officer corps did not even meet
the standards of non-partisanship as set forth by Janowitz.
discussed

in

this

study,

different

officers

supported

As will be
different

political leaders and their respective factions:
The army, commanded by veterans of the war of independence,
represented, in a sense, the repository of Lithuanian nationalism,
and was thus the natural sponsor of an administration whose first
watchword was the defense of the national cause abroad, particularly
against Poland, and at home, against Communism, national minorities,
and any government whose "weakness" might expose the country to
external dangers. At the same time, the army was not of one mind in
the actual policies to be followed. The older officers, trained in
the Russian Imperial Army, tended to be more conservative and
cautious in the pursuit of these general aims, while a younger group,
which rallied around · Voldemaras, • wa.s more openly anti-Polish and
anti-minority, and more in favor of the institutions of Fascism as
the best framework for the national mission of the state. The former
group in general concurred with the policies of the Smetona
government; the latter found those policies too cautious and more
than once •
• at tempted to overthrow it.
Smetona, therefore,
enjoye~
important, but not unanimous support from the military
group. 4
This

politicization and polarization of the officer corps reflects

general politico-military tendencies in authoritarian contexts.

While

43cf. Janowitz above.
44 Benedict V. Maciuika, ed., Lithuania in the Last 30 Years,
Subcontractor's monograph prepared in the Division of the Social
Sciences at the University of Chicago. HRAF Subcontract HRAF-1 Chi-1
(New Haven, CT: Human Relations Area Files, 1955), p. 58.
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Palmer

here

writes

of

developing

areas,

the

same

holds

true

for

Smetona's·Lithuania:
Given the. winner-ta.ke-all nature of political conflict
,
distrust between diverse ideological and parochial factions within
the military often generates the very real fear that successful
political intervention by one faction will result in efforts to
eliminate the major competing factions.
Counte4~oups, therefore,
often are perceived in terms of self-preservation.
In the period 1927-1940, opponents of the Smetona regime, often backed
by the appropriate faction within the officer corps, attempted thirteen
revolts.

The 1926 coup, thus, did not solve the problems of partisan

politics which

it

had

set

out

to eliminate.

Indeed

it may have

exacerbated them. 46
On the other hand, Smetona stayed in power partially due to the
military' s support.

This reflects other politico-military tendencies.

One scholar writes that the military in authoritarian systems sees to it
that interelite struggles remain within the boundaries of the ruling
party.

It does not usually intervene against the party, but supports a

particular faction in the internal power struggle.

Indeed without the

military or with a neutral military, an opposing faction may refuse to
surrender,

leading

to

debilitating

-- possible

bloody

-- results.

Military intervention is thus less of a threat to the ruling elite than
from civilian political challenges. 47 When studying post-coup political

45Palmer, p. 215.
46 cf. Nordlinger, p. 209 where he writes of the confidence the
opposition possesses in carrying out countercoups.
47Perlmutter, pp. 52, 56.
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dynamics, it is possible to discern two primary factions within the
ruling

Nationalist

Association:

the

Smetona

supporters

and

those

following the right-wing radical Professor Augustinas Voldemaras.
will be discussed in chapter four,

Vol~emaras'

faction made several

attempts to depose, or at least weaken, Smetona;
for

Voldemaras'

materialize.
eventually

return

This
accepted

to

power

faction was
Smetona's

a

~his

return

relatively small,
more

stable

As

and

to pave the way

which

would

never

for most officers
moderate

course

in

domestic and foreign affairs.
Extreme

politicization

of

intervention in the political arena.

the

military

may

lead

to

its

As was discussed above, this most

likely occurs during a period of extreme political crisis when domestic
disturbances spill over into the military.
the

Grinius-Slezevicius

chapter.

administration

Such a crisis occured during
discussed

in

the

following

This short-lived political leadership failed in dealing with

disorder created by radical elements, especially the communists, and
alienated a substantial segment of the officer corps by threatening
budget and personnel cuts,
deemed imcompetent.

along with actual discharges of officers

The administration thus set the stage for its own

downfall in a highly charged atmosphere.
threat

to

corporate

interests,

Domestic disorder and the

coupled with

encouragement

from the

Nationalists, spurred some officers to act against the government.

The

perceived loss of governmental legitimacy in the eyes of the public was
the rationale for that action.48
The coup, regardless of detail, resembled a standard coup.

The
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Kaunas garrison carried it out rather easily since it was a concentrated
Provincial uni ts were powerless to act since their commanding

force.

officers were interned in the capital during President Grinius' birthday
festivities.

The lightning speed with which the conspirators carried

out their plans prevented a civil war.

A civil war was also averted

perhaps because the population breathed a sigh of relief at the change
and the perceived turn toward stability and order.
The Lithuanian army, however, did not rule.

The following day

power was turned over to Smetona, who was installed as president at a
rump session of the Seimas on 19 December.

Succeeding events render it

difficult to classify the military's role in politics.

Just as it is

difficult to describe Smetona 's regime utilizing standard nomenclature
in chapter four,

the same holds true for the military.

It did not

appear to be even a moderating veto group, to use Nordlinger's taxonomy,
though

it

associated
five.

did

experience

with

the

divisiveness

politico-military

and
duties

political

difficulties

described

in

chapter

Yet, it appears that the army was not acting on its own here, but

on orders of the civilian leadership, seeking to maintain order through
the district military command system.
the

government,

not

throughout the study.
senior officers.
chief

of

the

vice

versa,

The military was thus a tool of

though

the

tensions

are

obvious

There were still challenges, even from the most

For example, General Stasys Rastikis, commander-inarmy

1935-1940,

is

48cf. Nordlinger, pp. 63-66.

described

as

both

a

force

for
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authoritarianism and democracy in chapter seven.
One thread which runs throughout this study is the tension and
ambivalence among the politicians, the military, and the president who
was head of both.

Perhaps the only factor which guaranteed the relative

obedience and trustworthiness of the military, along with civil rule,
was the allegiance to both the person and office of the commander-inohief, President Antanas Smetona.

As Janowitz writes, "this image of

personalized allegiance helps to make military honor compatible with
civilian supremacy." 49
The following chapter deals with the rise of this focus of
allegiance.

----------------49

Janowitz, The frofessional:__Soldier, P.• 220.

CHAPTER III
SMETONA ASSUMES POWER
A. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GRINIUS ADMINISTRATION
In order to fully understand civil-military relations during the
regime of President Antanas Smetona, it is necessary to begin with the
coup d'etat of 17 December 1926, in which the military dramatically
entered the sphere of politics for the first time.
1926, elections for the third Seimas were held.
least, divisive.

In the spring of

They were, to say the

Many write that the elections were conducted outside

the bounds of decency as factions smeared and libeled each other, with
the result of sharply polarizing Lithuanian society along political and
class lines.

The results of the voting are found in Table 3.1.

As had been the case throughout the period of independence, the
Nationalists were not recipients of a
Further,

no

.

Populists and

party

had

Social

an

significant number of votes.

absolute majority.

Democrats had

should circumstances permit.

However,

the

Peasant,

previously agreed to a coalition

This was exactly what was done as Peasant

Populist Kazys Grinius, a medical doctor, former prime minister, and
long-time

political

activist,

was

elected

president by the

Seimas,

replacing Christian Democrat Aleksandras Stulginskis after six years of
rule.

Grini us, in turn, selected Peasant Populist Mykolas Slezevicius,

an attorney, to form a cabinet.
The new cabinet, headed by the Populist leader Mykolas Slezevicius,
an energetic and idealistic stalwart of Lithuanian politics, who had

30
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TABLE 3.1: THE THIRD SEIMAS OF LITHUANIA MAY 1926-APRIL 1927
Number of seats
Faction
14
Christ.tan Democratic
Farmers Association
11
Labor Federation
5
Christian Democratic bloc
30
---22
Peasant Populist
Social Democratic
15
2
Lithuanian Farmers Party
Nationalist Association
3
13•
Minorities

*This included three communists
Klaipeda Territory (Memel).

and

five

Percentage of vote
16.4
12.9
5.7
35.3
25.8
17.6
2.3
3.5
15.3

representatives from the

Source: Kazys Grinius, Aeie 1926 m. a_ruodzio 17-os dienos perversma (On
the C~ of 17 December 1926) (Chicago: Chicago Lithuanian Literary
Society, 1954), p. 226.

---·

________ ___
,
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headed a differently constituted coalition Cabinet during the
dangerous years of the wars of independence ( 1919-21), immediately
proceeded to reward coalition partners and supporters and initiated
or planned a number of policies designed to cut expenditures;
unfortunately, these seemed (and some were) devised to redress the
domestic balance of power, which until then had favored the Christian
Democrats. Some of the measures were intended to normalize certain
democratic procedures. However, these policies estranged influential
segments of society and irritated the citizenry, thus producing
effects quite contrary to those intended,
For example, the
elimination of restraints on th~ right of assembly and on the press,
which dated back to the war period of 1920, and an amnesty for
prisoners convicted for violation of these restraints benefited the
Communist Party almost exclusively. Its activities now aroused fears
of Communist domination, especially sin.ce the Social Democratic
Minister of the Interior, in the name of freedom, even allowed
attacks on, and blackmail of, law-enforcement agencies. These fears
were intensified by plans, advocated primarily by the Social
Democratic coalition partner, to reconsider the place of religion in
the schools • • • , to discontinue the clergy's salaries, and even to
cut the size of the Church's landholdings. The dissatisfaction of
the clergy and other groups with these developments, and with
radically Leftist tendencies generally, was shared by many Army
officers, who feared not only the regime's Leftism, but also for
plans in the reduction in the armed forces, which they considered a
threat to national security.
Finally, the coalition incurred
universal disfavor by allowing an increase of Polish schools • • • as
a reward for Polish support. This favoritism was shown at a time
when the Polish Government was closing down Lithuanian schools in the
occupied Vilnius region; the country was very angry. These anxieties
and emotions easily engulfed the youth, who began demonstrations
against the government, and by the fall of 1926, the country was a
powder keg. 1
Graham also c::t.tes a crop failure and renewed economic depression as
additional components of the Lithuanian political crisis of 1926. 2
The

military

directly

Slezevicius government.

felt

the

hand

of

the

reform-minded

It had become established practice that with

1v. Stanley Vardys, "Independent Lithuania: A Profile," in
Lithuania Under the Soviets: Portrait of a Nation, 1940-65, ed. V.
Stanley Vardys (New-York: 'Praeser;-i'"9b5f;-PP• 34-35. 2Malbone W. Graham, Jr., ~Governments of Eastern Euroee (New
York: Henry Holt, 1927), p. 403.
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each cabinet change, a new defense minister and chief of staff were also
Since

appointed.

cabinets

in

Lithuania

alternated

relatively

frequently, this created instability in military leadership and progress
was

next

to

impossible.

Lieutenant

Colonel· Juozas

Papeckys,

an

attorney, was appointed defense minister and Lieutenant Colonel Kazys
Skirpa took the post of chief of staff. 3

Skirpa, a recent graduate of

the Belgian Military Academy, possessed a number of ideas for military
reform, some of which elicited opposition from his fellow officers. 4
Skirpa took swift action to dismiss incompetent officers.

About ten

officers were almost immediately discharged to the reserve, including
two officers with prestige earned in the wars of independence: Colonel
Vincas

Grigaliunas-Glovackis

and

General

Kazys

officers soon realized that only a change

Ladiga.

Some senior

in government would save

them.5
The Slezevicius government was a budget-cutting one.

Papeckys

and Skirpa spoke of reducing the army in size by one-third one-half.

even

Concern grew, especially among aviation· officers who earned

high pay and a pen.sion after only ten years of service. 6

However,

3stasys Rastikis, Kovose del Lietuvos: Kario atsiminimai (In the
Battles for Lithuania: A Soldier's Reminiscences) (Los Angeles: Lietuviu
dienos I Lithuanian Days, 1956), I, 202.
4Albertas Gerutis, "Independent Lithuania," in
Years, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Manyland, 1969), p. 220.

Lithuania 700

.
. ~Grinius, pp., . 245-?46. ·Smetana, upon returning to power, would
return b.oth ]Den. ·to t.he regular army •.
6Konstantinas Zukas, Zvilgsnis i praeiti: Zmogaus ir kario
atsiminimai. Med ziaga istorikams (A Glance at the Past: A Person's and
Soldier's Reminiscences.
Material for Historians) (Chicago: Terra'·

.

;
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another author writes that charges of the army being greatly reduced and
a large number of officers discharged were false. 7

Nevertheless, fear

on the part of officers was justifiable in light of statements made by
some radical members of the Seimas.
Steponas
demand

Kairys,

to

who declared

reduce

that

the military is

One of them was Social Democrat
he was an

antimilitarist:

just a minimal one.

"'The

The Social

Democrats seek the complete elimination of the military.' "8
It was not sufficient for officers to have knowledge of an
agreement between the Social

Democrats and Peasant Populists not to

inject politics into decisions involving military policy.
feared

military reform

reconvening in

the

fall

legislation
of

1926.

prepared

for

Among other

Seimas
aims,

They still
action

upon

it sought the

reduction of the influence of opposition parties in the military.

As

opposed to most of his colleagues, Skirpa, the chief of staff, felt that
reforms were strengthening the military, not decimating it.9
The official state of war which had existed in Lithuania ever
since

the

wars

of

independence

eliminated by the third Seimas.

even

during

peacetime

was

It had been both an embarrassment and

1959), pp. 456-457.
7Antanas Rukas, ed., Mykolas Slezevicius (Chicago: Terra, 1954),
p. 161.

~.K., Valstybininkas politikos sukuriuose: Prelatas Mykolas
Krupavicius 1885-1970 (Statesman in the Whirlwind of Politics: Prelate
Mykolas Krupavicius 1885-1970) (Chicago: Pope Leo XIII Fund, 1980),
p. 106.
9Rukas, pp. 243-246, 251.
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burden to the district military commandants, charged with carrying out
its provisions of censorship and political restraint.

This inevitably

brought them and the rest of the officer corps into politics, though
perhaps unwillingly.

However, the elimination of the state of war was

brought on too suddenly, without adequate provision for administrative
transitory phases or machinery. 10
the government

This only served to contribute to the

impression

that

had

country.

This was especially due

lost effective control over the
to

increased communist activity,

including various incidents, harassment, demonstrations,
assaults.

General

Sta sys

and physical

Rastikis writes that he began carrying a

revolver in his pocket for the purpose of self-protection, though he was
never the victim of any incident. 11
There was
ignoring

a

criminal

utilizing

perception that
behavior

physical

demonstrators. 12

force

by
to

the

leftist
disperse

government and

police were

groups,

occasionally

while

anti-communist

students

and

There were also rumors that Interior Minister Vladas

Pozela, a Social Democrat, was actually a closet communist.

Many of the

old

Stulginskis

Christian

Democrat

civil

administration were dismissed.
the

provinces

tainty. 13

and

the

It should

servants

hired during

the

All of this served to decrease morale in

military,

and

increase

feelings

of

uncer-

be noted, though, that anger was not directed

10 Rukas, pp. 148, 247.
11Rastikis, I, pp. 202-203.
12Rasti ki s, I, pp. 202-203 ~
1

3sa~

c•. Sark~sian

finds that people cannot long operate in such
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personally at Grinius or
patriotic

service

to

Slezevicius,

Lithuania,

but

who both had
that

long records of

general

discontent

response to government inaction against disorder. 14

was

a

Many feared that

the Slezevicius government would follow the same destructive road as had
Kerensky's provisional government in Russia in 1917.

Of the many fears,

the triumph of bolshevik elements in Lithuania was the greatest. 15
A major

event

on

the

road

toward

the coup d'etat

rightist student demonstration of 21 November .1926.
the

Nationalist

Association

and

was the

It was organized by

included members of the

Catholic Federation "Ateitis" and "Meo-Lithuania."

Lithuanian

Over two thousand

participants listened to anti-government speeches and cheers.

They then

marched to the War Museum to honor the Unknown Soldier and sing the
National Anthem.

En route, the mounted police, administratively under

the Interior Ministry, attacked the demonstrators with truncheons.

Some

police officers entered the grounds of the museum, but its director, the
popular Brigadier General Vladas Nagius-Nagevicius, ordered them out.
The

University of Kaunas

condemning
Christian

interpellation
Democratic

bloc,

Senate condemned this
was
the

made

in

the

Nationalists,

police action

Seimas,
and

signed

the Farmers

and
by

a

the

Party.

an atmosphere and are increasingly disposed to use drastic measures to
eliminate it.
Cf. various lectures at Loyola University of Chicago
1981-1985.
14 Rastikis, I, pp. 202-203.
15Rapolas Ski pi tis, Nepriklausoma Lietuva statant: Atsiminimai
(Building Independent Lithuania: Reminiscences) (Chicago: Terra, 1961),
p. 414.
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National sentiment was overwhelmingly in favor of the students, though
in his memoirs, President Grinius writes that they behaved poorly and
chose to fight the police. 16
Did the Grinius administration lose its legitimacy in the eyes
An interesting parallel may be drawn to Chile with

of Lithuanians?

regard to the perception of disorder:
In Chile in 1972 and 1973, the long and devastating strikes by the
Confederation of Truck Owners against the Allende government created
shortages in food and raw materials throughout the nation, which
initially encouraged the government to bring the military officers
into the cabinet and later played an imP.ortant role in the breakdown
of legitimacy preceding a military coup. 17
Disorder contributes to feelings in favor of regime change -- drastic,
if necessary.

It

is here where,

just as in Chile, the Lithuanian

military stepped into the political arena.
B. THE COUP D'ETAT OF 17 DECEMBER 1926
Despite the fact that the Lithuanian army was a relatively small
one, the officers involved in the overthrow plot realized the advantages
of such size with regard to political change,
context

where

the

populace

is

seeking

relief.

especially witbin a
"If

the

civilian

16 Grinius, pp. 254-255; M. K., pp. 16-17; Aleksandras Merkelis,
Antanas Smetona: -!~~!suo~~,!line, kulturine J:!:_p_?litine veikla (Antanas
Smetona: His Social, Cultural, and Political Activjty) (New York:
American Lithuanian-National-Association, 191'4), ·pp. ·31 -319, Zukas, pp.
457-458. See Petras Maldeikis, Ml.,_kolas Krueavicius (Chicago: Lithuanian
Christian Democratic Association, 1975), p. 187 for an account of the
breakup of the demonstration and Rukas, pp. 155-158 for the government's
version of the events.
17Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Come_ara~
Politics: System, Process, and Policy.
An Anal~tic Study, 2nd ed.
(Boston:- Little, Brown,--1978), p. 88.
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population is indifferent or disaffected, even a very small military can
overthrow a civilian government.

Indeed, it may be easier for officers

to organize discontent in a smaller military organization." 18

Even

prior to the elections of May 1926, the problematic nature of military
loyalty was

brought

Nationalists and

out

Peasant

in a

meeting

Populists.

between

delegations

of

the

Kazys Grinius asked Professor

Augustinas Voldemaras, an extremist Nationalist, if the military would
obey the Nationalists.
is ours." 19

Voldemaras reportedly responded, "Yes, the army

Nevertheless, once in power, Grinius and the government did

not heed such warnings, for they did not think the Nationalists could
actually carry out a coup.20
The Christian Democrats, who were ousted from power in the
elections of 1926, were also partially to blame for the politicization
of the military.

The Christian Democratic press savagely attacked the

new military leadership, while the military itself was unable to respond
either in the press or the political arena.

The military did bring

lawsuits in some cases in which it felt it had been libeled, but such
procedures took time -- time in which attacks in the press continued.
Defense Minister

Papeckys

even went

to

the

extreme

legislation whereby press courts would be established.

of suggesting
They would have

18Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics, p. 133.
19Maldeikis, p. 193.
See also Mykolas Krupavicius, "1926 m.
gruodzio septynioliktoji," ("17 December 1926"), Draugas, 6 December
1956, p. 3.
20arinius, pp. 256-257.
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three members representing the government, the press, and the judiciary
utilizing simpler procedures so that cases could be decided in a matter
of days.

However, this never came to pass. In addition, the Christian

Democrats attempted to bring into their fold any officer who had been
dismissed by his new superiors or who had been punished for violations
of military discipline.

The aim: To hurt the authority and legitimacy

of the new military leadership, and to set the officer corps against the
government.

Indeed, one author writes that the

major~ty

of the Central

Committee of the Christian Democratic Party was of the opinion that the
Grinius-Slezevicius administration must be forcibly ousted. 21
Reverend Mykolas Krupavicius, a former agriculture minister in a
Christian Democratic government,

was reportedly twice approached by

Antanas Merkys, a Nationalist attorney, to seek support for the coup.
In his memoirs, Krupavicius writes that he refused to participate on
both

occasions. 22

According

to

Petras

Maldeikis,

Krupavicius'

biographer, General Kazys Ladiga, who had been replaced by Colonel Kazys
Skirpa as chief of staff, went to Krupavicius complaining that he had
been removed from the circle of officers plotting the coup because he
was perceived to be a Christian Democrat and belonged to the "Ateitis"
Catholic Federation.

Krupavicius replied

that

support the idea of overthrowing the government.

the

party does not

He advised Ladiga not

to participate and go to his farm in the Birzai district; Ladiga took

21 zukas, p. 459.
22M. K. , pp. 17-1 8 •

See also Rukas, pp. 248-249.
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Krupavicius became fearful that Lithuania would go the

this advice.

route of a South American dictatorship. 23

Nevertheless, many of the

functionaries in the Internal Security Department were holdovers from
the Christian Democratic era and had not yet been replaced by the new
government.

It is quite conceivable that they would not have hindered

coup efforts. 24
Events had led to a situation where high-ranking officials in
the Defense Ministry had no authority or respect among the officer
Further, they had seemingly little, if any, knowledge of the

corps.

unrest occuring within the military. 25

In response to questioning by

Seimas Defense Committee member Aleksandras Stulginskis, Chief of Staff
Colonel Skirpa replied that the military was trustworthy. 26
occasion,

however,

during

the

debate

On another

over military reductions,

an

officer told Seimas deputy Rapolas Skipitis that the Seimas will not
reduce the military, but that the military will reduce the Seimas. 27
was,

after all,

threats.

It

not surprising that military men would make such

The precedent was broken on 22-23 February 1920 when a portion

of the Kaunas garrison revolted over conditions -- and fired erratic
23Maldeikis, pp. 195-196.
24 J. Sarunas, Gruodzio 17 dienos perversmas (The Coup of
December 17) (n.p.: Lietuvos demokratijos draugai I Lithuanian Frl-eriCiS
of Democracy, 1927), p. 5.
25 Sarunas, P• 4 •
26 Rukas, p. 256.
27Merkelis, pp.
Lietuva Statant, p. 415.

320-321.

See also Skipitis,

Nepriklausoma
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artillery rounds into the city. 28

Nevertheless,

Slezevicius trusted

the military, thinking it incapable of extreme political acts.
that officers

and

enlisted

personnel

would

come

He felt

to him with their

problems as they had done when he served as prime minister in 1919. 2 9
The only trouble Slezevicius foresaw was political, not military.
intended to clean radical socialists out of the government
coup was to carry this task out for him. 30
Interior

Ministry

surveillance

of

~

He

though the

Ironically, he cancelled

suspicious

officers,

citing

its

undemocratic nature.
There were three groups of politicized officers.

The first and

largest consisted of those who sympathized with the Christian Democratic
bloc.

The

second

was

of

the

opinion

that

Antanas

nationalist, was the politician most able to restore order.

Smetona,

a

He had an

excellent . reputation based on his performance as first president in
1919-1920.

The third and smallest group consisted of supporters of

Professor Augustin as Voldemaras, an ultra-Nationalist.
group was the most active and radica1.3 1

This right-wing

On 20 September 1926, a small

2 8Skipitis, Nepriklausoma Lietuva Statant, pp. 177-192 writes of
the revolt.
A. Novai tis was one of the officers placed under house
arrest by the rebels.
However, the leaders of the Kaunas revolt were
mainly civilians and former NCOs of the Czarist army.
Of the thirty
arrested and sentenced, only seven possessed Lithuanian surnames. See
his 11 1920 metu kareiviu sukilimas" (The Soldiers' Revolt of 1920"),
Karys, April 1961, pp. 103-106.
29Rukas, p. 326.
30M.K., p. 10.
6
31Rapolas
Skipitis,
Nepriklausoma
Lietuva:
Atsiminimai
(Independent Lithuania: Reminiscences),
(Chicago: Draugas,
1967),
pp. 110-111 •
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group of young officers, headed by Aviation Captain Antanas Maciuika,
formed a committee to plot the coup.

The committee, which included

officers representing the Nationalists and Christian Democrats, decided
to ask Smetona to be the new president.3 2

Colonel Vladas Skorupskis, a

graduate of the Prague General Staff Academy, headed a group

ho~sed

in

the Senior Officer Courses responsible for planning the coup.33
Though the officers were patriots who meant no harm to the
country, they were inexperienced in politics and affairs of state.

They

had forgotten that those presently at the head of the military and
government were experienced patriots who had saved Lithuania during the
wars of independence in 1918-1920.

Indeed, it had been Slezevicius who

called for volunteers to defend the nation in late 1919.

The officers

had become blind tools of the opposition parties.3 4
Those who master-minded th~ coup were better able to recruit
junior officers.

Senior officers viewed affairs of state with a cooler,

more pragmatic eye.

Only a few senior officers whose careers were

foundering or who were inclined to intrigue cooperated with disloyal
elements.

Even Major Povilas Plechavicius, who would be invited to act

as dictator during and immediately following the coup, wavered prior to
32Skipitis, Nepriklausoma Lietuva, pp. 110-112.
Ski pi tis
believes that Smetona himself devised the title "Tautos Vadas"
("Nation's Leader"). 33E. Dirvele, Klasiu kova Lietuvoje 1926 metais (Class Conflict
in Lithuania 1926) (Vilnius: State Political and Scientific Press,
1961), p. 171; Zukas, p. 458.
34Rukas, pp. 252-253.
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joining the plotters. 35

Most officers in the Kaunas garrison did not

participate in the coup.

They were concerned that a coup would invite

counter-coups, perhaps a civil war -- even invasion by Poland.36
What was the role of the Nationalist Association in the coup?
The Nationalists, who had early expressed ambivalence toward agrarian
and social reform, also possessed a lack of close contact with the Roman
Catholic clergy.
agrarian and
people.

Consequently, because the country was overwhelmingly

Catholic,

the Association had 1i ttle support among the

This is reflected in their poor showing in all three Seimas

elections.

However, because of its elitist, nationalistic stance, and

because a nationalist president ruled during the wars of independence,
the Nationalist Association had a good deal of influence among army
officers.37

The Nationalists cultivated support within

corps by accentuating patriotism. 38
writes

that

the

Nationalists
anarchists

who

were
awoke

the officer

In defending the coup,
not
the

its

initiators;

nation

and

it

stirred

Jakstas
was
it

the

communists

and

to

action.39

Be that as it may, it is widely believed that coup officers

35Rukas, p. 254.
36Rastikis, I, p. 206.
37Kazys Pakstas, Lithuania and World War II (Chicago: Lithuanian
Cultural Institute, 1947) p. 20.
38Rukas, pp. 238-239.
39Juozas Jakstas, "Tautos pazangos partijos-Lietuviu tautininku
sajungos istorijos bruozai 1916-1940 11 ("An Historical Sketch of the
National Progress Party-Lithuanian Nationalist Association 1916-1940 11 ) ,
in Tautines minties keliu: . J..ietuviu tautininkijos istoriniai bruozai
(Path of National Thought: Historical Sketch of Lithuanian Nationalism)
Eds. Jonas Puzinas and Jonas Pranas Palukaitis.
(Chicago:
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made contact with Smetona long before 17 December 1926, and that the
officers would not have carried out the coup if it were not for the
encouragement of the Nationalists. 40
As

was

mentioned

above,

the

new

military

leadership

had

dismissed Colonel Vincas Grigaliunas-Glovackis, a Christian. Democrat who
had distinguished himself during the wars of independence.
1926,

along with

Reserve Captain

In October

Pranas Klimaitis and Reserve Major

Juozas Tomkus, he began editing and publishing Tautos Valia (National
Will) in Kaunas.

It was ideologically opposi tionist, anti-cormnunist,

and occasionally fascist.
government.

It exhorted the people to actively oppose the

Following publication of the eighth issue, the paper was

banned and Grigaliunas-Glovackis was placed in the Kaunas hard labor
prison. 41

Prior to his silencing, though, he was involved in a secret

conference at the offices of the Christian Democratic publication Rytas
(Morning)

on

representatives

16
of

October
the

1926.

Christian

Among

other

Democratic

participants

Party,

the

were

Nationalist

Association, and the commanding officer of the second infantry regiment,
Colonel Jonas Petruitis.

This was one of many meetings to coordinate

the coup. 42
It was soon an open secret.

The coup officers began spreading

American Lithuanian National Association, 1979), pp. 121-122.
40Merkelis, p. 327; Sarunas, p. 11.
41D.irve1 e, p. 167; Merkelis, p. 318.
42Dirvele, pp. 170-171.
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rumors that Poland was preparing for an invasion of Lithuania and that
the military leadership was doing nothing to counteract it.

General

Ladiga and Major Plechavicius reported to Chief of Staff Colonel Skirpa
that Polish troops were massing in the east at the demarcation line;
this despite the fact that Section Two reported no such movement. 43

A

number of junior officers wished to speak with Skirpa to investigate
whether

there was

force.

a method to alter the situation short of armed

However, Nationalist Antanas Merkys urged them not to do so, for

that ~ould ruin the plot. 44

General Teodoras Daukantas would visit the

editorial offices of Lietuvos Aidas (Lithuania's Echo) and infQrm the
editors of coup preparations.

Yet, Prime Minister Slezevicius trusted

the ability of the military leadership to see that military discipline
was maintained. 45

This is amazing considering the mounting evidence~

evidence which should have been greeted with more decisive action on the
part of the government.
prime

minister's

government,
justice.

office

Slezevicius
A former

One example of evidence may be found in the
itself.
was

also

In

addition

minister

of

to

being

foreign

head

affairs

of
and

Christian Democratic minister experiencing legal

difficulties approached Slezevicius with a proposal.

He would give the

government a list of conspirators in return for favorable treatment;
Slezevicius refused.46

Chief of Staff Skirpa was

also apparently

43 Rukas, p. 257.
Section Two was the equivalent of the U.S.
Army's intelligence branch, G-2.
44 Rukas, pp. 272-273.
45Rukas, p. 314.
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unwilling to take action beyond warnings and reminders of an officer's
honor and duty to obey the elected political leadership.
number

of officers
with

involved
discipline.

and

informed

politics;

them

punishment

that

they

would

He summoned a

should

follow

not

become

breaches

of

Skirpa also requested the Lithuanian National Guard,

a

civilian militia, to report on events and morale in the provinces. 47
However, it was too late.
17 December

The road to coup had already been paved.

1926 marked President Grinius' sixtieth birthday.

The commanding officers of all major units stationed throughout the
country were gathered in Kaunas on the previous evening in preparation
for the next day's celebration.

In this way, they were able to be

interned, preventing organized resistance from provincial units. 48

At a

meeting held on 16 December, only one officer, Colonel Oskaras Urbonas,
the commander of the fourth artillery regiment in Vilkaviskis, spoke of
a potential revolt within the army itself
the Nationalists and Christian Democrats.
garrison,

~

a revolt being organized by

Then, on behalf of the Kaunas

spoke Colonel Jonas Petruitis, the commander of the second

infantry regiment.

He

stat~d

that the men in Kaunas were absolutely

trustworthy and that no revolt was being organized.

Ironically, it was

Petrui tis, a Christian Democratic sympathizer, who would lead his men
against the government several hours later.

4 6Grinius, pp. 255-256.
47 Rukas, pp. 250, 255.
48Dirvele, pp. 174-175.

Defense Minister Papeckys

47
and Colonel Skirpa calmed the officers down, but did not issue any
orders to quell potential stirrings, for despite reports of low morale
and opposition, the commanding officers also stated that the army will
continue to obey. 49
For purposes of this presentation, it is not necessary to enter
into details of the actual coup. 50

It had been agreed in advance that

Major Povilas Plechavicius would act as the dictator during the coup and
in the interim period afterward. 5 1

In the early morning hours of 17

49Rastikis, I, pp. 203-204.
50see Vladas Krivickas, The Coup d'etat of 1926 in Lithuania,
Diss. Columbia University 1970 for a comprehensive presentation.
See
also Algis Budreckis, "Gruodzio 17 d. perversmas" ("The Coup 'of 17
December"), Karys, December 1962, pp. 290-293; P. Genys, 11 Atsimin1mai
is 1926 metu gruodzio 17 dienos" ("Reminiscences from 17 December
1926"), Karys, December 1962, p. 294; and.various articles in The New
York Times, 18 December 1926. Grinius, ipp. 251-266; Rukas, pp. 258-267;
Petras Stravinskas, Atsiminimai ir easaulezvalga: Rastai ir credo.
Antra knyga (Reminiscences and Worldview: 'Writings and Credo.
Second
Book) (Chicago: Committee to Publish P. Stravinskas' Works, 1982), pp.
30-32; and Bronius Balutis in Vytautas Sirvydas, ed., Bronius Kazys
Balutis: Jo yvenimas ir darbai (Bronius Kaz s Balutis: His Life and
Work)· (Sodus,
I: J. J. Bachunas, 1951 ) ', pp. 89-95 write of their
experiences during the coup. . Aviation Lieu.tenant Steponas Darius
recalls his participation in the coup in Petras Jurgela, Sparnuoti
lietuviai: Darius ir Girenas.
Ju gyvenimas ir pirmasis lietuviu
skridimas per Atlanta is Amerikos Lietuvon (Winged Lithuanians: Darius
and Girenas. Their Lives and the First Lithuanian Transatlantic Flight
From America to Lithuania) (Chicago: Vincas & Konstancija-Kotryna
Stulpinas, 1935), pp. 99-103.
Photographs taken after the coup
depicting tanks, patrols, and the coup officers with members of the new
government are in Jurgela and Pauli us Jurkus, Gen. Povilas Plechavicius
(Brooklyn: Karys, 1978), pp. 35-36, 41; and P. Jurgelevicius, Kauno karo
komendatura 1919-1929 (Kaunas Military Commandery 1919-1929) (Kaunas:
Kaunas Municipal and District Commandery, 1930), pp. 31, 37.
51 He first had to be released from the guardhouse during the
initial stages of the coup.
Different sources place him in the
guardhouse for various reasons at the order of different superior
officers.
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December 1926, the men of the second infantry regiment were awakened by
an

alarm

and

government.

informed

that

the

bolsheviks

were

provided by the

professed

the

The presidential residence, the Seimas building and other

vital centers had to be surrounded and "protected."
was

threatening

his

commanding officer,

men's

loyalty

but

This information

Colonel Petrui tis,

several

hours

before.

who had
Colonel

Grigaliunas-Glovackis, the editor of Nation's Will, was released from
the Kaunas hard labor prison and named the commanding officer of the
Kaunas garrison.

Aviation Captain Antanas Maciuika and several dozen

officers dispersed the Seimas, which was in the midst of late night
budget

debates.

Aviation,

cavalry,

and

armored units participated,

assuming control over strategic centers in Kaunas.

They were assisted

by students from the University of Kaunas who were members of opposition
groups, namely the

11

Atei tis" Catholic Federation and the "Neo-Lithuani&1t

Nationalist Fraternity.

In response, Chief of Staff Colonel Skirpa led

approximately eighty military policemen in opposition to the coup -with shots fired. 52

Nevertheless, Skirpa was captured.

Military

(Laikinoji

Government

Karo

dictatorship of Major Plechavicius.

Valdzia)

provisional

government

were

formed

under

the

Lithuania was declared to be in a

state of war, Kaunas under a state of siege.
the

was

A Provisional

to

be

Those who refused to obey
turned

over

to

military

tribunals.53
52The popular version of the coup says that no shots were fired;
this is false. However, it was without bloodshed.
53Dirvele, p.
Zukas, pp. 459-460.

183; Merkelis, pp.

328-329; Rukas, pp.

160-161;
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President Grinius, with a tank in the yard of the presidential
residence, was awakened in the middle of the night by a lieutenant and
placed under house arrest.

Important members of the Seimas, along with

the entire cabinet, were placed under arrest and brought to military
headquarters.

The president of the Seimas, Dr. Jonas Staugaitis, was in

hiding and discovered only several days later.
to tender its resignation.
president.
officer

and

Plechavicius

The cabinet was ordered

Plechavicius advised Grinius to resign as

When Grinius informed him that he had broken his oath as an
advised

him

attempted

to

to

send

the

explain

men

back

to

Upon

himself.

the

barracks,

departing

the

presidential residence Plechavicius remarked that all that was left for
him to do was commit suicide.5 4

After visits from several influential

senior officers, including General Vlad as Nagius-Nagevicius, imploring
him to resign in the interest of the country and to avert a possible
invasion by Poland, Grinius agreed.
prime

minister,

Professor

t~at

He stipulated though,

Augustinas

Voldemaras,

sign

an

the new

affidavit

promising that he will act within the bounds. of the Constitution. 55
Grinius resigned after approving Voldemaras' cabinet.

This was his last

official act as president.
Military headquarters was in chaos.

The government was under

arrest and the coup officers were planning the future of the country

5 4Grinius, pp. 259-260; M. K., p. 122; Zukas, p. 460.
55This affidavit was to be broken many times.
p. 199.

See Maldeikis,
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along with representatives from the Nationalist Association and the
Christian Democratic Party.

The collectivity, with Stasys Silingas as

primary author, wrote a declaration, a public request by the military
government asking Smetona to assume the reins of government.
agreed in another declaration which they all helped write.

Smetana

The document

mentioned the association between Smetona and the officer corps dating
back to the wars of independence.5 6
That day,

17 December,

the Central Board of the Lithuanian

National Guard issued the following instructions to its members:
National Guardsmen of Lithuania!
The Central Board of the National Guard of Lithuania, keeping in
mind the new circumstances, having convened for a special
consultation, on 17 December 14:00 hours unanimously decided:
To order all National Guardsmen to remain calm and not take any
action without the knowledge of the Central Board, remembering that
our spiritual calm carries over into Lithuania's calm;
to remind National Guardsmen that Lithuania's external enemy
[Poland] is especially dangerous now. Therefore all National Guardsmen must be especially vigilant and prepared to defend Lithuania's
borders at every hour.~7
The. same day, the commanding officers assembled for President Grinius'
birthday were informed of what had occurred and instructed to return to
their units and carry on.58

Nevertheless, during officers' mess at the

second infantry regiment that morning, one officer loudly exclaimed:
"Men, what good have we done?
ment 11159

We have overthrown our legal govern-

Many officers who had participated in the coup later regretted

-----------------

5~erkelis, pp. 329-330, 338.

57Jonas Matusas, Sauliu Sajungos istorija (History of the
National Guard); 2nd ed. (Sydney, Australia: Mirttis, 1966), p. 196.
58Merkelis, p. 329.
59zukas, pp. 460-461.
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their

actions.

Indeed

Major

Plechavicius,

the

interim

dictator,

apologized to former Prime Minister Slezevicius, even offering to stage
a counter-coup; Slezevicius refused.60
Slezevicius later informed General Nagius-Nagevicius that the
enlisted men were more worthy than their officers, who had broken their
oaths and stricken the nation. 61
the same opinion.

Evidently, the enlisted men were of

The men in the Kaunas garrison were angry that their

officers had deceived them.

The officers, fearful of a counter-coup,

were ordered to stay with the men at all times, even to sleep with
them.

Since lies had been used to rouse the men to action, they no

longer trusted their superiors. 62

The conspirators were prepared to

destroy the bridges leading to Kaunas, for their were several provincial
uni ts suited up in full battle gear and prepared to rescue the legal
government.

However, Grinius'

appointment of a new cabinet and his

resignation from office stymied any action. 63
coup,

a delegation

Populists.

of

NCOs

proposed

Several days after the

a counter-coup

to

the

Peasant

Grinius and Slezevicius politely refused. 64

60 Rukas, p. 315.
61 Grinius, p. 270.
62Grinius, pp. 269-270; Rukas, p. 273; Sarunas, p. 33.
63oirvele, pp. 181-182.
64 zukas, p. 463. Within days of the coup, new Defense Minister
Antanas Merkys visited a unit and shouted his greetings to the men
( 11 Sveiki, vyrai!").
There was no response. Merkys was greeted by total
silence. See Dirvele, pp. 181-182.
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On

19 December

1926 a rump session of the Seimas convened,

confirmed the new cabinet, and elected Smetona the fourth president of
Lithuania. 65

The Nationalist-Christian Democratic compromise following

the coup made it appear to be just another governmental crisis, instead
of the radical step it actually was.
along with

The bloodless nature of the coup,

the pseudo-constitutional means utilized

government, helped downplay the entire incident. 6 6
President

Smetona,

in an

dissolved the Seimas.

in altering the
On 12 April 1927,

announcement by Prime Minister

Voldemaras,

According to the Constitution, the president was

to announce new elections and reconvene the Seimas within two months;
this was not done.
1936.
of

Elections to the Seimas would not be held until

In the meantime, decrees would be issued by the cabinet in place

formal

legislation.

carried out in April

The

decade-long

dissolution

of the Seimas

1927 was the more radical· "second coup d'etat"

which closed the democratic chapter of Lithuania's existence. 67
was the military's immediate contribution to .Lithuanian politics.
was

to

have

a

large

role

in

those

politics

until

the

This
It

end of the

independence period.
65The new prime minister, Augustinas Voldemaras, had written six
articles in Lietuvis (Lithuanian) from 25 June to 9 December 1926.
Ironically, the final one was entitled 11 Valdzia pries istatymus" ("The
Government Acting Against the Law"). See Augustinas Voldemaras, Rastai
(Writings), ed. Morkus Simkus (Chicago: Lithuanian Renaissance League,
1973), pp. 621-665.
66 Grinius, p. 207; Bronis J. Kaslas, The Baltic Nations: The
Quest for Regional Integration and Political Liberty (Pittston, PA:
Euramercia Press, 1976), p. 108.
67 Kaslas, p. 109-110.
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C. CONSEQUENCES OF THE COUP
Of course, varying analyses of the coup abound.
are some objective causes for the coup.

However, there

11 Though the Lithuanian village

was the very source of democracy, its residents hardly knew anything of
democratic
parties. 1168

institutions,

basic

democratic

elements,

and

political

The elections to the third Seimas in May 1926 strained

Lithuania's democracy to the breaking point.

Those who wished

to

circumvent democratic procedural arrangements were quite willing to use
the situation to their advantage; the Nationalists succeeded.
cannot learn democracy overnight.

People

Thus the government should have been

better prepared to operate within a more liberal context subsequent to
the lifting of various restraints.
Supporters of the coup mainly view the short-term context of
Lithuanian politics and politico-military relations.

Binkis writes that

the nation entered into chaos, and that the military intervened to put
an end to selfish, uncontrolled partisan politics. 69 Sapoka writes that
society strongly supported the coup, for it was yearning for any kind of
change. 70

Others write that it was unfortunate that the inept civil

68Juozas Audenas,
Paskutinis posedis: Atsiminimai
Meeting: Reminiscences) (New York: Romuva, 1966), p. 95.
69Kazys Binkis, Antanas
sukaktuvems pamineti (Antanas
Sixtieth Birthday)
(Kaunas:
President's Birthday, 1934), p.

(Final

Smetpna 1874-1934: ~esiu desimoiu metu
Smetana 1874-1934: Commemorating His
Chief Committee to Commemorate the
60.

70Adolfas Sapoka, ed. Lietuvos istorija (History of Lithuania),
3rd ed. (Fellbach-Wurttemberg, Germany: Patria, 1950), p. 591.
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government forced the military to become irrevocably involved in the
politics which it so detested.
viewed
unified

as

Nevertheless, the young officers are

"true patriots." 7 1

the

military,

Smetona himself wrote

rendering

it

better

that

prepared

to

the

defend

coup
the

nation.7 2
Critics of the coup take a more long-term approach, explaining
its detrimental effect on Lithuania for the duration of independence.
In the first place, they state that there was no communist threat to the
nation, either within or without the military.
and disorganized.

Indeed,

The coD111unists were weak

the enlisted men would collect communist

leaflets and bring them to their officers. 73

As far as Maldeikis is

concerned, the coup was not a spasm of national unity.

On the contrary,

it was carried out by a small group of well-organized officers under the
influence of the Nationalists. 74

.Zukas places the entire blame on the

shoulders of the guilty officers, citing their lack of comprehension of
the

essence

of

government.

They

had

no

right

to

7 1Lietuviu tautos komitetas (Lithuanian National
Desimts · nepriklausomos Lietuvos metu
(Ten Years of
Lithuania) (Chicago: L.N.C., 1928), pp. 7, 21.

interfere

in

Committee),
Independent

7 2Antanas Smetana, Pasakyta parasyta: 1927-1934 (Spoken Written
1927-1934) (Kaunas: Pazanga, 1935), I, 30. For a philosophical defense
of the coup from. the Nationalist perspective, see J. Tamosaitis, 11 Nuo
gruodzio m. 17 d. ligi siu dienu" ("From December 17th Until Today"), in
Pirmasis nepriklausomos Lietuvos desimtmetis 1918-1928 (First Decade of
Independent Lithuania 1918-1928), ed. J. Barkauskas, et al. (Kaunas:
Chief Committee to Celebrate the Decennial of Lithuanian Independence,
1930)' pp. 139-159.
73Grinius, p. 247; Rukas, p. 250.
7 4Maldeikis, p. 201.
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politics.
time.

Once the precedent is broken, it can happen again at any

The revolts which occured during the remaining thirteen years of

independence received
one.

their

impetus

from

the

success of this first

As far as Zukas is concerned, the military must be the backbone

and foundation of the state ~ not its helm. 75

Sarunas asks how junior

officers are expected to be obedient when they act as Napoleons.

The

coup hurt military discipline and split the military along two planes.
First, the officer corps became divided along party lines.

Second, the

enlisted men, who felt they had been used as blind tools, were split
from their officers.7 6
coup

hindered

Rukas assumes a similar stance, adding that the

progress

in

military became a gendarme,

military
which

training
served

to

and

improvement.

divide

the

nation

actually intensify debilitating forms of partisan politics.77

The
and

General

Stasys Rastikis writes that state and military affairs were managed by
one political group for many years following the coup.

This served to

alienate a substantial portion ·of society from the state -- and the
military. 1B
75zukas, pp. 464-465.
76 sarunas, p. 33.
Smetana's biographer writes of the
77Rukas, pp. 274-275.
president's New Year's greeting to the military on 1 January 1927.
Smetona stated that obedience and harmony were absolutely essential.
All must work where assigned, with the junior obeying the senior. To
say the least, it was an ironic statement considering the events which
had transpired just two weeks b.efore •
. 78
.
. '
Rastikis, I, pp. 380, · 383.
As will be seen ·later in this
study, Rastikis took steps to close this gap when he served as
commander-in-chief from 1935 to 1940. He was quite successful.
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The

ambivalent

nature of the

coup

and

its participants is

articulated well by interim dictator Major Povilas Plechavicius.

He

places the bulk of the blame for the coup on his own shoulders, adding
that the incident follows him like a "shadow."

He was left with no

foundation to stand on, for it is spiritual death for an old soldier to
raise his hand against the government.

Yet, he still believes that he

participated out of love for his country.79

79p. Plechavicius, 11 0 skambink per amzius vaikams Lietuvos"
("Ring Through the Ages for Lithuania's Children"), Karys, January 1953,
pp. 3-4. He adds an interesting historical sidelight in support of the
coup. He believes that "pseudo-democracy" brought Europe to its knees
in the face of Hitler and Stalin. This is most poignantly demonstrated
by Chamberlain's appeasement in Munich in 1938.

CHAPTER IV
THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
A. NATIONALISM AND THE NATIONALIST ASSOCIATION
The context of Lithuanian civil-military relations, as well as
the

context

nationalism.

of

politics

during

Smetona

era

in

general,

was

Nationalism, of course, was a phenomenon widely prevalent

in interwar East-Central Europe.
Nationalist

the

Association

had

While in the Lithuanian context, the
a

monopoly

over

official

politic al

nationalism, it was accepted by the general populace, including even the
opposition.

For example, Juozas Audenas, Peasant Populist agriculture

minister in the last cabinet, implies a non-political nationalism in his
memoirs.

He writes that defense and national uni t.y are inost important

in times of crisis.
must be guarded
order. 1
fact

Above all else, the state and nation's interests

through calm,

Gilpin writes:

that

individual

harmony,

and

keeping

one's house

in

"The power of modern nationalism lies in the

identity and

state

interest become fused;

the

nationalist becomes the patriot willing to sacrifice his own life for
the good of the state. 112

In this sense, even the politic al opposition

in Lithuania was nationalistic.

1Juozas Audenas, Paskutinis posedis: Atsiminimai (Final Meeting:
Reminiscences) (New York: Romuva, 1966), pp. 139-140.
2Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politios
Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 98.
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One scholar makes the point succintly with regard to small
nations:
Many Big Power ideologists condemn nationalism, and a number of
scholars habitually use the te:rm nationalism only in a negative
sense. However, ·small nations must recognize and rely on nationalism
as a primary source of their strength.
In theory, one must be able to distinguish sharply between
nationalism on the one hand and imperialism, xenophobia, or the
attempts to abridge the rights of nations on the other.
Nationalism has become an expression of a nation's will to live
and its individualism.
It has become a symbol of the dignity of
peoples. It is the feeling of belonging to a national brotherhood.
In many instances it is the strongest and most durable social bond.
From the point view of national defense and survival, nationalism
-- a product of patriotic loyalty and uniting cohesion -- is the main
source of strength.
It fixes the basic loyalty, the political
objectives, the strategy, and many techniques in the struggles to
defend a nation.
Nationalism, adequately mobilized, is an impressive force.
In
situations of political and social conflict, it enhances national
strength in various ways: (a) rallies the nation's forces, {b)
unifies them, (c) clarifies the issues of the struggle, distinguishes
friend from foe, and (d) provides a guiding philosophy, a sense of
direction, an understanding of the goals to be achieved.
Small states and nations that do possess the precious inheritance
of nationalism should recognize its value as a f~undation of national
survival. They should build their future on it.
How did political nationalism manifest itself in Lithuania?

The

Nationalist Association grew out of the Lithuanian Democratic Party
(Lietuvos Demokratu Partija), which had been founded in 1902.

It later

called itself the National Progress Party (Tautos Pazangos Partija) and
the Agricultural Association ( Zemdirbiu sajunga) •
itself the Nationalist Association.

In 1924 it renamed

The Nationalist Association was a

3v.v. Sveics, "Nationalism: A Source of Strength for Small
Nations," in Fourth Conference on Baltic Studies: Summaries of Papers
(Brooklyn: Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, 1974), p.
69. Sveics' emphasis. For an extended treatment of these ideas see his
Small Nation Survival: Political Defense in Unequal Conflicts, {New
York: Exposi tion,1970) , PP. 127:fb'5.
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small, young party without wide suupport among the people.
seats in the first and second Seilnas.

It was able to win three seats

out of a total of eighty-five in the third.
had about 12,000 members.

It had no

In 1926, the association

By 1938, membership, despite the fact that it

was the only legal party, had increased by only about one thousand.
Among the 13,000 registered members that year, 7,500 were farmers, 350
were tradesmen, 500 were industrial workers, 2, 800 were professionals
(including property and industrial owners, and bureaucrats), and 1, 700
were teachers. 4
Thus,

terms.

The Association desired national unity, but on its own
while in quest of unity,

its internal politics and

policies were often unpopular and unsuccessful.5
The Leader

Smetona was the Nation's Leader ( Tautos Vadas) •
Principle was used elsewhere in Europe.
German

The Italian "Duce" and the
It was ilnplicit in

"Fuhrer" were explicit manifestations.

Pilsudski's

personal

dictatorship

in

Poland

and

in

the

development of the other Baltic states: Latvia and Estonia.
Lithuania

itself,

this

principle

was

often

used

in

political
Within

non-political

4Juozas Jakstas, "Tautos pazangos partijos-Lietuviu tautininku
sajungos istorijos bruozai 1916-1940" ("An Historical Sketch of the
National Progress Party-Lithuanian Nationalist Association 1916-1940"),
in Tautines minties keliu: Lietuviu tautininkijos istoriniai bruozai
(Path
of
National
Thought:
Historical
Sketch
of
Lithuanian
Nationalism).
Eds. Jonas Puzinas and Jonas Pranas Palukaitis.
(Chicago: American Lithuanian National Association, 1979), p. 155; Kazys
Pakstas, Lithuania and World War II (Chicago: Lithuanian Cultural
Institute,~7), p. 21.
5stasys Rastikis, Kovose del Lietuvos: Kario atsiminimai (In the
Battles for Lithuania: A Soldier's Reminiscences) (Los Angeles: Lietuviu
dienos / Lithuanian-Days, 1956), I 491.
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contexts.

Commanding officers in the military had the title of "vadas"

of their unit.

The National Guard and the "Ateitis" Catholic Federation

each had its respective "vadas."

The cult of the National Leader was

actually not begun by the Nationalists.

According to one source, it
~as

(Morning), using the

term in reference to Smetona on 20 December 1926. 6

Smetona, who admired

began in the Christian Democratic newspaper

the strong executive in the US political system, formalized the Leader
Principle (Vadizmas)

in the Cons_titution promulgated in 1928, which

authorized the President to execute "leadership of the state."7
Smetona exercised his powers as Leader through the leadership of
the Nationalist Association.

However, he was able to assert that he was

not participating in partisan politics, since the Nationalists were
organized into an "association," not a "party."

In a speech to the

Nationalist Congress on 5 January 1940, Smetona stated that a political
party deals only with a certain portion of society and is operated
according to principles of democracy.

The Nationalist Association, on

the other hand, is ruled from above by the Leader not according to pars
(a portion of the nation), but in tota (the nation in its entirety). 8
6Audenas, p. 115.
1Albertas Gerutis, "Independent Lithuania," in Lithuania 700
Years, 2nd rev. ed., Albertas Gerutis (New York: Manyland, 1969), pp.
228-229; !ndrius Ryliskis, Fragmentai is praeities ~~lu: Atsiminimai
(Fragments From the Mists of the Past: Reminiscences), ed. Povilas
Gaucys (Chicago: n:p., 1974), p. 374. For biographies of other famous
leaders, such as Lineoln, Gandhi, Woodrow Wilson, and "Kaiser Wilhelm II,
in addition to analytic: . and . psychological essays, . see. Charles B.
Strozier and Daniel Offer, eds., The Leader: Psychohistori.£!_1 Essays
(New York: Plenum Press,, 1985).

8Audenas, pp. 116-117.
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Smetona was also viewing the European context.

He saw that, other than

Czechoslovakia, there were no liberal governments remaining in EastIn such a climate, the nation's leadership must be

Central Europe.

strong and vigilant.

There was no place for traditional liberalism in

the interwar atmosphere.9
Despite

the

negative

connotation

associated

with

European "leadership," Smetona must be, judged differently.
he was a quiet, gentle person.

interwar

Personally,

Politically, he was a moderating

counterweight to the more radical Augustinas Voldemaras.
Smetona saw some good in Fascism, but he considered it alien to
Lithuania and therefore did not copy it too closely.
He opposed
National Socialism outright and condemned i t pub1bcly.
It is,
however, quite clear that Smetona was not a democrat.
Under Smetona,

political development was retarded and the political

arsenal declined in the sense that new political figures could not
develop.

Political affairs were the exclusive preserve of Smetona and

the Nationalists.

In this sphere,

"the nation was not allowed to

speak." 11

9Edvardas Sulaitis, "A. Smetona apie kariuomene" ("A. Smetona on
the Army"), Karys, June-July 1959, p. 162.
For an overview of
Lithuanian nationalism see Leonas Sabaliunas, Lithuania in Crisis:
Nationalism to Communism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972),
pp. 25-40.
10 v. Stanley Vardys, "Independent Lithuania: A Profile," in
~~ia Under the -~oviets: Portrait of a NationL- 1940~-' ed. V.
Stanley Vardys (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 36.
11 Audenas, pp. 103-105.
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B. THE POLITICS OF THE SMETONA ERA
The
analysis.

Smetona

regime

is

ambivalent

with

regard

to

scholarly

Though authoritarian, there were many manifestations that the

regime was a relatively benign one.

Many pleas for commutation of the

death sentence were approved by Smetona.

They would be

~educed

to life

sentences, and political prisoners were often released under amnesty
after several years of serving the commuted sentence.
is aviation officer Antanas Maciuika.

Another example

Maciuika was the officer who

dispersed the Seimas on the night of the coup.

He would later offer

several challenges to the regime, demanding that Voldemaras be returned
to the post of prime min·ister. 12

Nevertheless, Maciuika rose to the

rank of lieutenant colonel, holding important posts in military and
civilian life, even serving as ''One of the attorneys connected to the
Lithuanian Supreme Court in

1939.

Kazys Grinius,

Jr. ,

son of the

deposed president, rose to the rank of colonel and served as military
attache to Berlin 1937-1940.
The ambivalent nature of the politics of the Smetana era is
brought out in the analyses of Pakstas, Vardys, and the US House of
Representatives:
Some called the Nationalist regime of 1927-1939 a fascist
dictatorship friendly to Moscow, others considered it as a special
form of semi-democracy. This author is inclined to label it 'semidemocracy, semi-dictatorship' with a few totalitarian attributes.
Though all political parties (except Nationalists) were closed in
1929-1930, 6,600 various cultural,
professional and economic
societies were functioning under mild police supervision; and a vast
12 As will be dicussed below, Voldemaras was forcibly removed
from the post by Smetona in 1929.
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majority of these societies was not dominated by the Nationalists.
The opposition press was censored, but not liquidated. For instance,
the Catholic daily 'The Twentieth Century' was the most influential,
with the Liberal daily 'The News of Lithuania' next in importance.
Most of the private Lithuanian and Jewish schools were still open and
President Smetona was held in
even subsidized by the government.
great esteem by the orthodox Jews and by a part of the Polish
minority interested to preserve their larger landed properties. A.
Smetana had been assistant professor of Greek philosophy and was an
admirer of Plato.
With this background and his conservative
humanistic leanings he was not suited to be a really totalitarian
dictator.
Thus, some foreign observers used to label Lithuania a
'dictatorship without a dictator.'
In German literature this was
called
'Eingeschraenkte
Demokratie'
(limited
or
restricted
democracy).
In short, the Lithuanian democratic opposition was too
numerous and too influential to submit to the much smaller
Nationalist group of totalitarian leanings. 13
The regime that the Nationalists created defies easy definition. It
certainly was not totalitarian; opposition, though outlawed,
functioned unofficially, and many opposition leaders were strongly
entrenched in the universities and schools and in a number of large
state-supported cooperatives.
Although controlled and hampered,
several thousand associations continued their work and only a small
part of the press was in Nationalist hands.
Press censorship
existed, but it was not absolute.
Arrests of opposition leaders,
although numerous in the early 1930's, almost ceased by 1938.
Economic activity was completely free.
Minorities were protected.
Attempts to overthrow the regime were put down, yet capital
punishment against conspirators was extremely rare and only
Communists were held in prisons for extended periods of time. The
regime was certainly more moderate than Mussolini's and gentler than
Pilsudski's personal dictatorship in Poland.
Indeed, the
Nationalist regime could not introduce totalitarianism, because the
forces of democratic opposition were too strong and had to be handled
by less extreme methods. A mild-mannered man, Smetana could not be
compared to Mussolini, Hitler, or even Pilsudski. He kept the regime
in power largely by using political patronage and cleverly playing
off the competing governmental institutions and political forces,
including his own supporters, against on!!! another.
The regime was
,
constantly subject to pressures at home. 1q
It is even noteworthy that even stro~g opposition leaders to
Smetona 's rule found i t impossible to label his regime as Fascist or
13 Pakstas, p. 22.
14 Vardys, p. 37.

Pakstas' emphasis.
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dictatorial in the accepted sense.
In the face of the
extraordinary complexities that faced Smetona from Poland over
Vilnius and, later from Germany over Klaipeda, to say nothing of
internal stresses and strains, the semiauthoritarian rule he directed
from 1928 to 1938 might well go down in the history of Europe as more
the government of enlightened statesmanship than the government of
one-man rule. 15
C. PRIME MINISTER AUGUSTINAS VOLDEMARAS 1926-1929
While the regime of President Antanas Smetona may have been one
of enlightened authoritarianism, it almost did not come to pass.

In the

first two years of his regime, he had to contend with the more radical
Nationalist prime minister Professor Augustinas Voldemaras.

Voldemaras

was a brilliant, often arrogant and ascerbic, scholar who specialized in
hi story, politics and languages.

He spoke sever al languages fluently.

While heading up the cabinet, he also served as minister of foreign
affairs and,
defense.

for

the last few months of his rule, as minister of

His radicalism, aggressiveness, and arrogance caused him to

lose support not only in military
well. 16

His

extreme

circl~s,

anti-Polish

'

but among
the Nationalists as
-

stance

also

contributed

to

this

15u.s. Hous·e of ·Representatives, Third Interim· Report of the
Select Committee on Communist Aggression, 83rd Congress, Second Session
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 128-129; see
also pp. 126, 127. For accounts of the early development of Lithuanian
political parties,
see M.
Kersis,
Lietuviu politikos partijos
(Lithuanian Political Parties) (n.p.: n.p.,
1921);
Martisius,
Valstieciai liaudininkai arba valstieciu sajunga (Peasant Populists or
the Peasant Association) (Kaunas: Liaudies politikos knygynelis I
People's Political Library, 1923); Meskus (pseud. for Bishop Justinas
Staugaitis of Telsiai), Musu politines partijos ir ko jos nori (Our
Political Parties and What They Want) (Kaunas: Sviesa, 1923).
16Aleksandras Merkelis, Antanas Smetona:
Jo visuomenine,
kulturine ir politine veikla (Antanas Smetona: His Social, Cultural, and
Political Activity) (New York: American Lithuanian National Association,
1964), p. 366.
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disaffection.

According to Voldemaras, "Lithuania had only two things

in common with Poland, namely, the Catholic religion and 525 kilometers
of demarcation line." 17

Voldemaras was aware that his power base was

eroding and took steps to rectify the situation.
[Voldemaras] endeavored to build a personal following among the
younger nationalist officers who were favorably impressed by emergent
fascism.
The majority of the senior officers favored
conservative policies and usually stood by the chief executive
[Smetona]. On the other hand, the dynamic personality of Professor
Voldemaras continued to attract admirers among the _younger officers
who were displeased with Smetona's moderate course. 1 ~
Voldemaras and this group of younger officers condemned the government
for being too conservative and not nationalistic enough.

It would

eventually develop that the Smetona regime, or any regime which did not
include Voldemaras, must be opposed.
such attitudes

unacceptable and

take

Smetona, of course, would find
steps

against his

opponents,

including his own prime minister. 19
On 6 May 1929, three leftist students attempted to assassinate
Voldemaras as he was entering a theater in Kaunas with his family.
Voldemaras escaped unharmed

but one aide,

Voldemaras'

nephew Major

Leonas Virbickas, was injured and another, Captain Pranas Gudynas, was

17 Owen J.C. Norem, Timeless Lithuania, 2nd ed. (Cleveland:
Viltis, 1967), p. 227. See also Benedict V. Maciuika, ed. Lithuania in
the Last 30 Years, Subcontractor's monograph prepared in the Division of
the Social Sciences at the University of Chicago.
HRAF Subcontract
HRAF-1 Chi-1 (New Haven, CT: ,Human Relations Area Files, 1955), p. 58.
18sabaliurtas, pp. 257, 46 quoted in Kristina
"Augustinas Voldemaras," !::_ituanus, 30,· 3 (Fall 1984), 76.
19see Maciuika, P•. 61; Norem, pp. 131-132 •
•

Vaicikonis,
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killed.

This incident further turned Voldemaras toward the clique of

officers he was forming.

The clique, formed within the Iron Wolf Sports
di~cussed

Association (Gelezinio vilko sporto sajunga), will be

in more

depth in the following section.20
Smetana, concerned about Voldemaras and the opposition he was
fomenting

among

the

political career.
minister

for

younger

decided

to

end

Voldemaras'

On 19 September 1929, after having served as prime

almost

three

years,

appointed his brother-in-law,
that month,

officers,

Smetana dismissed the cabinet and

Juozas Tubelis, prime minister.

Later

Voldemaras was forcibly evicted by the police from the

apartment of the director of the Bank of Lithuania.
conrnandeered the residence for himself.
later Zarasai.

Voldemaras had

He was exiled to Plateliai,

It was then that the secretive Iron Wolf organization

mobilized more fully around Voldemaras and

sought

to return him to

political power -- by force, if necessary.2 1

D. THE IRON WOLF PARA-MILITARY ASSOCIATION
During the cabinet crisis in which Voldemaras was removed from
20Major Virbickas, the injured aide, writes that one of
Voldemaras' relatives was injured in the attack. See Stepas Jakubickas,
Kas yra Lietuvos atgimino sajudis (What the Lithuanian Renaissance
League Is) (Delhi, ONT: L.R.L. Canadian Region, 1978), p. 48. Andrius
Bulota writes that Voldemaras' arm was injured, though this fact was
never publicized.
See his Limuzinas nr. 4: Dokumentine apysaka
(Limousine No. 4: A Documentary Narrative) (Vilnius: Vaga, 1977), p. 95.
2 1see "Predict Lithuanian coup: Army reported to be ready to
oust Premier Voldemaras, 11 The New York Times, 31 January 1929, p. 3.
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power, one hundred "wolves" were prepared to act against Smetona and the
government on behalf of their mentor. 22

What was the Iron Wolf?

an organization patterned after the Blackshirts of Italy.

It was

The name of

the organization was derived from the legend of the founding of the city
of Vilnius.

Gediminas, a grand duke of _Lithuania, allegedly had a dream

about a wolf in a suit of armor.

A soothsayer then interpreted it to

mean that Gediminas must build a great city; that city would become
Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania.
Iron Wolf was founded in the fall of 1927.

It was the Iron Wolf

Sports Association (Gelezinio v:f.lko sporto sajunga).

Its motto was

"National honor, State welfare!" (Tautos garbe, Valstybes gerovel).

The

organization's political programr dictated that any government which
seeks national unity, honor, the welfare of the state, honors _religion
and guarantees property rights 111ust, be protected. 23
Voldemaras' prop.

Iron Wolf was

Its official chief was Smetona, but the president had

little actual influence over its members.

Voldemaras was the actual

head of the organization, who was designated sponsor and chief leader
(globejas ir vyriausias vadas).
These extreme nationalists who operated semi-secretly wished to
stabilize the post-coup situation, defend the regime, and keep opposition parties out of government. 24

A person who joined was a candidate

22 Andrius Bulota, Nuo baltojo zir~o __i:_ki svastikos (From the
White Steed to the SwastikafCVilnius: State Political and Scientific
Press, 1962), pp.-85-86.
23Bulota, Nuo~~alto.J.£_~irgo iki svastikos, pp. 73-74.
24Bulota, Nuo balt_£Jo zirg~-~ki svastikos, p. 72.
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for three months.

If nothing unacceptable was discovered about him, he

was allowed to give the oath, which included kneeling and kissing a
dagger.
firearm.

Each member then secretly carried the dagger and possibly a
This

could have been a factor

attractirlg youth to the

organization. 2 5
The membership of Iron Wolf represented people from different
walks of life: lawyers, physicians, police officers, Internal Security
Department agents, bureaucrats, foresters, students.

More important for

this study though, is the presence of reserve and active army NCOs and
officers in the rolls of the organization. 26
was a leading member of Iron Wolf.

Captain Antanas Maciuika

The day Voldemaras was removed as

prime minister, he met with Maciuika three times, possibly seeking the
army's support through the organization. 2 7

Another top member and

supporter of Voldemaras was Reserve Lieutenant Al gird as Sliesorai tis,

25Apolinaras Bagdonas, ed., Lietuvos
olici a istatymu ir
tvarkos tarnyboje (Lithuania's Police in the Service of Law and Order
(Chicago: Lithuanian Police Club "Kri v\iTe," 1974), p. 150; Bulota, Nuo
baltojo ~irgg___iki svastikos, p. 74; Merkelis, p. 366.
Nationalist
Association member and future prime minister Rev. Vladas Mironas
presided at the first secret swearing-in ceremony.
See Bulota, Nuo
baltojo zirgo iki s~~stikos, p. 74.
26Bagdonas, p. 149; B. Baranauskas, ed., Gelezinis Vilkas (Iron
Wolf), vol 7. of an archival documentary fi~collected by the
Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences (Vilnius: Mintis, 1965), pp. 22, 24,
58-59; Bulota, Nuo ba_~~~-z~!ki svastikos, pp. 77, 79; Lithuanian
Christian Democratic Assooiation,
Arkiytskupas Mecislovas ·Rein.ya
(Archibishop Mecislovas ~~inys) (Chicago: L.C.D.A., 1977), p. 92.
2 7Jonas Augustaitis, Antanas Smeton~. ir jo veikla (Antanas
Smetona and His Work) (Chicago: Chicago Lithuanian Literary Society,
1966), p. 90.
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who

edited

Tautos

Voldemaras faction.
1928 and 1929.

kelias

(Nation's

Road),

the

newspaper

of

the

Sliesorai tis headed up the staff of Iron Wolf in

Other members of the staff included Captain Maciuika,

Major Leonas Virbickas, Captain Juozas Gineitis, Captain Pranas Gudynas,
and aviation Major Jonas Pyragius.

The staff of the Kaunas chapter

included some members of the army's general staff • 28
The activity of wolves was dictated by secret instruction 32 ,
which

told

them

to

"See

all,

They were

Know all."

information on opposition parties and other organizations.

to

collect

They were

also to monitor anti-state activity, especially by government workers.
They would,

for example,

report on teachers and other bureaucrats,

recommending whom to hire, fire, and promote.

Iron Wolf attempted to

purge the National Guard of elements with questionable loyalty to the
regime.

Thus Order (No. 1 )5 instructing all wolves to join the Guard

was issued on 5 January 1928.
correspondence,

along with

Procedures indluded secret and coded

passwords

and

high

signs.

There were

standing assembly and action orders in case of emergency.

Activity was

guarded by such se.crecy that there was one incident where a lowerranking police official refused to unlock a drawer for his superior
because it contained some of the organization's secret papers. 2 9
While

Iron Wolf had been organized officially as a sports

organization seeking to inculcate obedience and dispose of undesirable
28 Bulota, Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, p. 73.
29Bagdonas, pp. 149-150; Bulota Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos,
pp. 68, 74, 82, 84.
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elements through sports and drill, it assumed a broader dimension in
August

1929 when sports became a secondary activity and more secret

political activity assumed increased importance.

It was now to be an

internal regime army combating anti-nationalism and foreign anti-state
elements.
and

It was to defend any government which promoted nationalism --

the

authority

of

the

leaders

of

Iron

Wolf.

Further,

only

Lithuanians could belong to the organization and expelled members were
to be persecuted. 30
willed

and

In the process, though, Iron Wolf became self-

arbitrary,

and began to terrorize the opposition.

Even

before Iron Wolf was officially formed, it had experimented with such
activity.

In his memoirs, President Grinius writes that individuals,

later members of Iron Wolf, blew up the "Varpas" press on
1927.

11 March

It was here that the Peasant Populists printed the Lietuvos

zinios (Lithuania's News) newspaper and other publications.

The wolves

were also known for breaking into homes and apartments at night, beating
and threatening those whom they felt were not sufficiently loyal to the
regime.

They sometimes took victims outside city limits for late night

interrogations.31
There was some reaction to the wolves'
Catholic

students,

"Kestutis"

members

Fraternity,

of

the

organized

"Ateitis"
armed

activity.
Catholic

protection

A group of
Federation's

for

Catholic

-----------------

30Bulota, Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, pp. 73-74.

3 1Kazys Grinius, Apie 1926 m. gruodzio 17-os dienos perversma
(On the Coup of 17 December 1926) (Chicago: Chicago Lithuanian Literary
Society, 1954), p. 273.
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leaders.

Later, however, an informal arragement was concluded whereby

Iron Wolf would not attack Catholic leaders and "Kestutis" would remove
its armed guards.32
The terror assumed such proportions that the Vienybe (Unity)
newspaper, published in the US by Lithuanian-Americans, called Iron Wolf
Lithuania's Ku Klux Klan in 1928.33

President Smetona, who as chief was

supposedly the supreme authority of the organization, but who practically had no ties to it, became increasingly critical of the wolves.3 4 The
first strike was Voldemaras' ouster from government in September 1929.
Subsequently, the liquidation of Iron Wolf commenced.

Voldemaras was

removed as sponsor of the organization and replaced by Colonel Brunonas
Stencelis, the general secretary of the Interior Ministry.

He was

charged with disarming and disbanding the organization.

Needless to

say, the wolves were not pleased with these developments.

It was as if

there were

now two organizations,

with different

groups of wolves

obeying either Lieutenant Algirdas Sliesoraitis or Stencelis.35
Though the organization was officially outlawed in 1930, it
continued to operate secretly.

The wolves were reorganized into groups

of five (penketuku sistema) which were led by instructors.

Captain

32Lithuanian Christian Democratic Association, pp. 92-93.
33J. Ziugzda, et al., eds., Lietuvos TSR istorija nuo 1917 iki
1940 (History of the Lithuanian SSR 1917-1940) (Vilnius: Mintis, 1965),
III, 215.
34Merkelis, pp. 366-367.
35Bulota, Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, pp. 92-98; Merkelis,
p. 374.
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Juozas Gineitis, who worked for Captain Antanas Maciuika, was at the
head of this network.

During his vacation in the summer of 1930,

Captain Leonas Virbickas travelled Lithuania and contacted various Iron
Wolf instructors.36

They continued to operate and terrorize various

individuals, often challenging the regime itself.

In 1930, several

wolves attempted to assasinate Colonel Steponas Rusteika, director of
the Internal Security Department of the Interior Ministry.37
On 6 May 1934, the Voldemaras faction reorganized itself into

the Lithuanian Nationalist Party (Lietuviu Nacionalistu Partija).

While

this made the wolves sound more respectable, a scant one month later
they would carry out the greatest challenge to the Smetona regime, the
Kubiliunas Revolt, which will be discussed below.38
E. CHALLENGES TO THE REGIME
In one meeting of the cabinet of Prime Minister Antanas Merkys,
Interior Minister Brigadier General Kazys Skucas remarked that there had
been fourteen revolts against the regime in the thirteen years following
36Bulota,

Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, p.

92; Maciuika,

p. 58.
37Bagdonas, p.
PP. 104-11 4.

151; Bulota, Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos,

38Jakstas, p. 141; Jakubickas, p. 20; Merkelis, p. 422.
The
Jakubickas book is a pro-Voldemaras work published by his faction, which
reorganized itself in 1948 into the Lithuanian Renaissance League
(Lietuvos Atgimimo Sajudis).
This League still publishes the Free
Lithuania (Laisvoji Lietuva) newspaper in Chicago. The Iron Wolf logo
and motto are on the masthead.
Jakubickas participated in the
Kubiliunas Revolt as an NCO and was sentenced to fifteen years in
prison.
President Smetona amnestied him, along with many others, in
1937. See Jakubickas, p. 21.
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the

1926 coup.39

regime,

There were indeed many serious challenges to the

involving both military and

non-military elements.

revolt of 1934 was discovered in advance.

The NCO

Its aim was the restqration

of Voldemaras and General Petras Kubiliunas to power as prime minister
and chief of staff, respectively.

The Suvalkai farmers strike of 1935

was violent and disruptive.40
Attempted and unsuccessful revolts had obvious politico-military
implications.

On 21 February 1927, Dr Juozas Pajaujis, a Peasant Popu-

list Seimas deputy, gave a speech condemning the coup.

He was also

conferring with a number of officers regarding the possibility of a
counter-coup.

The plot, however, was discovered by Smetona 's security

agents and Pajaujis, along with the other plotters, was arrested on 4
April.

On 28 April he was sentenced to death, though Smetona later

commuted

it

to

deputies

issued

life
an

in prison.
interpellation

Subsequent to his
in

the

Seimas,

arrest,. leftist

charging that the

government had violated the immunity of a Seimas deputy.

Voldemaras

39Audenas, p. 106.
4°For information regarding the Taurage revolt see Augustaitis,
Antanas Smetona, pp. 62-63; Bagdonas, pp. 154-155; I. Lempertas,
"Fasistines diktaturos Lietuvoje klasines esmes klausimu" ("On the
Question of the Class Essence of the Fascist Dictatorship in
Lithuania"),
175;
Merkelis, pp.
358, 404-405; Rapolas Skipitis
Nepriklausoma
Lietuva:
Atsiminimai
(Independent
Lithuania:
Reminiscences) (Chicago: Draugas, 1967), pp. 121-129.
Bulota, Nuo
baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, p. 122 writes of the NCO plot.
For the
Suvalkai farmers strike see Juozas Kondratas, Tolimos pabares (Distant
Fields) (Vilnius: Vaga, 1971), pp. 9-18; J. Macijauskas~ Saule leidzias,
saule teka: Atsiminimai (The Sun Sets, The Sun Rises: Reminiscences)
(Vilnius: State Literary Press, 1961), pp. 124-125; Maciuika 61.
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responded on 12 April, though the Seimas would continue, with a 4/5
majority, to vote no confidence in the government.

At the same session,

Voldemaras read President Smetona's decree dissolving the Seimas without
issuing a new date for elections, as required by the Constitution.

This

was the second "constitutional" coup which placed Smetona and Voldemaras
firmly in control of the government. 41
Colonel Jonas Petrui tis, who led his second infantry regiment
during the coup, was named commanding officer of the second infantry
division and commander of the Kaunas garrison in the summer of 1927.

He

was a good friend of the president, visited him often, and was almost on
a first name basis with him.

However, he was also a Christian Democrat

and friend of Christian Democratic leader Dr. Leonas Bistras.

Bistras

urged Petrui tis to bring the Christian Democrats into office and both
began planning a revolt.

In November 1927, Petruitis, along with Majors

Juozas Grazulis and Ignas Slapsys, visited Smetona and informed him of
discontent

growing

in

democracy be returned.

the

military,

advising

that

the

Seimas

Smetona responded that it was too early.

and

During

a second visit with Grazulis only, Petruitis' advice became a demand, an
ultimatum.

He was subsequently discharged and asked to leave Kaunas to

his farm in Daugai.
did so.

Petruitis was still allowed to visit the city and

On one occasion, while wearing civilian clothing, he met and

spoke with his friend and successor as commander of the second infantry
41 Jakstas, p. 124; Merkelis, pp. 343, 358. Pajaujis was granted
amnesty on 1 September 1929 under the condition that he leave
Lithuania. He spent three years in Paris and then returned. In 1934 he
founded and taught at the Institute of Conmerce in Klaipeda.
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regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Bronius Ivanauskas.

Several days hence,

Ivanauskas was discharged.42
The coup of December

1926 had been motivated by patriotism.

Subsequent regime challenges were motivated by two different forces.
Some officers,

sympathetic to opposition groups, wished to turn the

country toward democracy.

Others, officers loyal to Voldemaras, wished

to institute a more rigid regime.
belong

to a politic al

Though officers could not formally

party, different

factions possessed different

officers expressing sympathies. 43
Different

commentators claim varying results

challenges to the regime.
coup

weakened

the

of the

various

Smetona's biographer writes that whereas the
actually made

the

government stronger, demonstrating the need for a strong regime.

In

Lithuania's case,
state. 44

government,

partisan

Most writers,

subsequent

revolts

politics were not

however,

suited

write that challenges had negative

effects on the state, the nation, and the military.
concerned,

each revolt

corps as a whole.
men

were

lost.

for affairs of

As far as they are

served to degrade and demoralize the officer

As officers were punished, otherwise good military
They became politicized and no longer

trusted the

42 Petras Jurgela and Pauli us Jurkus, Gen. Povilas Plechavicius
(Brooklyn: Karys, 1978), pp. 65-66; Merkelis, pp. 358-359; Antanas
Rukas, ed., Mykolas Slezevicius (Chicago: Terra, 1954), p. 272;
Ski pi tis, Nepriklausoma Lietuva, pp. 130-133.
43For ~xample, see Bronys Raila, Pag_uoda (Solace) (London: Nida,
1974), II, 207.
!

44Merkelis; p. 359.

\
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political

Other officers were

leadership.

persuaded that the only

solution was to take the 1926 coup even further, bringing the government
to the extreme right.
better control

and

Such a government, presumably, could maintain

discipline within

the

army and

society. 45

The

Kubiliunas revolt of 6-7 June 1934 sought such a solution.
F. THE KUBILIUNAS REVOLT OF JUNE 1934
According to General Stasys Rastikis, the motto of the Kubiliunas revolt

could

very well

have been "Topple Tubelis'

government!"

Rastikis searches for politic al reasons for this anti-regime outburst.
There

was

Seimas.

no

national

representation

since

the

dissolution of the

There was no brake on governmental power.

Smetona could fully control his own government.
there was
frustations

no other
could

political organ
be

ameliorated;

Indeed, not even

Without the Seimas,

where politic al differences and
no

sense

of

parliamentarianism

existed. 46
The individuals who masterminded the revolt were members of the
Voldemaras faction and Iron Wolf.

The center of activity was the Air

45stasys Rastikis, Ivykiai ir zmones: Is mano uzrasu (Events and
Personalities: From My Notes), ed. Bronius Kviklys (Chicago: Akademines
skautijos leidykla I Academic Press, 1972), pp. 215-216.
See also
Bulota, Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, p. 125; Grinius, p. 276.
46Rastikis, I, p. 447.
For accounts of the revolt and its
aftermath see "Ex-premier sentenced: Waldemaras [sic] gets 12 years for
plot in Lithuania," The New York Times, 19 June 1934, p. 7; K. U., "1934tuju metu sukilimas" ("The 1934 Revolt"), Karys, May 1974, pp. 163-167,
June-July 1974, pp. 209-212; "Lithuanian coup reported nipped," The New
York Times, 8 June 1934, p. 10; Jonas Svoba, Seimine ir prezidentine
Lietuva (Parliamentar_x and Presidential Lithuania) (Cleveland: Viltis,
1985), pp. 229-235.
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Club (Aeroklubas) in Kaunas, frequented by air force officers.

They

included Major Jonas Pyragius, former chief of staff Lieutenant Colonel
Juozas

Lieutenant Colonel Antanas Haciuika,

Narakas,

Morkus. 47

Captain Vlad as

The name popularly attributed to the uprising implies that

Chief of Staff General Petras Kubiliunas was the chief culprit.
not the case at all, though.

That is

The Voldemaras faction was actually using

him as an instrument, an intermediary. 48
Kubiliunas was a distinguished military man who had served with
honor in W0rld War I and during Lithuania,'s wars ,of independence.

He

was a graduate of the Czechoslovakian Military Academy and Lithuania's
Senior Officer Courses.
Gaiziunai.

In 1930 he established the firing range at

The following year he established the. Grand Duke Vytautas

Senior Military School (DLK Vytauto Aukstoji Karo Mokykla).

He was

appointed chief of staff on 10 February 1929 and soon earned respect and
admiration as a military organizer, reformer, and educator.
close

to

the

president,

often

accompanying

him

He was even

horseback

riding.

Despite these impressive facts and his good intentions, he was a poor
politician

who

could

not

interpersonal relations.
support to

no

political

comprehend

complex

political

affairs and

He was uninterested in politics and lent his
faction.

Indeed

he

felt

contempt

toward

political parties, which he felt ignored the interest of the nation in

----------------4

7J. Jakai tis, Isdavystes keliu (The Path of Treason) (Vilnius:
Mintis, 1976), p. 12. See also Kazys Musteikis, Prisiminimu fragmentai
(Fragments of Memories) (London: Nida, 1970), pp. 17, 19.
48Jakubickas, p. 64.
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favor of partisan advantage. 49
This political ignorance must be understood within the context
of the relationship between Kubiliunas and Defense Minister Colonel
There was a great deal of tension between the two

Balys Giedrai tis.
men.

Giedraitis, who had been appointed minister on 28 June 1930, was a

good

administrator,

matters.

but

slightly

incompetent

regarding

military

This was juxtaposed with Kubiliunas, one of the most competent

military professionals Lithuania ever produced.

He was of the opinion

that Giedraitis was holding back military arming and strengthening.
economic crises

in

Europe meant

that

Lithuania could

military as quickly as it would have liked.

The

not arm its

However, since Kubiliunas

concentrated only on military matters, he did not understand this.

This

animosity was exacerbated when budget shifts went against the defense
ministry and in favor of the agriculture ministry, whose head was Prime
Minister Juozas Tubelis.

Kubiliunas blamed Giedraitis, whom he felt

could not adequately defend the military's interests in the cabinet.

In

addition to disliking Giedraitis and Tubelis, Kubiliunas also disliked
Interior Minister Colonel Steponas Rusteika, whose Internal Security

49Herkelis, pp. 422-423; Musteikis, p. 12; Stasys Rastikis,
Lietuvos likimo keliais: Is mano uzrasu (On the Roads of Lithuania's
Destiny: From Hy Notes), ed. Jonas Dainauskas (Chicago: Akademines
skautijos leidykla I
Academic Press, 1982), pp. 233, 251.
For
biographical information see A. -Sova, "Buve vadai ir tautiniai herojai"
("Past Leaders and National Heroes"), Karys, March 1975, pp. 92-94; A.
Sova, "Generolas Petras Kubiliunas" ("General Petras Kubiliunas"),
Karys, February 1976, pp. 49-53, March 1976, pp. 87-93; O. Urbonas,
"Generolas Petras Kubiliunas" ("General Petras Kubiliunas"), Karys,
June-July 1973, pp. 195-200. Cf. chap. 2 of this study for professional
military contempt toward politics.
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Department had begun surveillance of officers.so
The Voldemaras group played on Kubiliunas' anger, urging him to
frighten Smetona into replacing Prime Minister Tubelis with Professor
Voldemaras.

According to their logic, this would be beneficial for both

domestic and foreign politics.

If Voldemaras were prime minister, so

the scenario went, relations with Germany would improve.
would

purchase

Lithuanian

agricultural

products,

economic crisis and rejuvenating agriculture.

In turn, it

eliminating

the

In this improved economic

situation, the military would be able to arm and improve.

Kubiliunas

did not have to oust Smetona, whom he respected, but merely ask that new
leadership be brought into government.5 1
With these aims in mind, on the night of 6-7 June 1934, the
chief of staff confronted his commander-in-chief.

The Internal Security

Department had discovered the plot and war.ned the government.

152

military

the

policemen

and

presidential residence.

twenty-five

soldiers

were

guarding

Thus the men commanded by Kubiliunas could not

surround Smetana, and the pre.sident could speak with authority.

The two

companies that Kubiliunas marched through Kaunas, along with several
tanks, were ordered back to their barracks by Kubiliunas himself sign of his fidelity to the president.

a

Kubiliunas was not willing to

have Lithuanian troops fight among each other, for the cadets of the
Military Academy and

the men

of the

second

infantry regiment were

50Merkelis, pp. 423-424; Rastikis, Ivykiai ir zmones, p. 96.
51Merkelis, p. 424.
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prepared to liquidate the revolt.

Two delegations of officers headed by

Kubiliunas would visit Smetona and demand changes in the cabinet.

On

both occasions, Smetana refused to negotiate and stated that he would
not make such decisions under duress.

Since Kubiliunas was a loyal

officer, and since the commander-in-chief was calling his bluff, the
revolt thus ended.52
Meanwhile, Professor Augustin as Voldemaras had been flown from
exile

in

However,

Zarasai
it was

to

Kaunas

and

waited

at

air

force

soon realized that the attempt had

headquarters.

failed.

Under

demands from the government, Colonel Juozas Narakas brought Voldemaras
to military headquarters, where he was arrested by Defense Minister
Giedraitis. 53
Though

others

authority to it.

organized

the

revolt,

Kubiliunas

lent

Thus a court-martial sentenced him to death.

his
Two

other officers, Colonel Narakas- and Lieutenant Colonel Jonas Backis,
received the same sentence.
Smetana commuted
fifteen
amnestied

years
8

the

sentences

respectively
April

In response to requests for clemency,

1936,

for

to

life

for

Kubiliunas,

Narakas

and

Backis.

Kubiliunas

and

Backis

Kubiliunas was allowed to live on his farm.
received

prison

sentences.

Others

were

16

twelve and
Narakas

February

was
1937.

A number of officers

transferred

to

different

52.For details of the revolt see Jakstas,' pp. 141-142; Merkelis,
pp. 424-428;> 'Musbe·ikis., pp. 15-18; Norem, p.· 137.
53Jaksta::t,. p. ,142; Musteiki~, pp. 18-19; Skipitis, Nepriklausoma
Lietuva, p. 147.
Jakstas wrftes 'that Voldemaras remarked to air force
officers, "You brought me right into prison."
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units.

Approximately seventy officers were discharged.

ones were able to remain in the reserve.

The fortunate

The unfortunate ones were

demoted to enlisted grades, had their shoulder insignia cut off in front
of the men, and were dishonorably discharged.5 4 General Rastikis writes
that "many stars fell from shoulders" following the revolt.55
Although Kubiliunas and the Iron Wolf failed to bring about a
change in the regime, Smetona decided to replace a number of ministers
on 12 June.

One of them was the new defense minister, General Petras

Sniuksta, the longtime head of the military tribunal system.

He had,

according to Rastikis, a better working relationship with the military
leadership.5 6

Tubelis,

however,

remained

as

prime minister.

The

Nationalists were not prepared to relinquish relevant political power -and were certainly not willing to allow Voldemaras to gain a foot in the
political door.
There were other high-level changes in military attaches and
unit commanders.

The new chief of staff was Lieutenant General Jonas

Jackus, a hot-tempered man who dealt with the rebels severely.

However,

a brain hemorrhage would incapacitate him soon after his apointment.
The new commandant of the Military Academy was Colonel Jonas Cerni us,
who would become chief of staff the following year.

Significantly,

5 4Bulota,Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, p. 124; Jakubickas, p.
65; Merkelis, p. 428; Musteikis, pp. 20-21; Rastikis, Ivykiai ir zmones,
p. 96; Skipitis, Nepriklausoma Lietuva, p. 148.
55Rastikis, Ivykiai ir zmones, p. 97.
56Rastikis, I, p. 487.
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Major Aloyzas Valusis was named the commander of a cavalry regiment.
Valusis was Smetona's first military aide following the coup

and his

~

The changes on the military chessboard meant that some

son-in-law.

individuals, such as Cerni us, Stasys Rastikis, and Kazys Musteikis, a
future

defense

sequence.

minister,

would

become

general

This occurred at other grades as well.

officers

out

of

It was the inevitable

result of political considerations playing a greater role in military
appointments. 57

Further aspects of politico-military affairs will be

discussed in the following chapter.
G.

THE FATE OF VOLDEMARAS
A military tribunal sentenced Professor Augustinas Voldemaras to

twelve years imprisonment.

He was amnestied, though, in 1938 under the

condition that he leave the country.

After spending some time in Paris

and Rome, he violated his exile .and returned to Lithuania in 1939.

He

was seized at the border and sent once again to Zarasai in northeastern
Lithuania.
Following

Voldemaras
the

Soviet

was

exiled

occupation

again
of

in

Lithuania

the
on

spring
15

of

1940.

June

1940,

Voldemaras, for some as yet unknown reason, returned to Lithuania.
was seized at the border and deported to the Soviet Union.

He

Death came

in a Moscow prison on 16 December 1942 -- almost exactly sixteen years
after the coup.
Iron Wolf continued to operate under the guise of the Lithuanian
Nationalist Party.

The Voldemaras faction continued to subvert the

57Augustaitis, Antanas Smetona, pp. 68-69; Merkelis, p. 427.
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government and attempt to overthrow Smetona.

However, Voldemaras and

the wolves were never strong or organized enough to succeed.58

58Bulota, Nuo baltojo zirgo iki svastikos, p. 149 writes that
some of the Kubiliunas rebels amnestied several years after the revolt
began agitating in the officer corps to overthrow Smetona.

CHAPTER V
POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS
A. A POLITICIZED MILITARY
According to Western tradition, the military is subordinate to
This is one of the hallmarks of modern, liberal

civilian authority.

However, reality dictates that the two spheres cannot be

democracy.

wholly separated.
often

the

For example, the political chief executive is also

commander-in-chief of the military;

the line is blurred.

Defense belongs to politics and can be manipulated by it for selfish
political ends.
instrument. 1

Indeed the military can become a blatantly political

General Stasys Dirmantas created an analogy between the

military and a knife.

According to him, a knife can be used to cut

bread for the hungry -

or to stab a person. 2

connection

Smetana

during

the

regime

The politico-military

demonstrated

the

ambivalent

position of the military in both state and society.
One

school

of

thought

says

that

the

military

influence in the politics of independent_ Lithua_nia.

had

little

General Dirmantas

stated that the "military never had decision-making authority in affairs

1see Antanas Sova, "Del praeities ivykiu" ("About Past Events"),
Dirva, 30 January 1974, p. 3.
2A. Reklaitis, "Lietuvos kariuomenei prisiminti: Pasikalbejimas
su Ramoves pirm. gen. S. Dirmantu" ("Remembering Lithuania's Army:
Conversation with Ramove President General Sta sys Dirmantas"), Draugas,
21 November 1964, p. 3.
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of state and the state was not militaristic. "3

Gerutis writes:

Since the regime came into existence as a result of a military coup,
the army was to become an important politic al factor. Though the
President constantly reiterated the importance of the army in the
life of the state, there were no tendencies among the army officers
to take a direct hand in the affairs of state. The officers' group
which organized the coup turned the gove4nment over to civilians, and
repeated their faith in Antanas Smetona.
Granted the state was not militaristic and government was turned over to
President Smetona.

Yet, Gerutis appears to hedge his bets with regard

to the role of the military in politics, granting it the status of
"important political factor."
A more
acknowledge

realistic

appraisal

the military's

internal and external factors.

political

is made by those
role,

attributing

analysts who
it to both

One example follows:

The domestic politic al order in Lithuania had a number of innediate
consequences to foreign and defense policies. Lithuania under the
Nationalist one-party regime of President Antanas Smetona can be
described as a partially mobilized conservative authoritarian system,
without formal sub-system (infrastructure) autonomy, but with
considerable pluralistic and competitive processes persisting among
the input structures of the system.
The anti-industrial and
traditionalist bias of the Smetona regime, its conservative agrarianoriented economic policies 'in the long run imposed severe limitations
on national military capabilities.
Lithuanian society was only
partially mobilized for the tasks of modernization, and this
substantially affected national capabilities for self-defense. The
army was mainly important for internal order, and the nation's
security depended largely on the state of relations between Berlin,
Moscow, and Warsaw.
Furthermore, the nationalistic attitudes that
the Smetona regime found necessary to promote, as means of
maintaining unity and the regime itself, imposed severe limitations
on the flexibility of foreign policy, especially on the handling of
3Reklaitis, p. 3.
4Albertas

Gerutis, "Independent Lithuania," in Lithuania 700
Years, 2nd rev. ed., ed. Albertas Gerutis (New York: Manyland, 1969),
p. 222.
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the key Vilnius question. Finally, one-party rule affected decisionmaking capabilities and quality of leadership. On the one hand, the
limited interest articulation and mobilization of society and, on the
other hand, the logic of one-party rule resulted in a relative
isolation of the Smetona regime from society and imposed severe
constraints on wider consultation and recruitment of leaders.5
The gist of the citation is that Lithuania had no control over its
external affairs.

Its relatively small army, though undoubtedly the

guardian of independence until 1940, would have been ineffective against
a deliberate attempt to destroy the Lithuanian state.
domestic

context,

however,

the

army

existence of the Smetona regime.

was

needed

to

Within the
guarantee

the

The alliance between the Nation's

Leader and the military was crucial to the survival of the post-coup
order. 6
Western
military.
merely
duties.

politicians

lamented

this

state

of

the

Lithuanian

Many senior officers, according to one American analyst, were

political

figures

Instability and

not

interested

political

in,

or

suited

intrigue affected

officer corps, but the enlisted ranks as well.

to,

their

not only the

This would change only

in the latter years of independence.7
5Thomas Remeikis, "The Impact of Internal Politics on Response
Capabilities of the Lithuanian Regime to International Challenges, 19381940," in Seoond Conference on Baltic Studies: Summari of Proceedings,
ed. Rimvydas Silbajoris, ·et al. (Norman, OK: Association for the
Advancement of Baltic Studies, 1971), p. 65.
6cf. Vladas Krivickas, The Coup d 'Etat of 1926 in Lithuania,
Diss. Columbia University 1970, p. 242.
7stasys Rastikis, Ivykiai ir' zmones, pp. 17-18; V. Stanley
Vardys, "Independent Lithuania: A Profile," in Lithuania Under the
Soviets: Portrait of a Nation, 1940-65, ed. V. Stanley Vardys (New York:
Praeger, 1965). p.• 38.
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Changes among the "Big Three" of the military, that is the
defense minister, the commander-in-chief, and the chief of staff, were
closely tied to politics.
military

would

receive

With almost every change in the cabinet, the
three

new men

to

run

its

affairs.

This

politicization allowed little, if any, time for consistent planning and
execution.

The Nationalists, of course, attempted to capitalize most on

these changes; however, as has been shown above, opposition parties were
not above intrigue.

Fragmentation and discontent in the army followed

-- a reflection of the fragmented nature of society during the Smetona
era. 8
In view of the fluid and unpredictable nature of politics, the
Nationalists wished to "nationalize" the military.

According to them,

if an officer had any dealings with the political opposition, this was
an unwarranted intrusion of politics into the military.

On the other

hand, if an officer dealt with the Nationalist Association, it was not
considered unacceptable, for it was a non-political association, not a
party.9

Thus when

assigning commanding officers of regiments and

higher, loyalty and trustworthiness both politically and personally to
Smetona were important criteria.
unable

to

develop

in

the

As a result, strong personalities were

military.

This

passivity

would

have

8Rastikis, Ivykiai ir zmones, pp. 17-18; V. Stanley Vardys,
"Independent Lithuania: A Profile," in Lithuania Under the Soviets:
Portrait of a Nation, 1940-65, ed. V. Stanley Vardys (New York: Praeger,
1965)' p. 38.
9stasys Rastikis, Ko¥-Ose del Lietuvos: Kario atsiminimai (In the
Battles for Lithuania: A Soldier's Reminiscences) (Los Angeles: Lietuviu
dienos I Lithuanian Days, 1956), It 500-501.
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devastating consequences in 1940 when challenged by the Soviet Union. 10
A short

catalogue

reveals

the

interconnection

political and military spheres in Lithuania.
felt beyond formal military boundaries.

between

the

The military's effect was

For example, there were many

reserve officers holding positions in the important Interior Ministry.
Colonel Kazys Skirpa, the chief of staff who attempted to halt the 1926
coup, was appointed military attache to Germany in 1928.

He would also

hold ministerial positions at the League of Nations and in Warsaw.

1938 he was appointed minister to Germany. 11

In

Colonel Povilas Zadeikis

was minister to the US from 1935 until his death in 1957.

Lieutenant

Colonel Juozas Papeckys was dismissed as defense minister following the
coup, but was allowed to remain in the military•

He was named to the

board of the justice ministry in 1927 and two years later became a
member of the Council of State. 12

General Petras Sniuksta, appointed

defense minister in 1934 following the Kubiliunas revolt, was a member
of the Council of State in 1935-1936 following his retirement from the
military. 13 Lieutenant General Teodoras Daukantas was named a member of

10Antanas Rukas, Mykolas Slezevicius (Chicago: Terra, 1954),
p. 278. See also Bronius Bieliukas, "Tegul meile viens kitam dega musu
sirdyse" ("Let the Love for One Another Burn in Our Hearts"), Karys,
December 1975, pp. 374-375.
11 A.
Gaigalai te,
"Burzuaziniai
nacionalistai
hi tlerines
Vokietijos tarnyboje 1939-1941" ("Bourgeoise Nationalists in the Service
of Hitler's Germany 1939-1941 11 ) , Lietuvos TSR Mokslo darbai (Works of
the Lithuanian SSR), Series A, 2 (11), (1961), 140.
12Aleksandras Merkelis, Antanas Smetona: Jo visuomenine,
kulturine ir politine veikla (Antanas Smetona: His Social, Cultural, and
Political Activity) (New York: American Lithuanian National Association,
1964), pp. 384-385.
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the

Council

minister.

in

November

1928

after

holding

the

post

of

defense

In January 1931 he was named the first charge d' affaires to

South America (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay). 14

The cabinet of

Brigadier General Jonas Cernius in 1939 contained four general officers
holding the posts of prime minister and ministers of defense, finance,
and interior. 15
Granted, officers were required to retire to the reserve prior
to assuming political posts.

However, many continued to wear uniforms

while carrying out their political duties.
line between politic al and military affairs.

This further blurred the
There was not really a

civil-military dualism as found in the U.S. military establishment, for
example.
always

With the exception of four years, the defense minister was
an

army officer whose political role was played out in the

cabinet.
B. SMETONA AND THE MILITARY
During the wars of independence in
popular

names

among

Lithuanian

military

1918-1920, the two most
volunteers

were

that

of

Commander-in-Chief General Silvestras Zukauskas and President Antanas

13Rapolas
Ski pi tis,
Nepriklausoma
Lietuva:
Atsiminimai
(Independent Lithuania: Reminiscences) (Chicago: Draugas, 1967), p. 188.
14Merkelis, pp. 365, 441.
15 Rastikis, I, pp. 554, 557.
The appointment of pre-coup
officials to important posts demonstrates, as discussed in the previous
chapter, the leniency of the regime.
The Skirpa and Daukantas
appointments, however, may have been measures to remove them from
influence, or "kick them upstairs."
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This

Smetona.

popularity

following the 1926 coup.

helped

ensconce

the new

National

Leader

It was largely Smetona's popularity within the

military as one of the nation's saviors that guaranteed the survival of
his regime.
Smetona felt that Lithuania would remain strong as long as the
military
honorable

was

obedient

calling

in

and

unified.

guaranteeing

Further,
the

the military

nation's

freedom.

had

an

He would

constantly mention the following: chivalry, strength, virtue, bravery,
obedience, harmony, the difficult wars of independence.

The military,

along with all of society, composed one body and one soul.
far

However, as

as the maintenance of independence was concerned, the military

possessed primacy.

By default, if the nation was legally in a state of

war with dangerous neighbors surrounding and threatening it, especially
Poland, there were implications for the importance of the mili tary's
political role. 16
Smetona viewed the military as performing an important role in
.national

development

and

education.

A soldier,

as

far

as

he

was

concerned, needed a· deep and broad knowledge of national ideals. and
culture.

This is to' develop dutiful and productive individuals with a

strong Lithuanian character, for it was spirit, and not numbers of men
and types of weapons, which determined superiority. 17
16Merkelis, pp. 354, 359; Edvardas Sulaitis, "A. Smetona apie
kariuomene" (A. Smetona on the Army"), Karys, June-July 1959, p. 162.
17Merkelis, pp. 413-414, 423.
Major F.G. Beaumont-Nesbitt of
the British Army's General Staff inspected the Lithuanian army in July
1927.
He was impressed by its discipline and training.
He stated,
"With such a disciplined and well-trained army, you Lithuanians will
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What

were

the

ties

between

the

president

and

the

officer

This question is problematic, for even Smetona' s biographer,

corps?

Aleksandras Merkelis, is ambivalent regarding the answer.

On the one

hand, he writes that there were close and trustworthy ties between the
president
president.

and

the

military,

He would

stemming

from

his

status

as

first

often eat lunch and dinner with the officers

assigned to the presidential residence, even play cards with them. 18

On

the other hand, Merkelis criticizes the military for desiring the lion's
share of control over domestic politic al 11 fe; the president's and the
military's relationship was not always smooth. 19

Another commentator

repeats this opinion, stating that Smetona did not trust the officers.
He only had to remember

the revolt of his chief of staff, General

Kubiliunas, to recall his fears. 20
The · president
ceremonies.

participated

in

all major military events and

1928 and 1929 were especially busy.years.

The former was

overcome your enemies. While technically weaker, you will surpass them
morally."
See E.J. Harrison, ed., Lithuania 1928 (London: Hazell,
Watson, & Viney, 1928), pp. 71-72. A. Reklaitis, "Lietuvos kariuomenei
prisiminti:
Pasikalbejimas su
Ramoves
pirm.
gen.
s. Dirmantu"
("Remembering Lithuania's Army: Conversation with Ramove President
General Stasys Dirmantas"), Draugas, 23 November 1964, p. 5 writes in
the same vein, stating that Lithuania's military preceded the formation
of the Lithuanian state in 1253, for the Lithuanians were forced to band
together to defend themselves against invaders.
18Merkelis, pp. 411, 458-459.
19Merkelis, p. 472.
See also "Antanas Smetona ir kariuomene"
("Antanas Smetana and the Army"), Karys, 13 June 1940, pp. 634-635.
20 Petras Jurgela and Paulius JurkUs, Gen. Povilas Plechavicius
(Brooklyn: Karys, 1978), p. 70.
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the decennial of independence, the latter the celebration of ten years
existence for many military units.
maneuvers, and visited barracks.

Smetona also attended drills and

He was a frequent visitor at veterans'

gatherings, especially honoring invalids as living monuments of a free
Lithuania. 21
As in the US, all officer commissions were formally issued by
the president.

In a pledge of almost personal loyalty to Smetona, each

graduate of the Military Academy would kneel before the president and be
touched on the shoulders with the officer's saber.

The president would

intone to each, "Do not raise this without purpose, do not lower it
without honor" ("Be reikalo nepakelk, be garbes nenuleisk").

In 1929,

the name of the Military Academy was changed to "Military Academy of the
First Lithuanian President" (Pirmojo Lietuvos Prezidento Karo Mokykla),
with Smetona's likeness on the Academy's flag.22
Before leaving this

section,

a short synthesis of Smetona' s

speeches and writings regarding the military will be put forth.
first

volume of

posthumously in

his
the

works
US. 23

was

published

On

18 May

in

1934,

Lithuania,

the

The
second

Smetona gave a speech

21 Merkelis, pp. 411, 413.
22Merkelis, pp. 364, 412; Vaclovas Sliogeris, Antanas Smetona:
Zmosus ir valstybininkas.
Atsiminimai (Antanas Smetona: Person and
Statesman. Remini.scences) (Sodus, MI: Juozas J. Bachunas, 1966), p.
64. For a photograph of the commissioning of a new lieutenant, see H.
Serafinas, .ed., V:ttauto Didziojo mirties 500 metu sukaktuvems pamineti
albumas (Album Commemorating the 500th Anniversary of the Death of
Vftautas the Great). (~aunas: Spindulys, 1933), p. 166.
'

.

2 3Antanas Smetona, Pasakyta parasyta: 1927-1934 (Spoken Written:
1927-1934) (Kaunas: Pazanga, 1935), I; and Smetona, Pasakyta parasyta:
1935-1940 (Spoken Written: 1935-1940), ed. Leonas Sabaliunas (Boston:
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containing politic al implications at the graduation of the first class
of the Senior Officer Courses.
foundation

of

political

principle operates

in

life

the

He said that the Leader (Vadas) is the
everywhere

military.

comprehend other aspects of life.

in

the

Officers,

world.

The

same

however,

must

also

They must understand politics and

teach youth within that framework.24
As far as Smetona was concerned, the barracks were the home not
only of the soldiers, but of the entire nation as well.

There, young

men from all over the country came together and grew in a spirit of
unity.

A soldier must be proud of his army and nation, for they compose

one family.

In addition, defense is the concern of everyone; every

individual must conscientiously carry out his duties. 2 5
War

and

various

Smetona's speeches.
the military.

Thus

external

threats

were

frequent

themes

of

During war, he said, all activity revolves around
in

peacetime an

officer

must be aware of his

nation's history, geography, and language in order to best carry out his
wartime duties.

Politics, in the broad sense of that term, must not be

foreign to the officer. 26

In a speech to the University of Vytautas the

Great Student Reserve Officers Fraternity
Smetona

warned

that

the

threat

of

11

war

Ramove" on 21 October 1934,
lurks

---------------.
Lithuanian Encyclopedia Press, 1974), II.
24Merkelis, pp. 412-413.
2 5smetona, I, pp. 20, 40; II, pp. 180-181.
2 6Smetona, I, p. 35.

everywhere

and

is
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He said that the next war will involve entire nations.

increasing.

Thus.. military preparation must be broad and all-encompassing, using
military development to develop national consciousness. 27

On another

occasion he repeated that the entire nation must prepare for war.
must be re-educated on the basis of obedience and unity.

It

Every school,

organization, and activity must serve this purpose, for the military is
strong only when the nation is united: 28
It would be a mistake to surmise that the nation's security depends
solely on armed force. Good order in society, national consciousness
and various spiritual goods are also great forces in resisting
danger. We prepare them together, thus all must be good, cooperative
workmen. The idea of national unity must predominate, not only in
the defense of the Motherland, but in all the work we do. 29
As

far

as the

president's formal

powers vis-a-vis military

affairs are concerned, they will be reviewed in the relevant appendices
of this study.
formal

powers

The following sections of this chapter deal with the
of

other

very

powerful

individuals

in

independent

Lithuania, namely the district military commandants who, in the formal
state of war which existed, wielded considerable political power.
C. THE DISTRICT MILITARY COMMANDANTS
In all

fairness

to Smetona, he was not the first to give

military conrnandants civil authority.

As early as

1919, military

conrnandants could issue orders under paragraphs six and seven of the

27Merkelis, p. 423.
28smetona, I, pp. 39, 42.
29smetona, II, p. 295.
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Special State Defense Statutes (Ypatingi valstybes apsaugos istatai),
passed on 7 February 1919. 30

The police and civil administration were

bound to execute these orders.
countermand

civil

Under

orders.

exercise

control

over

restrict

freedom

of

The commandants could also overrule and

assembly;
the

paragraph
paragraph

press. 31

Each

ten,
twelve

commandants could
allowed

administrative

them

to

district

(apskritis) had a civil head (apskrities virsininkas) and a military
commandant (karo komendantas).

During the period of independence there

were anywhere from twenty-three to twenty-nine districts in Lithuania.32
The commandants frequently used their power over assembly.

For

example, on 29 January 1930 the Kaunas commandant issued Order Nine,
which stated that the civilian district head must receive a request for
30see Laikinosios vyriausyb'8 zinios (Provisional Government
News) (Kaunas: Ministru tarybos kanceliarija I Chancellory of the
cabinet), 7 February 1919, No. 4.
31Juozas Bulavas, Rinkimai ir "tautos atstovavimas" burzuazineje
Lietuvoje (Elections and "National Representation" in Bourgeoise
Lithuania) (Vilnius: State Political and Scientific Press, 1956), pp.
See also M. Maksimaitis, 11 Burzuazinio teisetumo paneigimas
49-50.
administraciniu-policiniu organu antiliaudine veikla Lietuvoje 1919-1926
metais" ("The Countermanding of Bourgeoise Law in the Anti-Populist
Activity of Administrative and Police Organs in Lithuania 1919- 1926"),
Lietuvos TSR Mokslo Akademi os Darbai (Works of the Lithuanian SSR
Academy of Sciences , Series A, 2 (13), (19 2), 2 -28, which discusses
laws regarding organizations (Laikinosios Vyriausybes Zinios No. 15,
October 1919), assembly CLpikinosios Vyriausxbes Zinios No. 20, 21
February 1920), press (Laikinosios Vyriausybes Zinios No. 17, 30
November 1919 and Vyriausybes Zinios No. 197, 20 June 1925.
32see Centralinis Statistikos Biuras I Central Statistical
Bureau, Lietuvos statistikos metrastis (Lithuanian Statistical Yearbook)
(Kaunas: c.s.B.), 1927-8, p. 1; 1932, p. 6; 1938, p. 13; and the
Bureau's Visa Lietuva: Informacine knyga (All Lithuania: Infonaation
Book) (Kaunas: Spaudos fondas I Press Fund), 1922, pp. 236-237; 1931,
p. 24.
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permission to assemble at least fourteen days prior to the meeting.
request had
Permission

to

include the

from the

head

program and

had

abstracts of the

The

speeches.

to be registered in the local police

station twenty-four hours before the meeting.

One week later on 6

February 1930, the Internal Security Department of the Interior Ministry
issued

Circular

official

17086,

positive
In

meeting.
Association

or

the

which

required

negative

spring

of

opinion

that

heads

regarding

year,

the

to

each

Kaunas

state

an

requested

Food

Workers

(Kauno maisto produktu darbininku ir tarnautoju sajunga)

twice asked for permission to assemble.
the

district

organization

"bolshevik."

Upon

The civil district head labeled
receipt

of

this

opinion,

the

military commandant rejected the request on 17 April 1930.33
The commandants' power also had politic al implications.
various communist

After

excesses in response to poor economic conditions,

Kaunas military commandant Lieutenant Colonel Zigmas Talevicius issued
an order on

27 August

1933 under

the State of Emergency Statutes.

Agitation would result in three months imprisonment or a five thousand
litas

fine.

An

attack upon

the civil

police would result in the

criminal being brought before a military tribuna1.3 4

Two years later,

330. Ruzelyte, "Susirinkimu laisve ir jos suvarzymas darbo
zmonems burzuazineje Lietuvoje" ("Freedom of Assembly and Restrictions
for Working People in Bourgeoise Lithuania", ed. H. Miskinis, et al.
(Vilnius: Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences, 1976), pp. 101-103• See
H.K., Valstybininkas politikos sukuriuose: Prelatas Mykolas Krupavicius
1885-1970 (Statesman in the Whirlwind of Politios: Prelate Mykolas
Krupavicius 1885-1970) (Chicago: Pope Leo XIII Fund, 1980), p. 181 for
an account of how the local military commandant gave Rev. Mykolas
Krupavicius permission to speak at a meeting.
34Merkelis, pp. 444-445.
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FIGURE 5.1: LITHUANIAN ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS

1 JANUARY 1939
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in November 1935, Smetona would use the commandants to close down all
opposition parties.

This under a presidential act which allowed the

commandants to restrict or close organizational activity threatening to
the state.35
The entire basis for the power of the regime, in general, and
the co11111andants, in particular, was the state of war (karo stovis) which
existed in the country, even during peacetime.
lifted by the

Grinius-Slezevicius

The state of war was

administration

in

1926, but was

reinstated three days after the coup on 20 December 1926.

This was

based on a "recommendation" by the cabinet and paragraph thirty-two of
the Constitution.
Lithuania

and

Presidential Act 517-a declared a state of war in all

ended

guaranties

of

constitutional

civil

rights.3 6

Military and police methods were utilized during the entire state of
war, especially· during the Seimas elections of 1936. 37

General Petras

Sniuksta, who served as defense. minister from 12 June 1934 until 2
November

1935,

disliked

the

state

of

war,

especially

since

his

commandants were forced to dispose of political cases and punishments.
35see Vyriausybes Zinios (Government News) (Kaunas: Ministru
tarybos kanceliarija I Chancellory of the Cabinet), No. 450, 12 July
1934; Bulavas, p. 90; Lithuanian Christian Democratic Association,
Arkivyskupas Mecislovas Reinys (ArchbishoE Mecislovas Reinys) (Chicago:
L.C.D.A., 1977), p. 45; M. Maksimaitis, "Tautininku fasistine diktatura"
("Nationalist Fascist
Dictatorship"),
in
Burzuazijos diktaturos
Lietuvoje valstybiniai-teisiniai aspektai (State and Legal Aspects of
the Bourgeoise Dictatorship in Lithuania), ed. H. Miskinis, et al.
(Vilnius: Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences, 1976), p. 84; M.K.,
p. 127.
36vyriausybes Zinios No. 242/1582; Bulavas, pp. 88-89.
37su1avas, p. 57.
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Indeed

he

resigned

over

this

matter

after

becoming

embroiled

in

differences with the ministers of justice and interior.38
General Stasys Rastikis, conunander-in-chief 1935-1940, fought
long and hard to end the permanent peacetime state of war.

Supporters

of the state of war said that it was needed to maintain order in the
troubled Klaipeda region; it would be politically unfeasible to maintain
it in that region if it were not enforced in Lithuania Major as well.
Rastikis surmises that perhaps the political leadership preferred to
have the military conmandants punish citizens administratively, rather
than judicially.

This was more efficient and allowed politicians to

keep their hands clean of distasteful political cases.

Rastikis wished

to release the commandants of functions which he felt should properly
have been handled by the ministries of interior and justice.

He wanted

them to deal strictly with military matters, such as management, draft
enforcement, mobilization, and preparedness.

The state of war made the

conunandants unpopular figures, for punishments for political offenses
were made in their name, though the cases were managed by the civil
police.

The military even had to carry out the death penalty for

civilian offenders, though there were not many such instances.

Rastikis

saw this as inconsistent with the calling of a soldier, the principles
of military honor, and moral development.39
Under pressure from Germany, which threatened not to conclude a

38Sliogeris, p. 129.
39Rastikis, I, pp. 408-409.
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new and broader trade pact, the state of war was recalled on 1 November
1938.

As a result, the military

no longer had to deal with political

offenses and more civil liberties ensued.

However, Germany would use

this to agitate in Klaipeda.40
Administrative

punishment

was

co111Dandants under the state of war.

the

tool

used

by

military

It circumvented regular judicial

channels and allowed them to unilaterally punish civilians.

Many cases

that the co11111andants dealt with were rather mundane, including curfew
violations, public drunkenness, and disorderly conduct. 41
the

Srnetona

Statutes

regime,

allowed

a

paragraph
military

eight

of

commandant

the
to

Special
punish

a

Even prior to
State

Defense

person

deemed

dangerous to the public order or who had participated in anti-state
activity.
district,

There were four types of punishment:
2)

three months

imprisonment or

fine,

1) exile out of the
3)

sentencing to a

concentration/hard labor camp for any length of time (though the camps
were administered by the justice ministry), 4) exile out of Lithuania
itself.

Any citizen could be punished by any of these methods for not

obeying mandatory directives of the commandants. 42
40Martynas Anysas, Kova del Klaipedos: Atsiminimai 1927-1939
(The Battle for Klaipeda: Reminiscences 1927-1939), ed. H.G. Slav~nas
(Chicago: Lithuanian Cultural Society, 1978), pp. 352-353; Maksimaitis,
"Tautininku fasistine diktatura," p. 82; Rastikis, I, p. 409.
4 1See Karpenka, "Komendaturos isteigimas ir jos veikimas"
C"Commandery's Founding and Activities"), in Kauno karo komendatura
1919-1929 (Kaunas Military Co111Dandery 1919-1929), ed. P. Jurgelevicius
{Kaunas: Kaunas Municipal and District Co111Dandery, 1930), p. 57 for the
1926-1928 Kaunas district statistics regarding these minor violations.
42 A. Berzelionis, Dimitravo sienos netyli: Dokumentine apybraiza
(The Walls of Dimitrava are not Silent: A Documentary Sketch) (Vilnius:
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The following table, Table 5. 1, gives statistics with regard to
the

number

of

individuals

serving

administrative

punishments on

1

January:

TABLE 5.1: ADMINISTRATIVE PUNISHMENTS
BEING SERVED ON 1 JANUARY 1928-1936
1928

1929

1930

1931

1932

1933

1934

1935

38

45

67

54

80

109

89

67

-

1936
129

Source: Compiled and cross-checked from Bulavas, p. 93, Centralinis
Statistikos Biuras, Lietuvos statistikos metrastis, 1929-30, p. 147;
1931, p. 353; 1932, p. 271; 1933, p. 291; 1934, p. 300.

In

the

period

1927-1940,

a

total

of

6, 329

individuals

received

administrative punishments (administracine tvarka nubausti). 43
D. MILITARY TRIBUNALS
One

area

where

the

military

intruded

civilian sector was the judicial sphere.

into

a

traditionally

The military tribunal was

Mintis, 1968), p. 8; Bulavas, p. 53; Karpenka, p. 54; Vyriausybes Zinios
No. 49.
43v.

Sinkevicius,
"Lietuvos
valstieciu
dalyvavimas
revoliuciniame
ir
antifasistiniame
judejime
1927-1940
metais"
(Lithuania's Peasant Participation in the Revolutionary and Anti-Fascist
Movement, 1927-1940"), Istorija, 15, 2 (1975), 41. Statistics from the
Kauna~ district display an increase in administrative punishments issued
by the local military cormnandant in 1927, the year following the coup.
There were seventy-six sent to camps as opposed to fifty-three the
previous year.
Sixty-seven were exiled from the Kaunas district as
opposed to eighteen in 1926. The year 1928, however, displayed dramatic
decreases
in
both
categories:
twenty-five
and
twenty-eight,
respectively. See Karpenka, p. 58.
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often used to try civilians for both politic al
By

way of introduction into procedural

and criminal offenses.

questions, the following is

ofj'.ered:
According to the Military Court Statutes .Promulgated on March 27,
1919, and subsequent amendments thereto, a military court is formed
in order to speedily deal with serious offenders whose guilt is
already quite clear and does not call for prolonged investigation.
'Ole object of a military court is to punish the offender as quickly
as possible and thereby put a stop to the further spread of similar
offences.
A military court is formed in places where the army is
actively combating the enemy or where a state of war has been
declared.
'Ole Commander-in-Chief authorizes a military court to be
formed, and in his absence the Minister of National Defence.
In
special cases, the aforesaid persons may delegate the formation of a
military court to lower commanders. A Military court is composed of
an officer president, two members from among officers, and two from
among the men able to read and write.
Officers appointed to a
military court must have served not less than two years in the
regular army, and of the men one must be a non-commissioned officer •
• • • A court, the confirmation of sentence, and its fulfilment (only
where the death penalty is awarded) must last not longer than two
days. 'Ole condemned person within two days may appeal to the central
Government for pardon.
Civilians may be brought before a military
court for espionage, if they are caught on the spot and their guilt
is perfectly clear.
For robbery and murder, if the offender is
caught on the spot or not far away, the death penalty may be awarded
instead of penal servitude.
For Bolshevism, anti-State agitation,
and agitation in favour of the enemy, among the troops, inciting to
active non-fulfilment of State laws, or opposition to the Government,
overt action against State order, rising against the Government,
formation of Bolshevistic organizations or other organizations
hostile to the Government, if the offender is caught in flagrante
delicto, whether he is a soldier or civilian, the punishment may
include imprisonment of two years or more, up to the death penalty.
Furthermore, the Commander-in-Chief or the Minister of National
Defence has the right to bring before a military court and punish
according to the laws in force during war time persons accused of
other offences, if such should be deemed of sufficient gravity, or to
protect the interests of the army, or for the sake of public order
and tranquility of the State.44
The fact that civilians could be tried by military tribunals is
44 Harrison, pp. 65-66.
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neither a new nor surprising phenomenon.
Civil War to see such activity.

~American

judicial alteration.
in

One need only reflect upon the

Thus the key phrase, "a military court is formed
where

places

accentuated.

A state of war permits such

a

state

of

war

has

been

declared,"

is

The peacetime state of war provided the authority to bring

civilians before military tribunals for the aforementioned violations.
During

the

wars of independence, military tribunals were

an

efficient tool utilized by military commandants to clean the country of
looters and bandits.

In all fairness, it must also be recalled that the

state of war was in effect during the Christian Democratic regime of
President Aleksandras Stulginskis from 1920 until 1926, whereupon it was
cancelled

by

the

short-lived

Grinius-Slezevicius

administration.

Smetana returned this practice and efficiently used it to bolster his
regime,

take

distasteful

political

cases out

of the

hands of the

civilian leadership, and neutralize the opposition without encumbering
civil procedural requirements.

All that was needed was an agreement

among the ministers of interior, defense,
civil suit to a military tribunal.

and justice to transfer a

In the period 1919-1940, seventy-

five percent of all political suits were tried before military tribunals
-- 22.5% in military field courts (karo lauko teismai) and 52.5% in army
courts (kariuomenes teismai). 4 5

----------------4

5Bulavas, p. 91; A. Bulota and G. Feigelsonas, "Burzuazijos
teismines represijos pries revoliucinio ir antifasistinio judejimo
dalyvius Lietuvoje 1919-1940 m." ("Bourgeoise Legal Repression .Against
Participants in the Revolutionary and Antifascist Movement in Lithuania
1919-1940"), in
Lietuvos Komunistu Partijos istorijos klausimai
(Historical Issues of the Communist Party of Lithuania), vol 6, ed. K.
Navickas,
et
al.
(Vilnius:
Mintis,
1967),
p.
200;
Skipitis,
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An example of military justice for political offenses occured in

1930-1931.
student

At the end of the summer of 1930, all seventy high school

circles

(moksleiviu

kuopos)

of

the

Lithuanian

Federation "Ateitis" were closed by the Smetana regime.

The Lithuanian

bishops then issued a pastoral letter condemning the action.
was confiscated by the Interior Ministry.

Catholic

The letter

A group of Catholic students

belonging to "Ateitis" issued an appeal to the Catholic public urging it
to heed the bishops' statements.
appeal were placed under

The authors and disseminators of this

arrest and

tribunal on 12-13 May 1931.

tried before a closed military

Two priests and six students were issued

various punishments. 46

Nepriklausoma Lietuva, p. 186.
For legal specifics see Bulavas, pp.
55-56; Mykolas Romer'is, Lietuvos konstitucines teises paskaitos
(Lectures in Lithuanian Constitutional Law) {Kaunas: Law Faculty at the
University of Vytautas the Great, 1937), I, pp. 386-389; Centralinis
Statistikos Biuras I Central Statistical Bureau, Valstybes statistikos
kalendorius (Government Statistical Almanac) (Kaunas: C.S.B.), 1937, p.
37. See also Juozas B. Laucka, "Keletas zvilgsniu i Lietuvos 1922 metu
konsti tucija: Jos kilme ir pagrindiniai principai" {"Several Looks at
Lithuania's 1922 Constitution: Its Origin and Major Principles", Aidai,
May-June 1985, pp. 133-147.
46Lithuanian Christian Democratic Association, pp. 96-97.
See
Jonas
Demereckis,
Savanorio
ir
kontrazvalgybininko
atsiminimai
{Reminiscences of a Volunteer and Counterspy) (Chicago: Author, 1976),
pp. 100-105 for an account of someone sentenced to five years hard labor
for a non-political crime by a military tribunal; the sentence was later
commuted. For other accounts see J. Lankutis, et al., eds., Atsiminimai
apie Vytauta Montvila (Reminiscences ·About Vytautas Montvilas) (Vilnius:
Vaga, 1966), pp. 292-296; Michalina Meskauskiene, Zvelgiu i tolius
{Looking in the Distance) (Vilnius: Vaga, 1969), pp. 419-422; Stasys
Rastikis, Lietuvos likimo keliais: Is mano uzrasu {On the Roads of
Lithuania's Destiny: From My Notes), ed. Jonas Dainauskas (Chicago:
Akademines skautijos leidykla I Academic Press, 1982), p. 256.
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E. INTERNAL SECURITY
While the military police would ordinarily maintain order among
the soldiers themselves, it was not unknown for them to assist the civil
General Povilas Plechavicius, who was chief of

police if necessary.

staff following the coup, successfully urged Interior Minister Colonel
Ignas Musteikis to order the civil police to work closely and routinely
with the military commandants.
and the military.

There were other ties between the police

Military officers assisted

administration of the civil police.

in

the training and

Police officers were often former

soldiers and reservists. 47
While General

Rastikis forbade the use of troops to restore

order during the Suvalkai farmers .·unrest, there were other cases when
troops were utilized.

Colonel Konstantinas Zukas,

Peasant Populist

deputy to the Constituent Seimas and former defense minister, attended a
small gathering commemorating the decennial of that Seimas on 15 May
1930.
later,

Upon exiting, Zukas saw many people and police outside.
Colonel

Kazys

Skucas,

the

commander

of

the

Six days

second

infantry

division and of the Kaunas garrison, criticized Zukas for participating
in an "outlawed, horrible demonstration."

Skucas had been under orders

to disband it, using truncheons if necessary.

However, at the last

minute, President Smetona decided to call the attack off. 48

The Kaunas

47Apolinaras Bagdonas, ed., Lietuvos policija istatymu ir
tvarkos tarnyboje (Lithuania's Police in the Service of Law and Order)
(Chicago: Lithuanian Police Club "Krivule, 11 1974), pp. 40, 47, 62; Jonas
Juodvalkis, Mano dienos: Atsiminimai (My Days: Reminiscences), ed.
Bronius Kviklys (Chicago: Anatolijus Kairys, 1973), pp. 100-101; Jurgela
and Jurkus, p. 51.
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workers' strike of 18-20 June 1936 was patrolled by troops assisting the
civil police. 49
One other police function carried out by the military under the
guise of the state of war was the censorship of publication.

Under a

state of war, nothing could be published without the approval of the
military censor.

This, however, was no secret; it was a fact generally

known

citizenry.

among

the

The

verso

of books

would

often

have

"Permitted by the Military Censor" ("Karo cenzuros leista") printed on
it.

While it was a rather liberal censorship, there were, of course,

those individuals who

attempted to circumvent it.

Professor Kazys

Pakstas was a geography professor who, during the period 1928-1931,
lectured on geography every other week in Riga, Latvia.

When in Latvia,

he would correspond with friends in the US and dispatch various reports
regarding
censorship.

the

situation

in

Lithuania

so

as

to

avoid

military

Granted his information was not inflanrnatory or of an anti-

state nature, but he nevertheless found it necessary and expedient to
issue his reports by this indirect method.50
General Stasys Rastikis disliked the use of military personnel
48Konstantinas Zukas, Zvilgsnis i praeiti: Zmogaus ir kario
atsiminimai. Medziaga istorikams (A Glance at the Past: A Person's and
Soldier's Reminiscences.
Material for Historians) (Chicago: Terra,
1959), pp. 444-446.
49Maciuika, p. 61; J. Ziugzda, et al., eds., Lietuvos TSR
istorija nuo 1917 iki 1940 (History of the Lithuanian SSR 1917-1940)
(Vilnius: Mintis, 1965), III, 303.
50 Bulavas, pp. 49-50; Juozas Eretas, Kazys Pakstas: Tautinio
sauklio odiseja 1893-1960 (Kazys Pakstas: Odyssey of a National Herald
1893-1960) (Rome: Lithuanian Catholic Academy of Sciences, 1970), p. 90.
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for such police and internal security assignments.
receiv~d

Indeed he had

a promise from Smetona that the military would not be used to

maintain domestic order except in cases of extreme emergency.

Smetona,

however, appeared not always to hold true to his promise, which made
Rastikis even more resentful.

Rastikis was of the opinion that internal

order is best guaranteed by a democratic regime, and best managed by
competent civilian authorities whom the police answer to.
the

attention

of the

military

is

focused

In this way,

on matters of external

defense. 51
Nevertheless, the Internal Security Department worked closely
with the military commandants and tribunals.

Indeed internal security

work was often executed by military men not under the direct authority
of the defense ministry.

One of the most famous of these was Lieutenant

Colonel Steponas Rusteika.

By training he was a lawyer, but had spent

his life in the politico-military sector.

From 1920 to 1930 he was the

military commandant of the Telsiai district.

In 1930-1931 he was the

director of the Internal Security Department, being promoted to the post
of minister of the interior which he held until 1935.

For the last five

years of the independence period he was the deputy mayor of Kaunas.
Another was Colonel Ignas Musteikis who served as interior minister from
15 May 1928 until 30 November 1929.

The US State Department wrote that

he resembled a Czarist Russian governor-general in appearance and in the
execution of his duties. 52

Finally, it was Colonel Brunonas Stencel is

51Rastikis, I, p. 407.
52Merkelis, p. 421.
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who, as general secretary of the interior ministry, was charged with the
dissolution of the Iron Wolf organization, as discussed in the previous
chapter. 53
The old school ties that were developed among military men in
different agencies were partially responsible for the Kubiliunas revolt
in June 1934.
Defense

It was rumored that the close ties between Rusteika and

Minister

Colonel

Balys

Giedrai tis

led

commandeered to spy and report on fellow officers.
this, claiming

th~

to

officers

being

Kubiliunas opposed

it would destroy obedience and discipline.

When

Giedraitis did not oppose the scheme, Kubiliunas was further moved to
act

against

the

regime.5 4

Kubiliunas

once

ordered

Colonel

Kazys

Musteikis, who at that time was in charge of administrative matters for
the military,
Statkus and

to visit the then-Director of Internal Security Jonas

infor~

him that any officer or NCO discovered to be an agent

woul,d be dishonorably discharged.

Statkus replied that no such activity

was occuring, though rumors and discontent within the officer corps over
this matter continued.

NQbody was ever discovered or discharged.55

Spying on fellow soldiers and officers was not a new occurence
in the Lithuanian military.
police

as

early

as

1922

There was mention of a secret military
spying

on

soldiers

and

reporting

to

53For photographs of Stencelis and Rusteika see Serafin as, pp.
281 and 282, respectively.
54 Merkelis, p. 425; Kazys Musteikis, Prisiminimu
(Fragments of Memories) (London: Nida, 1970), p. 14.
55Musteikis, p. 14.
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superiors. 56

Following the coup, though, intra-military surveillance

expanded.

The government no longer trusted the officer's oath and words

of honor.

Many officers could not trust each other and, consequently,

there were a number

of resignations precipitated by such activity.

Ironically, some of the first to leave the military were those officers
actively involved in the coup.57
In his memoirs, General Rastikis reports that Defense Minister
General

Petras

Sniuksta

did

not

enjoy

receiving

reports

from

the

Internal Security Department which recommended punishment of officers
for alleged political offenses.

Sniuksta would read all the reports,

but often found no justification for disciplinary action.

Such reports

would often flow back and forth among the the ministers of defense,
justice,

and

interior

consuming

valuable

time.

Sniuksta

would

occasionally send these reports to Smetona, who agreed with Sniuksta' s
opinion, but advised to settle the matter among his fellow ministers.
Though Sniuksta was angry at such interference from another agency,
Rastikis reports

that

Sniuksta himself was

Security Department -- another

fearful of the

example of fear

Internal

and distrust in the

officer corps caused by the intrusion of politics into the military.58

About
p. 69.

5 6Kazys Kemezys, Po pasauli besiblaskant: Atsiminimai (Scurrying
the World: Reminiscences) (Sydney, Australia: Author, n.d.),
57Rukas, p. 276.
58Rastikis, I, pp. 478-488; Ivykiai ir zmones, p. 77.

CHAPTER VI
THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY
A. EDUCATION AND SOCIALIZATION
In his memoirs, General Stasys Rastikis writes that the matter
of national defense was downgraded
independence.

upon conclusion of the wars of

In addition to instability in the senior grades and

posts, and the politicization of the military, the political leadership,
in particular,

and

society,

in general, did not demonstrate proper

concern with military matters.

However, he also faults the military,

especially the senior officers, for not displaying initiative vis-a-vis
politicians

and

the

citizenry.

They

did

not

attract

sufficient

attention to military concerns and did relatively little to improve
military capability.

The divorce of society from the military resulted

in an attitude that the military could see to its own needs.

This

perspective even led to reluctance regarding mandatory terms of service
under conscription.
Rastikis charges defense ministers as a whole for not supporting
the

general

improvement.

staff

with

regard

to

military

preparedness

and

Further, some chiefs of staff contented themselves with

peacetime administration, without considering wartime necessities.

The

modern warfare which would surface during the Second World War was not
on the minds of the civil or military leadership.
wars

of

independence

took

precedence
110

over

Nostalgia over the
modernization

and

111

strengthening for the future.
Rastikis called for a general effort, a national partnership
among the military, society, and politicians to popularize the idea of
national defense.

Rastikis, as will be discussed more fully in the

following chapter,

approached the president and government officials

over this matter, but was met with inaction.

Thus he chose to take the

initiative himself in such activities as the army-society festivals
which will be dealt with below.

His relatively successful campaign

entailed a great deal of speaking and writing directed at soldiers,
national guardsmen, and youth.

Since the military belongs to society

and must serve as its watchdog, both spheres must be brought closer
together. 1
One method for drawing the military closer to society and vice
versa was conscription.

A Lithuanian male was drafted at the age of

twenty and served twelve months if an infantryman or eighteen months in
any other branch.
called.

Clergymen and individuals in poor health were not

Deferments were granted to those attending gymnasium or higher

education until that education was completed.

They were also granted if

conscription caused hardship in the family or if the target individual
was the only able-bodied son, brother, or grandson in the family. 2
1stasys Rastikis, Kovose del Lietuvos: Kario atsiminimai (In the
Battles for Lithuania: A Soldier's Reminiscences) (Los Angeles: Lietuviu
dienos I Lithuanian Days, 1956), I, 387-391.
2vyriausybes Zinios (Government News) (Kaunas: Ministru tarybos
kanceliarija I Chancellory of the Cabinet), No. 538, 30 June 1936. See
also Lietuvos Sauliu Sajunga I Lithuanian National Guard, Musu
kalendorius 1930 metams (Our Almanac for 1930) (Kaunas: L.N.G., 1929),
pp. 160-161; Vanda Tumenas, ed., Justinas Tumenas (Chicago: Author,
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One of
training.

the

purposes

of conscription was basic

non-military

Most enlisted men only possessed a grade school education, if

even that.

To compensate for this, they were taught various trades,

reading, writing, history, and geography.

It was also suggested that

they read widely, including literature, agriculture, physical education,
and theology.

Such programs were instituted after several incidents

whereby it was discovered that the education of the men was sub-standard
even in the most basic areas.
Staff

Colonel

Povilas

For example, in January 1929 Chief of

Plechavicius

visited

a

number

of

units

and

discovered that almost one-half of the enlisted men did not know the
words of the Lithuanian · National Anthem and did not comprehend its
meaning.3
Education was not limited to the enlisted grades.

The Senior

Officer Courses taught law, political economics, and finance among other
subjects.

Officers also received special training at the University of

Vytautas the Great in Kaunas in fields as diverse as engineering, law,

1959), p. 50.
3Petras Jurgela and Paulius Jurkus, Gen. Povilas Plechavicius
(Brooklyn: Karys, 1978), pp. 57-58; J.M. Laurinaitis, ed., Kareivis:
Lietuvos gyg~jas.
Lietuvos kareivio knyga (Soldier: Lithuania's
Defender.
A Book for the Lithuanian Soldier) (Kaunas: Headquarters
Staff ,_Military .. Education Board, 1926), pp. 189-191; Owen J.C. Norem,
Timeless l.1thuan1a, 2nd ed. (Cleveland: Viltis, 1967'), p. 145; Juozas
Vaiceliunas·; Tevynes sargyboje: Lietuvos kar~ninko-lakuno atsiminimai
1932-1941 {Guarding the Motherland: Reminiscences of a Lithuanian
Officer-Pilot 1932-1941 ) (Sudbury, Ont: Author, 1955), pp. 21-22, 2931.
For personal experiences in the military see Aleksandras Pakalniskis, Gyven!mq pakelei (Life's Roadsides) (Chicago: Author, 1979), pp.
73-96; and his Mes griztame: Jauno zmogaus dienorastis (We Return: A
Yol!ns Person'.s Diary) (Chicago: Stasys Jankus, 1976), pp. 7-27.
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chemistry,

medicine,

and

veterinary medicine.

The

Student

Reserve

Officers "Ramove" Fraternity at that university initiated the idea of
establishing a chair of military studies (karinio auklejimo katedra).
"Ramove" received support from the military and Major Vytautas Bulvicius
was appointed lecturer on national security matters. 4
Of

course,

these

educational-socialization

efforts

were

conscious and deliberate:
The strongest state educational institution is military service. The
result of its influence on the masses is huge. It gives ideological
foundations; civic culture develops an entire list of social
virtues.
The educational value of military service in the first
place is determined by the army's elite, its corps of instructors.
Those masses of recruits who each year march into the barracks have
not only to protect the religious culture of their parents, but to
also deepen it, so that a new type of citizen is formed: obedient,
loyal to the oath, having a subtle feeling of honor. To achieve that
purpose it is necessary to have within the army a stable, well
prepared and developed educational elite that well comprehends its
tasks. Lacking that, even the best recruit training will not bring
the republic good, trustworthy, selfless and strongly staunch and
resistant soldiers. Also very important is the link which must exist
between the army and society, which must manifest itself in the first
place in cooperation with those organizations which operate in the
sphere of military preparedness and various forms of national
defense. The army and those organizations which work with it must be
4.)'odauga, "Kariuomenes mokymas" ("Military Education"), in
Li~tuva t918-1938: Leidinys 20 metu Lietuvos nepriklausomybes sukakciai
pamineti (Lithuania 1918-1938: Publication Commemorating the Twentieth
Anniversary of Lithuania's Independence), ed. Vincas Kemezys (Kaunas:
Spaudos fondas I Press Fund, 1938) , p. 85; Jonas Kar ka, ed. , Vytauto
Didziojo universi teto Kaune Studentu atsargos karininku korporacija.
"Ramove" 1933-1983: Atsiminimai (Ramove Student Reserve Officers
Fraternity at the University of Vytautas the Great, Kaunas 1933-1983:
Reminiscences) (Toronto: Ramove, 1983), p. 104; Rastikis, I, p. 529;
Antanas Smetona, Pasakyta parasyta: 1935-1940 (Spoken Written: 19351940, ed. Leonas Sabaliunas (Boston: Lithuanian Encyclopedia Press,
1974), II 187.
See also Andrius Bulota, Limuzinas nr. 4: Dokumentine
apysaka (Limousine No. 4: A Documentary Narrative) (Vilnius: Vaga,
1977), p. 11; Petras Lelis, Lietuvos keliu 1910-1973 metai (Lithuania's
Path 1910-1973) (Toronto: n.p., 1973), p. 118.
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free from any kind of destructive partisan political warfare. The
door to partisan political activity in the army and those
organizations must be well shut. The foundation of military service
is sacrifice, resignation from one's "I," obedience and preparedness,
so that the strength designated for the protection of the life of the
state and freedom are not wasted for the purposes of narrow, egoistic
groups.5
Other

commentators

make

similar

aspects of military service.

statements

regarding

follower,

but

an

positive

In a theoretical pamphlet, Toliusis writes

that the idea of democracy penetrates the military.
blind

the

informed,

enlightened

A soldier is not a

citizen-soldier.

He

advocates short military training for all in order to create a citizen
militia are

a hallmark of democracy.

fighting

for;

education

The best fighters know what they

bolsters

morale

and

effectiveness.

Ultimately, the military should be the nation under arms. 6

Steponaitis

wrote that discipline develops upon educating village boys and men. 7
General Stasys Dirmantas, also a professor of geodesy, referred to the
Lithuanian army as a school of citizen responsibility, love of the
Motherland and of its history. 8

General Stasys Rastikis writes of a

5Mykolas
Krupavicius
Visuomeniniai
klausimai:
Straipsniu
rinkinys is jo palikimo (Social Questions: A Collection of Articles From
His Legacy) (Chicago: Pope Leo XII Fund, 1983), pp. 477-478.
Krupavicius' emphasis.
6z. Toliusis, Demokratija ir jos priesai arba demokrato
katekizmas (Democracy and its Enemies or the Democrat's Catechism)
(Kaunas: Varpas, 1926), pp. 23-24.
7Antanas Steponaitis, Tevyneje ir pasauly: Prisiminimai ir
apybraizos (In the Motherland and the World: Remembrances and Sketches)
(Brooklyn: Lithuanian Franciscan Fathers, 1962), p. 146.
8A. Reklaitis, "Lietuvos kariuomenei prisiminti: Pasikalbejimas
su Ramoves pirm. gen. S. Dirmantu" ("Remembering Lithuania's Army:
Conversation with Ramove President General StCJSYS Dirmantas"). Draugas,
21 November 1964, p. 4.
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national military, where the military and sochty exist hand-in-hand.
Only in such fashion can there be reciprocal trust, support, will, and
strength.

The type of nation which supports the military determines the

type of military produced.

It discontent exists within the nation, it

will spill over into the military.9

A National Guard publication wrote

how the military takes different kinds of people and gives them a single
mind and goal, while teaching and equalizing them.

It also writes that

all disciplines and fields of study are necessary for the creation of a
good military machine.

The cultural element composed of well-rounded

people, not just the "fist and stick," is needed. 10
Lanskoronskis

views

peacetime

national school, with reciprocal
military,

and

democracy.

military

a

continuation

of

Physical,

national

school, church, and society.
elements:
factories,

1)

as

a

~uge

interplay among good citizens, the
intellectual,

qualities are honed and refined through service.
is

service

development,

and

spiritual

Military development

comprising

the

family,

He sees armed force composed of three

material forces (land, population, weapons, fortifications,
transportation);

2)

intellectual

forces

(education,

development, preparation, organization, leadership, training); and 3)
spiritual forces (love of the Motherland, honor., duty, sacrifice).

All

of these are needed to fight and survive under conditions of extreme

9Rastikis, I, p. 448.

Lithuania's bistory bears this out.

10Lietuvos Sauliu Sajunga I Lithuanian National Guard, Musu
kalendorius 1932 metams (Our Almanac for 1932) (Kaunas: L. N.G., 1931),
pp. 50-55.
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stress.

With the emergent complexity of fighting, material goods are

less effective without intellectual and spriritual support. 11
The

socializing

value

of

military

service

has

long

been

recognized in various contexts:
The army is perhaps the most effective such institution [of
socialization] and has been consciously used in the new nations,
especially in Africa, as a _primary agent of adult socialization t.o
national political culture. 12
11 Lanskoronskis, "!autos parengimas karui" ("Preparing the
Nation for War"), in Kareivis: Lietuvos gynejas.
Lietuvos kareivio
knyga (Soldier: Lithuania's Defender.
A Book for the Lithuanian
Soldier), ed. J.M. Laurinaitis (Kaunas: Headquarters Staff Milita~y
Education Board, 1926), pp. 119-120, 123-124.
See also Mykolas
Birziska, Lietuviu tautos kelias i naujaji g_y:venima: Galvojimai apie
tauta savyje ir kaimynu tarpe (The Path of the Lithuanian Nation Toward
a New Life: Thoughts Concerning the Nation Within and in the Midst of
Neighbors) (Los Angeles: Lietuviu dienos I Lithuanian Days, 1952), I,
110; A. Dilys, Kareivis: Lietuvos gynejas.
Lietuvos kareivio knyg_a
(Soldier: Lithuania's Defender. A Book for the Lithuanian Soldier), ed.
J.M. Laurinaitis (Kaunas: Headquarters Staff Military Educati.on Board,
1926), pp. 138, 140; K. Jankunas, "Kariuomenes ~nasas i tautos gerbuvi"
("The Army's Contribution to the Nation's Well-Being"), Karys,. January
1982, pp. 1-6; Jurgela and Jurkus, p. 63; "Kariuomene ir visuomene
jubiliejiniais metais" ("The Military and Society During the Jubilee
Year"), Karys, 26 January 1939, pp. 107-108;
Patriotizmas ir
patriotinis tautos auklejimas (Patriotism and National Patriotic
Education) (Kaunas: Vilnius Liberation League, 1935), p. 7; Rastikis, I,
pp. 379-380.
For a poem romanticizing the link between citizen and
soldier, see J. Palionis, "Kariai ir tauta" ("Soldiers and the Nation"),
Karys, 23 September 1939, p. 1333.
For arguments for and against a
regular, standing army see Br. Nemickas, "Kariuomene -- Lietuvos
valstybingumo ugdytoja" ("The Army - Developer of Statehood"), Karys,
February 1972, p. 40; Sova, "Kariuomenes organizacija ir komplektavimas"
("Military Organization and Recruitment"), in Lietuva 1918-1938:
Leidinys
20
metu. Lietuvos
nepriklausomybes
sukakciai
pamineti
(Lithuania:
1918-1938t
Publication
Cormnemorating
the
Twentieth
Anniversary of Lithuania's Independence), ed. Vincas Kemezys (Kaunas:
Spaudos fondas I Press Fund, 1938), p. 72; Vanda Daugirdaite-Sruogiene,
Lietuvos Steigiamasis Seimas (The Lithuanian Constituent Assembly) (New
York: Lithuanian National Foundation, 1975), pp. 201-202.
12 James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., Comparative
Politics: The Quest for Theory (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
1981),p. 113.
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The use of Cuban troops on a large scale in combat, training, and
indoctrination missions in Angola, Mozambique,
Ethiopia, and
elsewhere in Africa is viewed not only as a way of exporting
revolution, but also as a means for indoctrination and ideological
hardening of young Cubans. 13
In addition to its role as defender of the nation, the military was
used to socialize the populace. Conscious efforts were made to draw
the military and citizenry closer together for two reasons: 1) to
popularize it, and 2) to show that the armed forces served all
Lithuanians, not just one group, i.e. the Nationalists. • • • The
military through regular units and auxiliary organizations sought to
maintain close ties with society. This form of socialization raised
morale, bolstered the stability of the regime, gave people a sense of
closeness with the men defending their freedom in a hostile
international environment, and raised nationalistic consciousness.
Furthermore,
citizens
could
directly
participate
in
thine
institutions -- and in a sense become a part of the regime itself.
Socialization
indirectly.

vis-a-vis

the

military

proceeded

both

directly

and

One indirect method proceeded merely from the fact of

citizenshi.p and residence.

Both officers and men frequently came from

the same place: the Lithuanian village.

It was here that the wars of

independence were fought and won, with people providing food, clothing,
and

shelter

to their

fighting brothers.

At

first

officers and NCOs who were Russians or Germans even speak Lithuanian.
and

the

there were some

and often could not

Gradually, the government trained its own people

military became "more

Lithuanian."

This

was

a boost

to

----------------1

3aabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., "Political
Socialization and Political Culture," in Comparative Politics Today: A
World View), 3rd ed., eds. Almond and Powell (Boston: Little, Brown,
1984) f p. 33.
14 Robert

A. Vitas, "Smetona and Socialization: Lithuania
1926-1940, 11 unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, Loyola
University of Chicago, 6 December 1983, pp. 20, 22.
'

'
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Further, the officer corps had a broader

patriotism and enthusiasm.

base than during the era of czarist rule.

Even a farmer's son could

become an officer. 15
A soldier, at least in the beginning, was lured to the military
by more

than

just

idealism and

In order to encourage

patriotism.

volunteers to join the Lithuanian army during the wars of independence,
the government promised land to those who served until demobilization.
Volunteers and the families of soldiers who were killed in the line of
duty received eight to twenty hectares (nineteen to forty-eight acres),
one hundred logs, and grain.

The volunteers were second in priority

after

landholders

the

following

landless
the

and

abolition

small
of

feudalism

in

who

had

czarist

land confiscated
Russia

in

1861. l6

"Everyone, except volunteers, had to pay for the land within thirty-six
years,

beginning

the

ninth

year

after

receiving

the

land. 111 7

The

government was true to its word and began land reform under Agriculture
Minister

Rev.

hostilities.

Mykolas

Krupavicius

following

the

cessation

of

As of 1 January 1935, volunteers had been granted 1O,421

___..,________ .._____

"

15vaiceliunas, p. 18 was an example of this.
Reklaitis, p. 4;
Antahas Smetana, Pasakyta parasyta: 1927-1934 (Spoken Written: 19271934) (Kaunas:. Pazanga, 1935), I, 27.
16v1adas Bublys, 11 Zemes reforma" ("Land Reform"), in Zemes uki.o
aamybine kooP!racija rtepriklausomoje Lietuvoje 1920-1940 (Cooperative
Aaricultural Production in Independent Lithuania 1920-1940), ed. Jonas
Glemza C[ondon: Nida, 1972), p. 27; Pranas Pauliukonis, "Mykolas
Krupavicius ar'ld Lithuanian Land Reform," Lituanus, 16, 4 (Winter 1970),
pp. 40-43; Adolfas. Sapoka, ed. Lietuvos istorija (History of Lithuania),
3rd ed. (Fellbach-Wurttemberg, Germany: Patria, 1950), p. 572.
17Pauliukonis, p. 44.
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plots of land consisting of 104,210 hectares (257,503 acres).

This was

out of a total of 467,460 hectares (1,155,094 acres) of land at the
disposal of the government.

Thus military men received almost twenty

percent of all land granted. 18
Following the coup, Smetana made tours of Lithuania in 1927 and
Chief or' Staff Colonel Plechavicius, occasionally accompanying

1928.
the

president,

would

Smetana's military
requests and

urge

aide,

people

Captain

to

present

Aloyzas

requests

Valusis,

would

to

Smetana.

take

these

then dispatch them to appropriate agencies for action.

Smetana's and

Plechavicius'

travels were enormously successful, with

them always being warmly greeted and often being carried on shoulders
back to their automobiles. 19
Society also
versa.

had

other

contacts

with the military and vice

Youth groups often visited military installations and were

allowed to fire weapons and eat the soldiers' mess.

It was not unusual

for some visitors to an air base to even be taken up for a short flight
in a fighter plane.
theaters.

Films of maneuvers and drills were shown in movie

On the other hand, the military participated in major civil

activities and

served as honor guards at the

funerals of prominent

181 ha = 2.471 acres. R. Mackevicius, Dvidesimt metu 1918-1938
For further
(Twenty Years 1918-1938) (Vilnius: n.p., 1938), p. 70.
details see Ladislovas Natkevicius, Lietuvos kariuomene (The Lithuanian
Army;) (New York: Lithuanian Development Corporation, 1919), pp. 163-164;
Konstantinas Zukas, Zvilgsnis i eraeiti: Zmogus ir kario atsiminimai.
Medziaga istorikams (A Glance at the Past: A Person's and Soldier's
Reminiscences. Material for Historians) (Chicago: Terra, 1959), p. 434.
19Jurgela and Jurkus, pp. 58, 75-78.

!',
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Lithuanians, such as poet Rev. Jonas Maciulis-Maironis in June 1932.
The winters would see troops chopping ice on the Nemunas River.20
There were also official civil-military ties.
Arms Fund (Ginklu Fondas).

Several members of the

11

One link was the
Ramove 11 Fraternity

began writing articles in 1935 urging people to collect money to buy
weapons for the army; radio programs also promoted the idea.

The

military supported it, for the official budget could not support all the
purchases the military leadership desired to make.

On 15 June 1935 a

number of organizations met and formed the Arms Fund and the Association
to Support the Armed Forces (Ginkluotoms Krasto Pajegoms Remti Sajunga),
which sought moral and material support for the military.

By the end of

1939, it had 141 chapters with about seven thousand members.

These

organizations collected money and were able to purchase rifles, machine
guns, and other material.21
The

Lithuanian

military

beyond the country's borders.

also

possessed

ties to

Lithuanians

In 1927 the Knights of Lithuania, based

---~------~------

20 Jurgela arid Jurkus, pp. 52-53; Pakalniskis, Mes griztame, p.
13; Vaiceliunas, pp. 16, 112-117.
Jorge I. Dominguez, "The· Civic
Soldier
in
Cuba , 11
in
Political-Military
Systems:
Comparative
Pers~ectives, ed. Catherine McArdle Kelleher (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage,
1974 , p. 236 writes that Cuban troops are employed in the sugar
harvest.
Socialization was sometimes cleverly executed.
One book
contains an illustration of a Lithuanian knight with the Knight's Cross
on his robe slaying a speared dragon, while a Lithuanian maiden looks on
from behind a shield decorated with the insignia of the Grand Duke
Gediminas. See A. Marcinkevicius, ed. Neuzmirsk Lietuvos (Do Not Forget
Lithuania) (Kaunas: Lithuanian National Guard, 1927), p. 99.
21 Karka, p. 31. For example of such accusations see Melduti s
Laupinaitis, As kaltinu: Trilogija (I Accuse: Trilogy) (Sao Paulo,
Brazil: Author, 1954), pp. 17-18.
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in

the

US,

established

the

Lithuanian

Military

(Lietuvos Kariuomenes Remeju Komitetas).

Support

Col'llDittee

On 3 July 1927 two of its

representatives, K. Vesulas and Rev. Juozas Simonaitis, presented a gold
saber to Commander-in-Chief General Silvestras Zukauskas as a symbol of
It was subsequently

gratitude for the work of the Lithuanian army.
placed on display at the War Museum.22
Did

close

civil-military

ties

contribute

to

The answer to this question is problematic.

attitudes?

militaristic
Certainly,

there was no resemblance to the militarism prevalent in Nazi Germany.
If

militarism was a

militarism

per

se.

phenomenon,

it did

There

very

were

not exist

real

for the sake of

external

dangers

facing

Lithuania, thus national security was very much on the minds of soldiers
and

civilians

alike.

Organizations were

sometimes

administered

in

military fashion, for example, the "Ramove" Fraternity, the Lithuanian
Scouts Association, Young Lithuania (Jaunoji Lietuva), and the National
Guard.
based

Uniforms were worn, rank was designated, and administration was
on

contained

a
the

top-down

principle.

The

symbol

of

Lithuanian

judicial scales supported by a sword.

judges

This went to

unusual extremes on occasion; not only did policemen wear decorations,
but some postal workers did as we11.23
22 Jurgela and Jurkus, pp. 71-73. See also Jonas Matusas, Sauliu
Sajungos istorija (History of the National Guard), 2nd ed.
(Sydney,
Australia: Mintis, 1966), pp. 191-192.
For a photograph of t.he
presentation ceremony see Ignas Sakal as, ed., Lietuvos vyciai Amerikoje
(The Knights of Lithuania in America) (Chicago: Knights of Lithuania,
1963)' p. 39.
2 3For photographs see Apolinar as Bagdonas,
policija istatymu ir tvarkos tarnyboje (Lithuania's

ed • , Lietuvos
Police in the
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Youth was not bypassed
militarism.
youth

to

Gvardija).

in the exercise of socialization and

In 1928 a letter was dispatched to middle schools urging
join

a

junior

Military

version

training

of

under

the

this

National
program

conjunction with the Senior Officer Courses.
never implemented. 24
beginning in 1930.

Guard

was

to

(Tautos
occur

in

However, this plan was

However, a more formalized plan was implemented
In that year, training in shooting, drills, and

military discipline and courtesy were begun in schools and conducted by
active and reserve officers.

The children involved started from the

fourth class of progymnasium, the fifth class of gymnasium, or the first
course of specialized schools.

Beginning in 1936, grade school students

were acquainted with the military, its purpose and history, along with
civic training emphasizing patriotism.
of

Karys

personnel.
months,

the

(Warrior),

which

was

School libraries received issues

the

weekly

magazine

Training was not limited to students.
Military

Academy conducted

of

enlisted

During the sununer

military courses

for

female

teachers and for male teachers who had never served in the military. 2 5
Service of Law and Order) (Chicago: Lithuanian Police Club 11 Krivule,"
1974); Ant an as Gintneris, "Pastininkai sauliu darbo baruose" ("Postal
Workers in the Work of of the National Guard"), in Nuo krivules iki
raketos: Lietuvos pastininku atsiminimai (From the Staff to the Rocket:
Reminiscences of Lithuania's Postal Workers) {Chicago: Lithuanian Postal
Workers Association, 1968); B. Masiulis and K. Avizonis 11 Teisejas"
("Judge"), Lietuviu enciklopedija {Lithuanian .Encyclopedia), vol. 30,
p. 495.
24Audrius Bulota • Nuo bal tojo zirgo iki svastikos (From the
White Steed to the Swastika) (Vilnius: State Political and Scientific
Press, 1962), p. 67.
2 5Lietuvos. Sauliu Sajunga I Lithuanian National Guard, Sauliu
kalendorius 1939 metams (National Guard Almanac for 1939) (Kaunas:
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The Lithuanian Scouts Association, mentioned above, was also a
component of the movement of the military toward youth.

As of 1928, the

Lithuanian government officially protected and sponsored the scouting
movement under the general oversight of the Ministry of Education.
addition

to

providing

policy

and

administrative

provided a portion of the organization's funding. 26
founder,

Petras

Lithuania,
officer,

Jurgela,

founded

the

was a
scouting

guidance,

it

In
also

The organization's

Lithuanian-American who emigrated
movement,

and

then

became an

for a time serving as Colonel Plechavicius' aide.

to

army

General

Teodor as Daukantas, one-time defense minister and later diplomat, was
chairman of the Lithuanian Scouts Assistance Society.
Kal~antas,

Colonel Mykolas

chief of the National Guard from 1925 until 1935, also served

a term as chief scouter 1925-1927. 2 7

Colonel Juozas Sarauskas, long-

time chief of the army's press and education section, served as chief
scouter from 1935 until 1940.

The president, by law, was the chief of

the scouts -- an analogy to his position as commander-in-chief of the
armed

forces.

In

1932 President Smetona awarded Sir

Robert

Baden-

Powell, founder of the world scouting movement, the Order of Grand Duke

'
L. N.G., 1938), pp.
103-104.
For a photograph of military training at
the Vindeikiai grade school in the Kretinga district see J. Ziugzda, et
al., eds., Lietuvos TSR istorija nuo 1917 iki 1940 (History of the
Lithuanian SSR 1917-1940) (V:ilnius: Mintis, 1965), III, 234. One child
is lying on the ground pretending to be either dead or wounded.
26Antanas Banionis, ed.,
Scouts-in-Exile, n .d.) , p. 11.

White Badge

(Boston: Lithuanian Boy

2 7For photographs of Kalmantas and Daukantas see Marcinkevioius,
pp. 117 and 121, respectively.
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Gediminas (First Class) on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday. 28
One scouting publication associated scouting with knighthood and
chivalry,

in addition

to public service.

vanguard of national renaissance. 29
the scouts.
and

the

Scouts were to join the

The military press often praised

Troops even built. a pontoon bridge for the 1938 jamboree,

army's commander-in-chief awarded prizes at scout shooting

competitions organized by the

11

Ramove 11 Fraternity.

The Collegiate

Division of the Lithuanian Scouts Association had especially close ties
to

the military.

A number

of reserve

officers

organization and donated money to the Arms Fund.

belonged

to

the

In one instance,

female collegiate scouts donated a rifle to the second infantry regiment
whose commanding officer, Colonel Juozas Tumas, was a sponsor of their
organization.3°
B. THE MILITARY AND THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
The

status

of

the

Roman

Catholic

Church

ambivalent during President Smetona' s tenure.

Catholic,

Lithuania was

The Church was given a

number of privileges in the military and society.
Lithuania was 85.5j Roman

in

However, while

it was also persecuted by the

Nationalists, who feared the Church as its largest potential enemy. 31
2 8Lithuanian Boy Scouts Association,
(Chicago: L.B.S.A., n.d.), pp. 16-17, 21, 23.

Lithuanian

Scouting

2 9stasys Salkauskis, _Sk,,,_a~u_t_a~i,___i_r~~p_a_s_a~u_l_e_z_i~u~r_a~_<_S_c_o_u_t~s~_a_n_d
Worldview), 3rd ed. (Chicago: Collegiate Division, Lithuanian Scouts
Association, 1953), pp. 7, 11, 15-16, 26.
30Karys apie akademikus skautus" ("Karys on the
Scouts"), Musu vytis (Our Knight), no. 2 (1984), pp. 19-22.

Collegiate
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, the high school circles of the
Cathol'ib\' Federation "Ateitis" were closed, as well as the Christian
Democratic Party.
expelling
Minister

the

Anti-Catholic action even went to the extreme of

papal

Augustinas

nuncio

to

Voldemara~

Lithuania

in

1931.

In

1929,

Prime

prohibited members of "Atei tis"

enrolling in the Military Academy.

from

This restriction was lifted the

following year subsequent to protests from the military leadership and
Voldemaras' dismissa1.32
Perhaps part of the answer for the stormy relationship between
the government and the Church may be found in the contrast between their
philosophies.

Professor

Stasys

Salkauskis,

who

was

the

head

of

"Ateitis" from 1927 until 1930, wrote that politics must be firmly based
on a Christian foundation, dominated neither by aggressive nationalism
nor cosmopolitan internationalism.

He stated that party politics was

good and necessary, but that it should not degenerate into extreme
partisanship;
equal.

all

positive

Finally, world

political

and

non-political

groups

are

Christian peace and unity should be striven

for. 33
The contrast with Smetona and his nationalistic philosophy is
obvious, and Salkauskis experienced his share of difficulty with the

3 1Tomas Zemaitis (pseud.)
Dvidesimt
(Vilnius: duplicated samizdat, 1978), p. 55.

metu

(Twenty

Years)

32vaiceliunas, pp. 58-59.
33stasys Salkauskis, Ateitininku ideologija (The Ideology of
"Ateitis"), 2nd rev. ed. (Putnam, CT: M. Juras, 1954), pp. 125-129.
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regime over issues such as academic freedom, and freedom of the press
and

organizational

sacrifice

what

1be

activity.

they

saw as

Nationalists were not

the good

of the nation

to

about to
excessive

Christianity, though Smetona, at least on the surface, was a devout
Catholic.

Neither were the Nationalists about to allow party politics

free rein, nor acknowledge the equality of all groups.

Finally, at this

point in Lithuania's history, the Nationalists saw their road as more
beneficial than trans-national action.

Poland, after all, was also a

Christian country.
Nevertheless,

the

Lithuanian

influenced by religious matters.

On

army

was

always

also celebrated.

much

11 May 1919, the first military

oath was administered by the local bishop in the
square; mass was

very

Kaunas Cathedral

The oath itself co11111itted the

soldiers, in the name of God, to serve faithfully in the army, to be
faithful to the Constitution, and to obey their superiors.3 4 The bishop
was also involved in the first blessing of the Military Academy that
same

year. 35

Lithuanian

soldiers

would

always

take

the oath of

allegiance during the course of a mass, which included the kissing of a
crucifix. 36
34Natkevicius, pp •. 59-70. For a photograph of the bishop, in
full garb, speaking to the men from the steps of the cathedral, see
p. 72.
35see Natkevicius, p. 132 for a photograph.
36Pakalniskis, Mes griztame, p. 19; Vaclovas Sliogeris, Antanas
Smetana: Zmogus ir valstybininkas. Atsiminimai (Antanas Smetona: Person
and Statesman. Reminiscences) (Sodus, MI: Juozas J. Bachunas, 1966),
p. 120.
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According to General Stasys Rastikis, the m1li tary leadership
was very much concerned with the religious and moral development of the
men.

As he interprets the oath, the officers and men committed them-

selves to be responsible first to God, then to their military obligations.

Religious feast days were observed and included mass.

bivouacs, and maneuvers were accompanied by outdoor mass.
were

blessed

Crucifixes

and

and

fac1li ties.

contained

religious

religious

illustrations

illustrations
hung

in

Parades,
Unit flags

and

barracks

and

mottos.
other

Army Chaplain Canon Adol fas Sabaliauskas wrote Catholic

Soldier (Karys Katalikas), a missal and prayerbook.

It was published by

the army's press and education section and went through at least five
ed i t1ons. 37
morning
hymns.

and

In

his memoirs,

evening

Colonel

inspections

were

Vaclovas

Sliogeris adds that

accompanied

by

prayer,

often

Religious instruction was routine, and troops marched to church

in ranks.38
Article seven of the concordat between Kaunas and the Vatican,
signed on 27 September 1927, stated that the Lithuanian army is provided
with all privileges provided to armies of the Holy See as stipulated by
Canon Law. 39

There were other ties between the two entities.

Many

37stasys Rast1kis, Lietuvos likimo keliais: Is mano uzrasu (On
the Roads of Lithuania's Destiny: From My Notes), ed. Jonas Dainauskas
(Chicago: Akademines skautijos leidykla I Academic Press, 1982), pp.
259-261.
38s11ogeris, p. 120.
39Konkordatas tarp
Sventojo Sosto
ir
Lietuvos Valdzios
(Concordat Between the Holy See and the Government of Lithuania
(Chicago: Draugas, 1928), p. 4.
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priests were members of the National Guard; one of them was the noted
writer Rev. Juozas Tumas-Vaizgantas, who was the first editor of the
Guard's periodical Trimitas (Bugle). 40
Whether

or

not

the

various religious-military ties had any

effect on the men is difficult to answer.

One former air force officer,

while praising General Rastikis for his devotion, writes that many of
the officers he encountered were not very religious, sending the men to
church while themselves not entering. 41

What is important in this

context are the ties between the two entities in a country which was
overwhelmingly Roman Catholic and where religious activists, both clergy
and lay, had played such important roles in the nation's renaissance as
well as during independence.
relations

with

the

Church,

Perhaps the government had problematic
but

it

was certainly not a

government and did not expect its military to be so either.
which played

an

important role

in politics and

society,

secularist
The Church,
played an

equally strong role in the military.
C. ARMY-SOCIETY FESTIVALS··
When General Stasys Rastikis was appointed commander-in-chief in

40Aleksandras Merkelis, Juozas Tumas Vaizgantas (Chicago: J.
Karvelis, 1955), I, pp. 269-271.
Antanas Rukas, ed., Mykolas
Slezevicius (Chicago: Terra, 1954), p. 176 brings out an interesting
detail.
During the funeral mass for former Prime Minister Mykolas
Slezevicius in 1939, Reserve General Vincas Grigaliunas-Glovackis
assisted at the altar wearing a surplice over his uniform. Ironically,
he was one of the officers who participated in the coup which ousted the
Slezevicius government.
41 vaiceliunas, pp. 79-81.
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1935,

he

sought

to

remedy what

military and society, one

w~ich

he discerned

as a gap between the

had developed after the 1926 coup.

Some

of the reasons for this were discussed in the previous chapter.

His

plan

to

close

the

gap

was

three-pronged:

1)

a

press

campaign

to

popularize the military and inform the public of its activities, 2) a
similar

radio

military

and

campaign,
society

and

closer

3)

within

the

ranks

events

together. 42

experiences were beneficial for
morale

open

and

which would

11 Rastikis

felt

civilian

the

that

such

They raised

all parties concerned.

brought

bring

support;

they helped

engender the idea of a unified national front -- a sphere in which there
could be no opposition. 114 3
Petras

Indreika

writes

that

the

idea

for

the

army-society

festivals (kariuomenes ir visuomenes susiartinimo sventes) arose from
the 11 Ramove" Fraternity.

The military agreed and the president, along

with the government, supported its planning.
occured on

The first such festival

15 May 1935 with senior civil, military,

officials participating.

and diplomatic

The festival commenced with mass in the church

of the Kaunas garrison, which was followed by ceremonies honoring war
dead

at

the

festivities. 44

War

Museum.

Speeches

and

parades

closed

out

the

Such festivals in Kaunas and the provinces enabled the

citizenry to visit military installations and facilities, and witness

42Rastikis, I, p. 383.
43vitas, "Socialization and Smetona," p. 21.
4 4Karka, pp. 41-42.
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how their fighting men 11 ved.

They could ride cavalry horses, fire

rifles and automatic weapons, fly in fighter planes, and sample the
mess. 45
There were other occasions when the military came into contact
with

society•

16

February,

Lithuanian

Independence.

Day,

and

23

November, the anniversary of the army's founding, were always celebrated
with large milftar.y parades and ceremonies.

Each year, units throughout

the country celebrated their anniversaries and staged unit holidays,
which included sporting and shooting 'ell/en ts, and banquets.

President

Smetona took time to visit some of these holidays; such visits resulted
in

even

larger

ceremonies.46

The

first

Lithuanian World

Congress

occured in Kaunas in 1935, bringing Lithuanians from many countries into
the capital.

This was the occasion for a massive military and air

display for the guests and residents of Kaunas.47
According to one commentator, the officers of the Lithuanian
army had become praetorians, guarding the security of the regime and
keeping it isolated from the citizenry, despite official propaganda and
"banal" patriotic speeches. 48

The army's and state's affairs had been

45 Rastikis, I, p. 385.
46s11ogeris, pp. 62-63.
47Rapolas
Ski pi tis,
Nepriklausoma
Lietuva:
Atsiminimai
(Independent Lithuania: Reminiscences, (Chicago: Draugas, 1967), pp.
406-407. For accounts and photographs of public military displays see
V. Augustinas, photographer, "Kariuomenes ir visuomenes diena Kaune
1938 m. 11 ("Army-Society Festival in Kaunas 1938"), Karxs, AugustSeptember 1958, p. 218; Gintneris, p. 168, Lelis, p. 125. For President
Smetona' s remarks at the army-s.ociety festival on 26 May 1935 see
Smetona, II, pp. 171-172.
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effectively

maintained

in

the

hands

of

one

Nationalist Association, since the 1926 coup.

political

group,

This was formalized in

the outlawing of opposition political parties in 1935.

A substantial

portion of society had thus fallen away from the government military which kept it in power.

the

and the

It is interesting that the initiative

for the army-society festivals came not from official sources, but from
General Rastikis credits the festivals, as

the "Ramove" Fraternity.

well as other public military displays, with providing moral support to
the army and giving it a sturdier foundation upon which to carry out its
tasks • . From the o.ther perspective, society was perhaps better able to
understand and appreciate the military which, despite being composed of
its

own

sons,

brothers,

and

husbands,

had

become

someWhat

of

an

alienated mystery and gendarme. 4 9
D. THE MI(ITARY MEDIA
In

a

theoretical

article,

Zlabis

writes

of

the

between the military and press during both war and peace.

close

ties

Information

is reciprocally exchanged and subject to mutual feedback between the
military and nation.
by way of the press.

Military information and civic education proceed
The pen is a mighty weapon, as the power of

propaganda has demonstrated time and time again.so
48Rukas, pp. 278, 280.
4 9Rastikis, I, pp. 380, 383-384.
50Juozas Zlabis, 11 Spauda ir karas" ("The Press and War"), in
Pirmasis Lietuvos zurnalistu sajungos metrastis . (First Yearbook of the
Lithuanian Journalists Association), eds. V. Kemezys and J. Paleckis
(Kaunas: L.J.A., 1934), pp. 62-64.
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These facts were not lost on the military leadership, especially
He saw to it that the press corps was invited to

General Rastikis.

drills and maneuvers throughout the country, in addition to various
ceremonies and commemorations, and the commissioning of new officers at
the Military Academy.

The press never refused such invitations and

Rastikis

both

reports

objective

that

in their

government

accounts.

and

Rastikis,

opposition

press

were

who viewed the press as a

partner, held news conferences and related plans for the future.

He

himself contributed a great deal to the military press on the necessity
of civil-military cooperation.51
Two examples of the
follow.

Issue number

National

Guard

Kedainiai,
September

importance of the

thirty-nine

periodical,

(1928)

recounted

pen

to the military

of Trimitas

maneuvers

which

(Bugle),

the

occurred

in

appoximately twenty-five miles north of Kaunas, on
1928.

The

12-21

account emphasized good relations between the

soldiers and people, especially the farmers, during the course of the
maneuvers.
their

It also wrote that the people were patriotic and proud of

soldiers.52

In

1939-1940,

Captain

Jurgis

Polujanskas

wrote

articles and analyses regarding the course of the European theater of
World War II for the Lietuvos aidas (Echo of Lithuania) newspaper, a
Nationalist daily.53
5 1Rastikis, I, p. 383.
52Jurgela and Jurkus, p. 55.
53sronys Raila, Paguoda (Solace) (London: Nida, 1975), III, 74.
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Radio was also viewed as a partner of the military.

Stations

never refused to broadcast news of a military nature, and Sundays and
holidays saw half-hour segments devoted to the military.
lectures,

announcements,

news,

concerts

They included

by military orchestras and

choirs, and. plays whi9h were written and acted by officers and soldiers
of all grades.

The themes of the plays were taken from the wars of

independence and general military life.

The thrust was always patrio-

tism and the self-sacrifice of the soldier.

All broadcasting was done

by military men under the direction of the army's press and education
section.
were

The broadcasts were listened to by civilians and soldiers, who

provided

component

of

with

barracks

military

radios

broadcasting;

humanize the face of the army The

National

Guard

had

and
this

speakers.5 4
in

a

11

Humor

constant

was

effort

a
to

and indirectly that of the regime. 11 55

its own

separate half-hour

program.

other

organizations would later begin their own broadcasts, often imitating
the military's examples and formats.56
E. THE ACTIVITY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL VLADAS NAGIUS-NAGEVICIUS
One example of the link between the military and society was
perfectly embodied in Brigadier General Vladas Nagius-Nagevicius.

His

cultural and social activity, coupled with faithful military service for
..
a lifetime, made him one of the most popular figures in the Lithuanian
54 Rastikis, I, pp. 383-384.

55vitas "Socialization and Smetona," p. 21.
56 Rastikis, I, p. 384.
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military.
He was born in Kretinga, Lithuania on 17 June 1881 and was a
graduate of the Institute of Archeology and the Military Academy of
Medicine, both in St. Petersburg, Russia.

As a student, he participated

in the Lithuanian national movement in Russia and was once jailed for
that activity.
seas

from

He served with the Russian fleet in the Baltic and Black

1910 until

1917.

After

the

declaration of

Lithuania's

independence on 16 February 1918, he volunteered for the Lithuanian army
and was appointed head of the army medical corps'.
position

until

1940,

making

dramatic

inroads

He would hold this

into

the

health and

treatment of military men.57
Though Nagevicius was a i>ersonal friend of Smetona, with the
president

occasionaily

visiting

his

farm,

he

did

not

actively

participate in the 1926 coup, and never either approved or justified
it.

Indeed, shortly before the coup, General Nagevicius proposed that

President Ka2ys Grinius, a medical doctor, be elected an honorary member
of the medical organization Fraternitas Lithuanica.

In a speech several

years after the coup, Nagevicius stated that it was a sad event, and the
country must return to normal! ty and democracy.

Be that as it may,

Nagevicius also often played the unpleasant role of intermediary and
peacemaker.

One such occasion was inunediately following the coup, when

------·~---------

5 7Jonas
Puzinas,
"Vlad as
Nagius-Nagevicius,"
Enc>;clopedia
Lituanica, 1975, vol. 4, p. 11. See also Henrikas Brazaitis, "Gen. dr.
Vlada Nagiu-Nageviciu prisimenant" ("Remembering General Doctor Vlad as
Nagius-Nagevicius"), Dirva, 4 October 1984, p. 9 for a treatment of
Nagevicius' early life.
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Nagevicius

delivered

a

letter

from

Smetona

to

President

Grinius,

pleading that Grinius step down to avert a Polish invasion.

Grinius

returned the letter to Nagevicius without a response.58
took

place

in

March

1938,

following

the

A similar role

Lithuanian

government's

acceptance of a Polish ultimatum demanding the restoration of diplomatic
relations.

During a demonstration in Kaunas inv?lving seven to eight

thousand people, the participants assembled on the grounds of the War
Museum, of which Nagevicius was founder and director.

He spoke on

behalf of the government, requesting people to calm down in the face of
this very unpopular move by the Smetora regime.59
On one occasion,

Nagevicius was an intermediary not merely

within Lithuania's borders, but beyond them as well.

The Lithuanian

government had a practice of sending emissaries to visit Lithuanian
colonies abroad.
Africa.

In

1938,

Nagevicius

was

chosen

to

visit

South

After a discouraging beginnirig, he was able to bring a number

of Lithuanians together in that obscure colony.

He brought a book and

film

with

about

Indeed,

that

Johannesberg.

Lithuania
year,

to

acquaint

Lithuanian

the

people

Independence

Day

was

their

homeland.

celebrated

in

The fruit of the general's visit was the organization of

58Balys Matulionis, ed., Generolo gydytojo Vlado Nagiaus
Nageviciaus gyvenimo ir darbu apzvalga (Review of the Life and Work of
Physician General Vladas Nagius Nagevicius) (Putnam, CT: Veronika
Nageviciene, 1962), pp. 44-45, 216-217; Sliogeris, pp. 62, 76, 78-79.
59Kostas Navickas, The Strue;gle of the Lithuanian People for
Statehood (Vilnius: Gintaras, 1971), p. 102. See also Robert A. Vitas,
"The Polish-Lithuanian Crisis of 1938: Events Surrounding the
Ultimatum," Lituanus 30, 2 (Summer 1984), 69.
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the

South

African

Lithuanian

Society

(Pietu

Afrikos

Lietuviu

Draugija). 60
At

home,

Nagevicius maintained

Babtai and Vendziogala,

his

north of Kaunas.

farm,

Zemai tkiemis,

near

Over time, this area had

become gradually polonized, and Nagevicius was determined to return a
Lithuanian

spirit to the

including

Lithuanian

area.

songs,

He began
folkdances,

holding

festivals

traditions,

and

games.

Eventually, it became not uncommon for two thousand to attend.
Nagevicius'

visitors,

Under

leadership and by force of his example, the area around

Zemaitkiemis
influence.

there,

was

gradually

brought

back

under

Lithuanian

spiritual

It was this farm which received an array of distinguished
including

President

Smetona,

Kaunas

Archbishop

Juozapas

Skvireckas, government and military officials, foreign diplomats, and
leading members of society.61
General Nagevicius, in addition to being the director of the War
Museum and head of the army's medical service, had a wide range of
social and cultural activities.6 2

He urged his medical Fraternitas

Lithuanica to assist the army's medical service morally, materially, and
in terms of talent.
military, the navy.
Russian fleet.

He also sought to assist the other arm of the
This was an interest stemming from his days in the

In 1923 he founded and was the first president of the

60Matulionis, pp. 41-43.
6 1Matulionis, pp. 67, 215-216; Sliogeris, p. 79.
62The following information is taken from Hatulionis, pp. 35,
40-41, 65-66, 236-250, 263-265, 275 ff.
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Sailors Association (Jurininku Sajunga).

This organization helped found

a sailors training school and arranged scholarships to allow sailors to
train

abroad.

In

1927,

General

Nagevicius

requested

Mrs.

Celina

Mosinskis to establish the Lithuanian Womens' National Naval Assistance
Society

(Lietuvos Moteru

Tautlniam

Laivynui

Remti

Draugija).

Its

purpose was to develop interest in sea power and its importance to the
state, and to assist in the navy's establishment.

The society raised

funds through donations, balls, lotteries, and picnics.
establish

the

Navy

Fund

(Karo

Laivyno

Fondas),

It later helped

another

example of

society being brought into the sphere of military funding, provisioning
and assistance.
In his continuing effort to preserve and

promote Lithuanian

culture, he founded a women's committee to revive the wearing of the
Lithuanian folk costume.

He also urged women to join in cultural and

social work, to maintain Lithuanian traditions, and not to surrender to
foreign influence.

A women's organization he helped found would later

become the famous Birute Society.
Other activities included the establishment of the Lithuanian
Beautification

Society

historical areas.

(Lietuvai

Pagrazinti

Draugija)

to

preserve

He also established the Animal Protection Society

(Gyvuliams Globoti Draugija) and headed it for many years.

The society

drafted rules for the handling of animals which were later adopted by
the government
Lithuanian,

and

enforced by the

Estonian-Lithuanian,

and

police.

He organized

Latvian-Lithuanian

associations to promote more solidarity within the Baltic.

Finnish-

friendship
His academic
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work

included

archeological

international conferences.

digs,

articles,

and

presentations

at

In the military sphere, he founded the

Kaunas Officers Club (Karininku Ramove) and served on the Central Board
of the National Guard.
The activity in which Nagevicius took most pride, however, was
his work with military invalids and their association with the War
Museum.

He founded a number of committees to assist invalids and mili-

tary hospitals. 63

Military invalids worked at the Museum, which was

considered a national shrine.
tants,

and guides.

uni :~orms.

They were guards, honor guards, assis-

They were distinguished by their special, dark

The invalids executed public ceremonies daily and special

ones on holidays.

Many spectators gathered for these events, which

included the lowering of flags and the honoring of the unknown soldier
in the evening.

Important foreign guests were received at the Museum,

which was also a focal point for all national festivals, parades, and
ceremonies.

Nagevicius, who founded and directed the museum until the

loss of independence, is most famous for these activities.6 4
63see Matulionis, pp. 35, 40, 65.
For a publication. honoring
invalids see J. Viliusis, Vycio zenklas 1918-1938 (Knight's Cross 19181938) (Kaunas: Association of Invalids of Lithuania's Wars of
Independence, 1938).
An advertisement for products produced by an
invalid sewing shop appears in Centralinis Statistikos Biuras I Central
Statistical Bureau, Visa Lietuva: informacine knyga (All Lithuania:
Information Book) (Kaunas: Spaudos Fondas I Press Fund, 1925), p. 403.
64E. J. Harrison, ed., Lithuania 1928 (London: Hazell, Watson &
Viney, 1928), pp. 78-79; Merkelis, Antanas Smetana, pp. 351, 361; Petras
Pleskevicius, Mes nesem laisve (We Carried Freedom), 2nd rev. ed. (n.p.:
n.p., n.d.), pp. 165-171. For a detailed description and explanation of
the Museum see Matulionis, pp. 81-167.
Even though the War Museum is
now the Communist State Museum, it is still a focus for Lithuanian
nationalism. On 14 May 1972 Romas Kalanta, a Lithuanian student, burned
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The
1940.

Museum was

closed

after

occupation of June

It was reopened and functioned in a limited capacity during the

German occupation of 1941-1944.
again

the Soviet

in

1944,

When the Soviets invaded and occupied

Nagevicius and his wife

emigrated to the US.

fled

to Austria and

He died in Willoughby,

later

Ohio on 15 September

1954. 65
F. CONCLUSION
Following the 1926 coup, there was a discernible gap between the
military

and

society,

mainly

due

to

the

fact

that

the

army

was

controlled by one . politic al group, for which it was forced to act as
gendarme.

For quite some time there was no action to remedy this

incongruity between the citizens and their soldiers.

General Stasys

Rastikis, commander-in-chief 1935-1940, was one of the few who undertook
positive steps, often using standard techniques of political socialization.

He was partially successful in these efforts.

As the indepen-

dence period continued, albeit for a short time, soldier and civilian
did

grow closer

together

a vital

strength in any political system.

ingredient

for

stability and

It is to General Rastikis whom this

study now turns.

himself to death there in protest of the continued Soviet occupation.
65 Puzinas, p. 12.

CHAPTER VII
PERSONA PRIMA IN MILITARY AFFAIRS:
DIVISIONAL GENERAL STASYS RASTIKIS, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 1935-1940
A. PREFATORY REMARKS
Persona prima is the title bestowed upon Rastikis by Aleksandras
Merkelis,

President

Smetona's

biographer.

According

to

Merkelis,

Rastikis rose like a meteor at a time when the military' s prestige was
at an all-time low following the Kubiliunas revolt of June 1934.

People

within and without the military looked to him with great hope.

In

return, Rastikis wished to raise the military's prestige by enhancing
his own personal authority and popularity. 1
helm of Lithuania's armed

forces,

During his tenure at the

he would take dramatic steps to

reorganize and modernize them, while raising the citizenry's trust in
their fighting men. 2

For example, Rastikis' efforts at socialization,

discussed in the previous chapter, were notable.

His

importance to

Lithuania, both military and nation, was such that his influence is felt
throughout this study, as his memoirs are mentioned numerous times.
Those memoirs were published in four volumes between 1956 and

1Aleksandras

Merkelis,
Antanas
Smetona:
Jo visuomenine,
kulturine ir politine veikla (Antanas Smetona: His Social 2 Cultural, and
Political Activity) (New York: American Lithuanian National Association,
1964), pp. 447, 537-538.
2vaclovas
Sliogeris,
Antanas
Smetona:
Zmogus
ir
valstybininkas.
Atsiminimai (Antanas Smetona: Person and Statesman.
Reminiscences) (Sodus, MI: Juozas J. Bachunas, 1966), p. 134.
140
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1982.

They encompass 2, 800 pages.

The Rastikis memoirs are necessary

reading for any student of independent Lithuania's military.
give insight into life and politics in general.
information there is found nowhere else.

They also

In many cases, the

Professor V. Stanley Vardys,

chairman of political science at the University of Oklahoma at Norman
characterizes the work as the most important and useful of all the
memoirs written by leading citizens of independent Lithuania, for they
chronicle the

internal

politics of the period 1935-1940.

Rastikis,

according to Vardys, is an expert writer and master of the pen, whose
work is readable and explains the complex well.
and attention to detail is scrupulous.

Facts are well-recorded

His analysis is many-faceted,

viewing any given question from all sides.

Rastikis realized his role

in history and wrote in such fashion; he was not merely arrogant as
critics claim.3
Rastikis was one of the few general officers in the Lithuanian
military

who

possessed

a

broad

perspective.

implications of the military in politics and society.

He

realized

the

When others, both

officers and civilians, were advocating a greater role for the military
in the politic al power structure, he advocated a strong voice for the
military, but with strict subordination to civil authority.
sense, he was a Western military man.

In this

Though he was serving at military

headquarters in Kaunas at the time of the 1926 coup, he was not involved

3v. Stanley Vardys, "Generolo Rastikio memuarai ir jo vaidmuo
Lietuvos poli tikoje" ("General Rastikis' Memoirs and his Role in
Lithuania's Poli tics"), Aidai (Echoes), no. 4, (April 1973), pp.
147-148.
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and learned of it the following morning along with most residents of the
capital.

Different scholars rate Rastikis differently.

Some say he had

no politic al ambition; others write that he had a secret desire for
supreme power, .if only indirectly.
B. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Stasys Rastikis was born
completed gymnasium in 1914.
Russian

army

and

was

13 September 1896 in Kursenai.

He

The following year he volunteered for the

promoted

to

NCO.

He

saw combat in

several

locations throughout the Russian Empire and Eastern Europe.

Rastikis

graduated from the Military Academy of Tiflis (Tbilisi)

1917 and

remained at the front in the Caucasus until war's end.

in

He returned to

Vilnius in Spring 1918 and registered to serve in the Lithuanian army,
which was still in the planning stages.
Kaunas Catholic Seminary.

That same year he entered the

The following year Rastikis volunteered for

service in the Lithuanian army, which was then fighting the wars of
independence against the Poles, Bolsheviks, and a German-Russian force
under Colonel Bermondt-Avalov.

He was seriously injured in combat with

the Bolsheviks, and was forced to lie on the battlefield under cover of
darkness while his own troops and the enemy exchanged fire.

Upon being

taken prisoner, he was kept in various hos pi ta ls, later in the Tula
concentration camp and Moscow prisons.
during a prisoner exchange in April 1921.

He was returned to Lithuania
In 1923 he was transferred to

headquarters and worked in military intelligence from 1926 until 1930.
Rastikis

graduated

the

University

of

Kaunas

Faculty of

Medicine in 1929 and the Berlin General Staff Academy in 1932.

Veterinary
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After serving as an infantry officer,

Rastikis was appointed

chief of staff in 1934, several months after the Kubiliunas revolt.

At

that time, this was the senior uniformed officer in the country; he held
the position while still a lieutenant colonel.

On 1 January 1935, he

was appointed to the newly reconstituted post of co111Dander-in-chief, the
new senior uniformed position.

Rastikis was promoted to the grade of

brigadier general on 23 November 1937.

In the five years he served as

commander-in-chief, Rastikis reorganized and strengthened the army in
terms of combat readiness, administration, education, discipline, and
decentralized mobilization.
eight months in 1938 in
While

He served as acting defense minister for

the~Mlronas

cabinet.

Rastikis ostensibly held to the principle of military

neutrality vis-a-vts politics, Smetona suspected Rastikis of forming a
rival

power

center.

He was relieved

from duties in

January 1940,

promoted to the grade of divisional general two weeks before becoming
eligible, and discharged to the reserve on 23 April.

However, on 7 June

1940 he was returned to active duty and appointed commander of the
Senior Officer Courses.

During the Soviet ultimatum one week later on

15 June, Rastikis was appointed prime minister in a desperate move by
the government, but was not allowed by Moscow to execute these duties.
He later fled to Germany.
the German liberation.

His wife was held in a Kaunas prison until

His three daughters, ages eleven, four, and one,

along with Rastikis' other relatives, were deported to Siberia.

His

one-year old daughter would die soon thereafter in exile.
When

the

Germans

launched

Operation

Barbarossa

against

the
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Soviet Union in June 1941, Lithuanians revolted and formed a provisional
government,

with

Rastikis

as

liquidated

this

government,

defense
but

minister.

offered

positions during the German occupation.

The

Rastikis

Germans

various

soon

senior

He refused each time, choosing

instead to work in the War Museum in Kaunas.
When the Red Army re-occupied Lithuania in 1944, Rastikis fled
to Germany where he lived in displaced persons camps.
emissaries continued
Lithuania.
refused.

to

harass him there,

Soviet Lithuanian

urging him to

return

They used letters from his daughters as bait;

to

Rastikis

In the beginning of 1948, British occupation forces arrested a

Lithuanian NKVD agent who had been sent to assasinate General Rastikis
and another former Lithuanian army officer.
In 1949 Rastikis and his wife emigrated to the United States.
He remained active in the Lithuanian community while working in a Los
Angeles factory.
sity.

In 1951-1952 he taught Russian at Syracuse Univer-

He worked at the European headquarters of the Supreme Committee

for the Liberation of Lithuania in 1952-1953.
Washington headquarters in 1954.

He was transferred to the

From 1955 until 1968 he was instructor

of foreign languages at the US Army Language School and the Defense
Language Institute,

Monterey,

California.

He also gave lectures on

military-related topics to the officers and men.
General
governments of

Rastikis
Lithuania,

was

awarded

Latvia,

military

Estonia,

decorations

Finland,

Poland,

by

the

Sweden,

France, and Great Britain.
Divisional General Stasys Rastikis died in Los Angeles on 2 May
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1985 at the age of eighty-nine.
C. THE RASTIKIS PLAN FOR MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
Upon being appointed chief of staff in Autumn 1934, Rastikis
immediately took steps to rationalize the administration of the senior
military leadership officer.

and to enhance his own power as senior uniformed

Throughout the period of independence, the military leadership

had been the most unstable of all government en ti ties.

In the twenty-

two years of independence, there were as many defense ministers and
chiefs

of

staff.

That

period

also

saw twelve

separate

terms

as

commander-in-.chief, though one individual, General Silvestras Zukauskas,
served

four of them.

Clarification is needed, though.

Between 26

January 1928 and 1 January 1935 there was no commander-in-chief.

The

position of senior uniformed officer was held by the chief of staff who,
in addition to administering the headquarters staff, was also in the
chain of command. 4
Rastikis

also

had

to

contend

with

ambiguity

regarding

the

specific spheres of. power of the "Big Three" in the military, that is
4stasys Rastikis, Ivykiai ir zmones: Is mano uzrasu (Events and
Personalities: From My Notes), ed. Bronius Kviklys (Chicago: Akademines
skautijos leidykla I Academic Press, 1972), pp. 15-16. Sova discounts
the thesis of instability.
He writes that for all practical purposes,
the leadership of the army can be divided into three phases. From 1919
until 1929 General Silvestras Zukauskas, a hero of the wars of
independence, in effect ran the army.
Indeed, in addition to three
previous short terms as commander-in-chief, he served in that post from
5 June 1923 until 26 January 1928. From 1929 until 1934, Chief of Staff
General Petras Kubiliunas ran the army, and General Rastikis held the
reins of military power for the last five years of independence.
See
Antanas Sova, "Del praeities ivykiu" ("About Past Events"), Dirva, 30
January 1974, p. 3.
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the

defense

minister,

conunander-in-chief,

and

chief

of

Occasionally they would overlap; other times a void existed.

staff.
Clashes

among these three, especially if one or more of them had a strong
personality,

would

defense

minister

without

consulting

staff.

reverberate throughout the entire military.
would

sometimes

either

the

make

a

military-related

conunander-in-chief

or

the

decision
chief

of

Further, the defense minister was often of a lower grade and not

as competent in military matters as the other two officers.
was

The

still

the

superior

and

had

the

greater

However, he

responsibility

and

authority.5
In his first meeting with the State Defense Board (Valstybes
Gynimo Taryba) Rastikis presented his reorganization and strengthening
plan.

In the first place, there were several proposals for rectifying

certain problems of foreign affairs.

Smetona responded by stating that

right was on Lithuania's side and nothing could be done.

Rastikis also

proposed a military alliance with the other Baltic states of Latvia and
Estonia.

Smetona rejected

this

also,

saying

that

Lithuania's two

northern neighbors were too sympathetic to Poland. 6
The second phase of the proposal dealt with military reorganization.
forces.

The president as before, was conmander-in-chief of all armed
He had the authority to order the army commander-in-chief to

5Merkelis, p. 423, Sta sys Rastikis, Kovose del Lietuvos: Kario
atsiminimai (In the Battles for Lithuania: A Soldier's Reminiscences)
(Los Angeles: Lietuviu dienos I Lithuanian Days, 1956), I, 485-486,
489-490.

~erkelis, p. 438.
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commence military

operations

when

war

was

declared

or

Lithuania's

The defense minister was head of the entire

territory was invaded.

military establishment (vi sos kariuomenes virsininkas) and prepared the
nation and army for war.

His deputy was either the prime minister or

another minister· designated by the prime minister.
chief answered to the defense minister.

The cormnander-in-

The army oommander.-in-chief

possessed responsibility for insuring that the army was combat-ready.7
Two bodies were to advise on and decide military matters.
first was the Military Board

The

(Karo Taryba), chaired by the defense

minister and consisting of the commander-in-chief, the chief of staff,
the chief quartermaster and, if required by the minister, one of ·the
commanding generals of the army's three divisions.

The State Defense

Board, mentioned above, was chaired by the president and consisted of
the prime minister, the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, finance,
interior, the commander-in-chief, and the chief quartermaster. 8
organization

of

the

Lithuanian

military

establishment

is

found

The
in

Figure 7. 1.
The third
military finance.

and

final

phase of the

Rastikis

Plan dealt with

In his seven year plan to strengthen and modernize

the army, he requested annually for special expenditures (nepaprastom

7For a short overview of the organization of the military under
the statute of 12 May 1919 see Ladislovas Natkevicius, Lietuvos
kariuomene (The Lithuanian Army) (Ne~ York: Lithuanian Development
Corporation, 1919), pp. 32, 36.
Bvyriausybes zinios (Government News) (Kaunas: Ministru tarybos
kanceliarija I Chancellery of the Cabinet), no. 3259, 31 December 1934.
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islaidom) 25 million l i tai, for a total of 175 million l i tai over and
above the regular budget.

The prime minister and finance minister,

Juozas Tubelis, opPosed such large increases in military spending on the
grounds that they would be almost imPossible for Lithuania's economy to
bear, and that large foreign loans were undesirable.

President Smetona

attempted to work out a compromise between the two positions, but the
clouds of war were approaching and he decided to approve Rastikis'
request.9
The

Rastikis

Plan

became

operational

on

1

January

1935.

Lieutenant Colonel Rastikis was named commander-in-chief and Colonel
Jonas Cernius was appointed chief of staff.

Most officers were pleased

with the 1935 reforms and felt that the young, energetic (thirty-eight
years of age) commander-in-chief would be able to execute his plan to
its fullest potential.

It was adopted perhaps for two reasons: 1) supe-

rior argumentation on the part of its proponent, and 2) fear of another
military uprising so soon after the Kubiliunas revolt, in which military
spending had been a factor.
Rastikis'

action,

stating

One commentator, however, is critical of
that

he

overstepped

his

authority,

budgetary matters are in the hands of the defense minister to Rastikis' own plan.

for

according

Nevertheless, during the course of the seven

year plan -- which would only receive five years to operate -

military

attaches in Kaunas observed that in terms of quality of education, arms,
and men, Lithuania's army had surpassed those of the other Baltic

9Merkelis, pp. 438-439.
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FIGURE 7.1: THE RASTIKIS PLAN:
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT OF LITHUANIA
1 JANUARY 1935-15 JUNE 1940
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states. 10
The

increased

power

which

Rastikis received

under

reforms proved to· have more than just military consequences.

the

1935

Whether he

wanted to or not -- scholars disagree as to his motives -- Rastikis was
also placed in the middle of domestic political vicissitudes.

This will

now be discussed.
D. RASTIKIS AND POLITICS
Despite the fact that General Rastikis was married to President
Smetona's niece, Elena Marija Srnetonaite, the relations between the two
men were mainly official.
First

Family.

More

often

Very rarely did the Rastikises visit the
they

would

visit

socially

with

Marija

Smetonai te Valusi s, the president's daughter, and her husband, Major
Aloyzas Valusis. 11

While Rastikis' relationship with the president was

mainly professional, it should not be construed that he did not have
strong political opinions.

In ~is memoirs, he writes that he felt

disdain for the excessive and sometimes unethical disputes which took
pl ace in domestic J?Oli tics.

He also disliked the peacetime state of

war, which necessitated military censorship of the press and political
intervention.

As far as he was concerned, civil administration should

10stasys Rastikis,
"A.a. brigados generolas Jonas Cernius"
("The
Late
Brigadier General
Jonas
Cernius"),
Lietuviu dienos
(Lithuanian Days), September 1977, p. 5.
For positive comments
regarding the plan see Sliogeris, pp. 127, 133.
For a critique see
Jonas Augustaitis, Vardxs ir Sova apie Rastikio atsiminimus (Vardys and
Sova on Rastikis' Memoirs) (Chicago: Author: 1975), p. 10.
11Sliogeris, p. 144.
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not be in the hands of the military and political matters must be dealt
with by the defense minister.

1be top military leadership should become

involved only to the extent of coordination,
contact with leaders of

that is,

to maintain

!!l. political parties and assure that they are

attending to military-related matters. 12
Rastikis became unpopular, especially among the Nationalists,
when he took steps to de-politicize the military.

For example, some

elements referred to Rastikis as a revolutionary when he informed the
president

and

defense minister

that

he

would

no

military to carry out civilian death sentences.
deemphasize the army's police function.

longer

allow the

He also wished to

During the Suvalkai farmers

unrest in 1934, Rastikis was on vacation in Palanga on the Baltic.
interior

minister,

through

the

prime

military assistance in restoring order.

minister's

office,

1be

requested

1be defense minister agreed to

send several cavalry units to the Suvalkai region.

Rastikis, however,

discovered this and took swift action to countermand the orders.

In the

end, the army and farmers never clashed. 13
While

Rastikis

advocated

a

strict

separation

between

the

political and military realms, and obedience to civil superiors, he also
urged respect from politicians toward the military.
military must not be injected into politics.

He warned that the

Further, civil superiors

must be vigilant that the military not overstep its bounds.

Rastikis

12Rastikis, I, p. 394.
Cf. chapter 2 of this study for a
discussion of the military profession's disdain for politics.
13R.as t i· k.is, I , pp. 407 - 409 •
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realized

that

a

number of officers

had

been

transferred

to other

ministries, sometimes for political duties, w:hile remaining on active
Upon assuming his new duties, he informed them that they must

duty.

either return to regular military service or retire to the reserve prior
to continuing political activity.

Many disliked this ultimatum and

opted to join the reserve. 14
Rastikis writes that the general
member of the government.

public

perceived him as a

He responds by saying that he was not, and

did not attend cabinet meetings unless ordered by the defense minister
to discuss military-related matters.

Rastikis was not even of vice-

ministerial rank; when the post of defense minister was vacant, the
portfolio was assumed by the prime minister or another minister..

When

the Constitution of 1938 was being drafted by the Seimas, there was a
suggestion that the commander-in-chief be designated a formal member· of
the cabinet with the right to attend meetings.

Rastikis writes that he

urged this provision not to be adopted, for it would detract from his
military duties, cause him to be responsible for government actions, and
pull

him too

adopted.

far

into the politic al sphere; the provision was not

Rastikis participated only in sub-cabinet councils. 15

his advice in such settings was often decisive.

Indeed

During the Polish

ultimatum of 1938, for example, Rastikis' argumentation to accept the
demand to restore diplomatic relations with Warsaw carried the day. 16
14 Rastikis,
res~rictions

He did ,not place
I, pp. 393, 410.
on reserve officers. See Rastikis, I, p •. 396.

15 Rastikis, I, pp. 489, 490.
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Rastikis'

determination

to keep politic al forces out of the

military evoked the wrath of the ruling Nationalist
first place, he was not pleased that the
composed

only

political

of

Nationalists.

patronage,

advancement in the

and

Further,

the

army.

Sei~as

political

As~ociation.

convened in 1936 was

he

wished

basis

for

they approved

to

eliminate

promotion

and

For example, civilian district officials

wished to control entry into the Military Academy.
those

In the

of to gain entry.

They wanted only

Rastikis ordered

the only

criterion for entry to be a competitive examination, with personal and
political considerations omitted.

Even innocent encounters with non-

political groups could immerse him in difficulties.

For example, if

Rastikis received delegates from a Catholic organization, it could be
construed

as

Democrats.

a
His

manifestation
devout

of

Catholic

sympathy

practice was

toward

the

Christian

also not politically

beneficial. 17
Aleksandras

Merkelis,

President

Smetona's biographer,

writes

that General Rastikis perceived himself as untouchable, that is, he
should

be

above

criticism.

He,

along

with

another

commentator,

concludes that in twice refusing an offer to become prime minister, it
is evident that Rastikis sought to maintain his power -- the real power
based on the military without

the

by managing affairs from behind the scenes,

responsibility

and

instability of the

prime minister's

16see Robert A. Vitas, "The Polish-Lithuanian Crisis of 1938:
Events Surrounding the Ultimatum," Lituanus, 30, 2 (Summer 1984), 66-67.
17Rastikis, I, pp. 409-410, 451-452, 495-496, 500.
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post. 18

One interesting indication supporting this line of thought is a

photograph which appears in one book published while Rastikis served
concurrently as acting defense minister for eight months in 1938.

Under

the photograph, the title of commander-in-chief precedes that of acting
defense

minister. 19

One

analyst

interprets

Rastikis'

actions

as

indicative of simple fear; he was afraid to be a civil political leader
with the position's accompanying'vicissitudes. 20
One contemporary example of the political sphere being forsaken
for the military may be found in Egypt.
Sadat was assasinated in

1981,

After Egyptian President Anwar

Vice President Hosni Mubarak assumed

interim power while waiting for new presidential elections.

During that

interim, however, Mubarak did not refer to himself as vice president or
acting president.

He did not assume a civil title, but instead declared

himself commander-in-chief of the armed- forces.

Perhaps, Mubarak, as

Rastikis, knew where the real power of his country was based.
At first, Smetona approved of Rastikis' increase of authority
over

the military.

He

felt this would be beneficial for mi'.1.1 tary

discipline and, perhaps, inject a note of stability into that troubled
area.

Indeed when initial differences arose between General Rastikis

and the Nationalist Association, Smetona supported Rastikis, despite the
18Augustaitis p. 11; Merkelis pp. 544, 565.
19see photograph in J. Viliusis, _v....y_c_io__z_e_n_k_l_as~-1--9._1--8._-_1_9=3-.8
(Knight's Cross
1918-1938) (Kaunas: Association of Invalids of
Lithuania's Wars of Independence, 1938), p. 7.
20 conversation with Dr. Thomas Remeikis,
science at Calumet College, Indiana, August 1984.

head

of political
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criticism this evoked from his own politic al faction.

Nevertheless,

after some time, Smetana became worried that Rastikis may fall into the
trap of partisan politics -- on the side of the Christian Democrats if he attempted to become persona prima in society, as he was in the
military.
tool,

In the minds of many in the regime, Rastikis had b-ecorne a

albeit unwittingly,

of the

Christian

Democrat.s.

Thus during

official reports, if Rastikis brought up non-military matters with the
president, Smetana would politely inform him that he did not care to
discuss them. 21
Evidently, Smetana soon thought that Rastikis was searching for
excessive

popularity,

influence,

and

authority

in

the

non-military

sphere.

Sliogeris, another biographer of the president and a one-time

military

aide,

writes

that

jurisdiction rather broadly.

Rastikis

would

occasionally

define

his

Merkelis asserts that Rastikis admired the

conunander-in-chief of the Estonian army, General Johan Laidoner, whom he
met during a visit to commemorate Estonia's independence day on 24
February 1939.
Pats.

Laidoner was a greater figure than President Konstantin

Merkelis is of the opinion that Rastikis desired similar status

in Lithuania. 22
As far as Smetana was, concerned, his quiet war with Rastikis for

primacy began. on 1 October 1936 when Secret Defense Ministry Section II

2 1Merkelis, pp. 539-540.
22Merkelis, pp. 542-543, Kazys Musteikis, Prisiminimu fragmentai
(Fraeents of Memories) (London: Nida, 1970), pp. 74, 83; Sliogeris
p. 130.
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Memorandum Number
Rastikis wrote

3760 was transmitted

that

to the

president.

it,

some communist-influenced reservists, while on

active duty, would be disruptive and insubordinate.
following remedies:

In

He suggested the

1) utilize all patriotic organizations to form a

united front in the fight against co111Dunism, 2) educate the masses, 3)
utilize more propaganda, 4) control the press and the importation of
Soviet films (Sovkinas), 5) government officials should take courses in
ideology and

give

a loyalty oath,

6)

only loyal

and

trustworthy

Lithuanians should be hired for government service, 7) transgressors
should

be

sent

to

labor

camps,

not

punishments of exile or the guardhouse.

the

standard

administrative

While sensible observations and

suggestions, Smetona did not like the fact that such political material
was emanating from military headquarters.
not as suggestions, but as directives.

Indeed he interpreted these

However, Smetona decided not to

have a conflict with the military or change leadership at this juncture,
instead opting to maneuver carefully with Rastikis until the appropriate
and secure time arrived to remove him. 23
As the

independence period

neared its end,

increasingly involved in political matters.

Rastikis became

This was especially true in

events surrounding the government of Brigadier General Jonas Cerni us,
which will be discussed

at more length

in the

following chapter.

Cernius was appointed prime minister on 30 March 1939 after the German
ultimatum, in which Lithuania was forced to cede the Klaipeda Territory,

2 3Augustaitis, p. 13; Merkelis pp. 540-541.
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was accepted.

Rastikis actively urged Smetona to place members of the

opposition in the new cabinet.

Smetona, though skeptical, agreed. The

evening the Cernius government was installed, Rastikis spoke over radio
to calm the people after such a traumatic international humiliation.

He

informed the citizenry that the president had agreed to form a new
government based upon a broader political foundation.

Ras ti ki s would

receive many congratulatory letters and telegrams for this action, since
people

were

becoming

disenchanted

with

the

one-party authoritarian

regime. 24
In November of that year, the Cerni us cabinet was weaken.ed by a
key resignation.
crisis also.

Rastikis was politically

ac~ive

during this cabinet

Smetona, who had not been pleased with the behavior of

several opposition ministers•

was of the opinion that the Christian

Democrats and Peasant Populists would not want to join a post-Cernius
government.

The president was irritated by Rastikis' declaration that

the opposition must be included; he perceived this almost as a threat.
Nevertheless, Smetona gave Rastikis permission to contact the opposition
regarding their· participation.
Ant an as

Merkys,

the

last

Consent was secured and the cabinet of

government

of

independent

Lithuania, . was

formed.25

2 4Augustaitis, p. 4.
25Merkelis, pp. 540, 561-562; Rastikis, I, pp. 634-636. It must
be noted that the last two cabinets of independent Lithuania were not
officially coalition governments, since the opposition had been
technically outlawed in 1935. However, it had continued to be active,
albeit without the fruits of political power, until the Cernius cabinet.
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How

does

interference?
assessment

himself

respond

to

charges of

political

He writes that he respects President Smetona, though his

must

personality.

Rastikis

be

realistic

and

not

tinged

with

any

cult

of

As far as Rastikis is concerned, he did not participate in

any political adventurism.

The charges that he desired political power

and the decrease of presidential authority are false.

It was his duty

to popularize the military per se, not its leadership.

However, in

order to accomplish this, it was necessary for him to emerge as a strong
and visible individua1. 2 6
He did not expect all to agree with him.

At the same time,

though, he did not wish youth to develop into unthinking individuals.
He wanted them to be critical in their analyses of all topics and come
to their own conclusions.

He also notes that he was forced to do this

due to a general lack of concern with military matters.

Thus the

critic ism of "too much talking" was unwarranted. 2 7
Rastikis wrote that senior military officials would be lax in
their

duties

maintenance.

if

they

dealt

only

with

military

education

and

In a blatant entrance into the civil realm, he states

that, within the bounds of the national defense effort, the military
must indirectly manage all agencies dealing even remotely with national
security.

This is the politico-military connection, though he writes

that he recommended non-military action only when it was for the sake of

2 6Rastikis, I, pp. 385-386; Rastikis, Ivykiai ir zmones, pp.
26-27.
2 7Rastikis, I, p. 391.

159
preserving military morale and effectiveness. 2 8
perception that

Be that as it may, the

Rastikis was too political, especially in the wrong

camp, eventually led to his demise.

This will now be addressed.

E. THE FALL OF GENERAL RASTIKIS
Until

mid-1938,

President

General Rastikis' opinion.

Smetona appeared

willing to

honor

However, by autumn of that year, Smetona

began expressing dissatisfaction with what he perceived as the pol i ticization of the conunander-in-chief.
emerged even earlier.

The Nationalists' dissatisfaction had

By the end of 1937, influential party members

would go speak with Smetona and Prime Minister Juozas Tubelis regarding
Rastikis, though the latter were unwilling to take action.
suspected to be an opposition leader.

Rastikis was

This was compounded by the fact

that Rastikis never had any ties to the ruling party, even informally.
His popularity among the citizenry was viewed as dangerous.

Rastikis'

policy of dealing with all groups was made even more distasteful to the
ruling

elite

when

the

opposition

would

take

the

initiative

in

capitalizing on the gener-al's popularity.29 ·
The troubled relationship between Rastikis and the Nationalists

2 8Rastikis

I, p. 395; Julius P. Slavenas, "General Stasys
1
Rastikis as Commander-in-Chief," paper presented at the Sixth Conference
on Baltic Studies sponsored by the Association for the Advancement of
Baltic Studies at the University of Toronto, 11-13 May 1978, quoted in
Rastikis, Lietuvos likimo keliais: Is mano uzrasu (On the Roads of
Lithuania's Destiny: From My Notes), ed. Jonas Dainauskas (Chicago:
Akademines skautijos leidykla I Academic Press, 1982), p. 451; Vardys,
p. 150.
2 9Rastikis, I, P• 495; Sliogeris pp. 142-143, 171.
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began right at the beginning of his tenure.

It had become accepted

practice for the military leadership to deal only with the ruling party,
not with any other political groups.

This, perhaps, was natural, since

one party had ruled single-handedly for an extended period of time.
Rastikis stated that the military belonged to all groups; therefore, it
should

have rel at ions with all of them.

approve of such a posture.

The

Nationalists did not

They understandably saw the position of

commander-in-chief as an important foundation of the regime.

In turn,

the individual who occupies that post must not deal with those opposed
to that regime.

At fir st , Smetana supported Rasti ki s.

For example,

when Rastikis was appointed chief of staff in 1934, the Nationalists
invited him to report to them on military matters.

Rastikis refused,

stating that then he would have to do the same for other groups; he
would report only to his civilian superiors.

Despite the pressure from

his party, the president stood by the connnander-in-chief .30
The predisposing factor in Rastikis' downfall was his active
political stance during the events surrounding the Cerni us government.
The general's demands that the opposition be included in that and the
Merkys government were

to prove fatal

appointed prime minister

in

November

in the end.

Ant an as Merkys,

1939, sought to bring Rastiki s

down; he had Smetana's approva1.3 1
30Rastikis, I, pp. 493-495.
31 Juozas Jakstas, "Tautos pazangos partijos-Lietuviu tautin.inku
sajungos istorijos bruozai 1916-1940" ("An Historical Sketch of the
National Progress Party-Lithuanian Nationalist Association 1916-1940 11 ) ,
in Tautines minties keliu: Lietuviu tautininkijos istoriniai bruozai
(Path of National Thought: Historical Sketch of Lithuanian Nationalism)
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The precipitating factor was an article Rastikis authored for
the December 1939 issue of Kardas {Saber), the officers' periodical.

In

it were politic al suggestions, including the necessity of having good
relations with Moscow.

There was also a statement that the commander-

in-chief earned less money than a mayor.

This was an indirect slap at

Prime

Kaunas.

Minister

Merkys,

Kazys

Skucas

General

distribution.
restore 1 t

former

mayor

ordered

the

of

issue

Interior

confiscated

Minister
prior

to

This was a blow to Rast! ki s' prestige, who sought to

by way of several points: 1) the president must publicly

declare satisfaction with the commander-in-chief's work.

The coDHDander-

in-chief would then state that he operates according to the president's
direct! ves, and that no difference of opinion exists regarding. affairs
of state; 2) the Seimas, without alteration, was to approve Rastikis'
proposal to amend the structure of the military leadership;3 2 3) the
prime minister was to utilize all available means to assure that General
Rastikis' name not be used in a derogatory sense in streets and public
places;

4)

Colonel

Skucas

was

to

publicly

apologize

for

the

confiscation; 5) the commander-in-chief's budget proposals were not to
be cut. 33
Eds. Jonas Puzinas and Jonas Pranas Palukaitis {Chicago: American
Lithuanian National Association, 1979), pp. 151-152; Slavenas quoted in
Rastikis, Lietuvos likimo keliais, p. 455.
32rhe proposal was as follows: 1) the corrmander-in-chief is the
head of the entire military establishment and participates in the
cabinet with a vote, 2) the defense minister merely maintains the
military.
See Musteikis, pp. 70-72.
According to Rastikis, he never
wanted to be in the cabinet. See above.
33Musteikis, pp. 76-77.
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President

Smetona,

who

had

military intervention into

the

political

always carried point one out.

disapproved
realm,

of

the

article

as

stated that he had

As for point two, the matter was in the

hands of the Seimas Constitutional Commission.

With regard to the third

point, Merkys stated that he could not co·ntrol people's conversations.
The solution was for Rastikis to tone his ego down.
fourth point, Skucas refused to apologize.
unacceptable.
president,

In response to the

The fifth point was deemed

Rastikis was rebuffed in a meeting consisting of him, the

Merkys,

and

Defense

Minister

General

Kazys

Musteikis.

Rastikis, after being offered a raise in salary, meekly asked to be
discharged from the regular army.3 4
This was a far different manifestation by Rastikis from his
stance before the fateful meeting.

Between the points and his final

rebuff, he staged yet another attempt to maintain his prestige intact.
After

issuing a request

to the defense minister to be relieved as

commander-in-chief, he stated, through Rev. Aleksandras Grigaitis, that
he would return only if invited by the president as an indispensable
official.
Rastikis,

However, since Defense Minister Musteikis had not relieved
no invi ta ti on to return was necessary.

informed Grigaitis that no person was indispensable.

Smetona, further,
Finally, he had

asked Rastikis to stay on as commander-in-chief, but the general had
refused.35
3 4Musteikis, pp. 77-80.
35Musteikis, pp. 75-76.
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Rastikis was

temporarily discharged

to the reserve,

given a

three month vacation, and raised to the grade of divisional general two
weeks prior to becoming

eligi~le

in January 1940.

Divisional General

Vincas Vitkauskas, the commander of the first infantry division, was
· appointed

temporary

commander-in-chief.

However,

after

Rastikis'

vacation, Smetana decided to keep Vitke1uskas permanently and advised
Rastikis to choose some other post in the regular army.
April

1940,

Rastikis requested

to

reserve; the request. was granted.

Instead, on 23

be permanently discharged

to the

However, because of growing anxiety

emanating from both the military and society over Rastikis' case, he was
returned to active duty and appointed co11111ander of the Senior Officer
Courses on 7 June 1940 -

without the authority to issue orders to line

units.3 6
Just one week after being returned to active duty, during the
Soviet ultimatum, Rastikis would be asked to form a new government as
prime mini.ster.

As the following chapter demonstrates, this was not

to be.

F. CONCLUSION
Divisional
figure to this day.

General

Stasys

Rastikis

remains

a

controversial

Politically and psychologically his position in the

3 6Augustai tis p. 6; Merkelis, pp. 565-567; Musteikis, pp.
80-81.
During Rastikis' "vacation , 11 he was secretly approached by an
individual who claimed that a group was prepared to stage a show of
force.
This to pave the way for Rastikis' return to both military and
political power.
Rastikis refused and asked the individual not to
execute the plans. See Rastikis, I, pp. 694-695.
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schema of Lithuanian civil-military relations is problematic.

Perhaps

all that can be said with any certainty, other than historical facts, is
that

he

was

approached

undoubtedly

such stature

in

persona

prima

in

military

society at large.

affairs,

and

His popularity as a

patriot and professional was great among soldier and civilian alike.
Indeed his reputation eclipsed that of most civil officials, including
the defense ministers he nominally reported to.
Rastikis'

goal

was

to

increase

the

military's

prestige by

increasing his own stature, that is, to make himself popular so that the
military, in particular, and national security issues, in general, would
become

popular

and

emerge

Rastikis was closely tied

to

the

forefront

domestic

affairs.

to the political realm, though more as a

statesman, and not as a partisan politician.
patriotic en ti ties,

of

He chose to deal with all

not reserving a monopoly on virtue only to the

Nationalist Association.
Who

was

more

powerful,

Rastikis

or

Smetana?

Objectively,

Rastikis possessed the greater potential power, for the soldiers and
tanks were his.
adventurism.

This strength could have been utilized for political
Granted,

he

was

certainly a

proud

individual,

referring to himself in his memoirs in the third person.

often

This perhaps

can be justified, though, when taking into account his ascent at an
early age and the phenomenal progress of the Lithuanian military under
his tutelage.

Of course, he made demands and interfered in politics.

Yet, he remained patriotic, professional, and democratic.

In short,

when he was under attack from his civilian superiors and the ruling
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party, he did not utilize his military power for the sake of personal
gain, but remained loyal and obedient.

No power play was staged, though

others offered to carry one out on his behalf; he meekly requested to be
released

from

This is evidence that he did not seek

his duties.

political power, while not ignoring the fact that he wielded much physical might.
His contributions to Lithuania and her military are enormous.
He reorganized,

strengthened,

and modernized the

armed

forces while

increasing their prestige and trust among the citizenry at a time when
they had been utilized as the regime's gendarme.
especially among youth,

he

increased

On a broader scale,

pride and patriotism.

Several

analysts even cite his role as a force against authoritarianism, giving
him

an

important

Lithuania. 37

place

in

the

history of democratic

evolution

in

A more enduring and invaluable contribution is found in

his memoirs, which are unrivaled monuments of Lithuanian historiography.
Rastikis fully admits modest politic al intervention.

However,

it appears that this is an unavoidable role for any military leader.
For

example,

the

US

Joint

Chiefs of Staff must become involved in

politics, budgets, the media, and other agencies, for national security
is a matter too important to leave only to military men.
for all in any state.

The union of politics and senior officers appears

to exist as long as recorded history. 38

Va rd ys

It is a matter

On the other hand, Rastikis'

37s1avenas quoted in Rastikis, Lietuvos likimo keliais, p. 455;
p • 15 3 •
38cf. Plato in chapter 2 of this study.
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Western bent and benevolent methods of political socialization attest to
the seriousness with which he regarded democracy, the political process,
and his own responsibilities.
gravity

than

those

officers

He undoubtedly viewed them with more
who

chose

to

recklessly

tinker

with

politics, that is, the officers who brought Smetona to power in 1926.
It must be recalled that when Captain Antanas Maciuika marched into the
Seimas with a pistol on 17 December 1926, he intervened more into
politics on that one night than Rastikis did in five years.

CHAPTER VIII
THE TiiILIGHT OF INDEPENDENCE 1939-1940
A. THE CABINET OF BRIGADIER GENERAL JONAS CERNIUS
Adolph Hitler decided to add the Klaipeda (Memel) Territory to
his empire in March 1939.

An ultimatum was issued to the Lithuanian

government demanding its cession to Germany.
against

the

military might

Hitler's ultimatum.

of the

On 22 March

Third

Kaunas, feeling Powerless
Reich,

grudgingly accepted

1939, a treaty was signed by both

governments which "reunited the Territory with the Reich."

The Germans

moved into the area very quickly, indicating premeditation, and Li thuanian private citizens, government officials, and army comPonents suffered many losses in the sudden move to Lithuania-Major • 1
Following the annexation, morale decreased both in the military
and society, while negative feelings toward the government increased.
Even senior army officers, who were supposedly the props upon which the
regime rested, stated that after two ultimatums -- the Polish ultimatum
demanding the restoration of diplomatic relations had been accepted one
year

earlier

in

March

1938 -- the

Nationalists

were bankrupt,

and

changes were necessary in the civil leadership in order for the nation
to survive.

On 25 March 1939 Prime Minister Rev. Vladas Mironas, also

1Juozas Audenas, Paskutinis posedis: Atsiminimai (Final Meeting:
Reminiscences) (New York: Romuva, 1966), p. 127; Julius P. Slavenas,
"Klaipeda Territory," Encyclopedia Lituanica, 1973, vol. 3, p. 137.
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the head of the Nationalist Association, invited representatives of the
Peasant Populists, the Christian Democrats, and the Voldemaras faction
for a consultation.

They warned Mironas of the changing and dangerous

mood of the country.
President Smetana.

Mironas, in turn, discussed their points with

Two days later the Mlronas cabinet resigned. 2

General Stasys Rastikis influenced events between the Klaipeda
ultimatum and the appointment of a new cabinet.
anticipated possible unrest in the military.

In the first place, he

He issued a declaration to

the soldiers asking thern to remain confident and to prepare to fight,
even if it meant losing honorably. 3 Second, he went on radio and stated
that in view of recent events, Lithuania needed a "practical end ·elastic
foreign

policy."

Further,

"discipline,

maintained by all sections of the people."

order,

and

unity

must

be

AlSd, "the economic, rnoral,

and cultural forces o-f the nation must be strengthened. 114
Gen:eral Rastikis' third action was most important 'and possessed
grave political implications.

He, along with Defense Minister Brigadier

General

Chief of

Kazys

Musteikis

and

Stat.if Brigadier General

Jonas

Cerni us, visited the president, advised him of potential unrest in the
2Audenas, p. 128; Kazys Musteikis, Prisiminimu fragmentai
(Fragments of Memories) (London: Nida, 1970), p. 34; U.S. House of
Representatives, Third Interim Report of the Select Committee on
Communist Aggression, 83rd Congress, ·second Session (Washington: U. s.
Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 153-154.
3Aleksandras
Merkel is,
Antanas
Smetana:
Jo
visuomenine,
kulturine ir politine veikla (Antapas smetona: His Social, Cul rural, and
Political Activity) (New York: Amert.can Lithuanian National Association,
1964) ' p. 518 •.
4U.S. House of Representatives, p. 155.
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nation,

and "in the name of the military leadership" asked him to

appoint a new government containing the opposition.

The president asked

Rastikis to accept the post of prime minister, partly to remove him from
the opposition camp,
working.
more

for

which the

president believed

Rastikis was

Rastikis refused, stating that stability in the military was

important

than

uncertain times.

stability

in

the

civil

government during

such

He added that it was easier to find a prime minister

than a commander-in-chief.
Cernius for the post.

Rastikis concluded by suggesting General

In turn, Smetana offered the post to Cernius who,

though stunned, accepted the request out of loyalty to the president.5
Brigadier General Jonas Cernius was neither a politician nor a
purely military man.

He was born. on 6 January 1898 in Kupiskis in the

county of Panevezys.

On 4 March 1919 he volunteered for the army and

completed the first accelerated class of the Military Academy on 6 July
of that year.

He held various technical positions in the military and

received his degree in engineering in Brussels in 1929.

He graduated

the Paris General Staff Academy (Ecole Superieure de Guerre) in 1932.
Cernius

was

appointed

commandant

following the Kubiliunas revolt.

of

the

Military

Academy

in

1934

The following year he assumed the post

of chief of staff after adoption of the Rastikis military reorganization
plan.

He was raised to the grade of brigadier general in 1937.

On 30

5 Jonas Augustai tis, Vardys ir Sova a pie Rastikio atsiminimus
(Vardys and Sova on Rastikis' Memoirs) {Chicago: Author, 1975), p. 3;
Merkelis, p. 520.
Augustai tis, a blatantly anti-Smetona commentator,
writes that the Cernius cabinet was a satellite of Rastikis.
See
Augustaitis, p. 17.
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March 1939 Cerni us was appointed prime mini st er of Lithuania. 6

The US

Minister to Lithuania, Owen J.C. Norem, characterized Cernius as a mildmannered, pleasant, and patient man.

However, he lacked experience in

politics and had never openly favored any party.

He was thus 1 eft

without political backing and could not formulate strong policies in the
face of the volatile international situation.7

Smetona's biographer

points out that Cernius may have been too willing to believe in the good
intentions of others.a
The Klaipeda ultimatum, the demarche by opposition parties, and
the political request of the military leadership demonstrated that the
authority of the president and his regime had been stricken.

This led

to the formation of the Cernius cabinet and, moreover, convinced Smetona
to allow Cerni us to request the opposition to join.
referred

to

as

Vyriausybe").
Democrats

the

"Government

those

government,

but

their

obvious

the

entire

declaration

Unified

Work"

("Vieningo

Darbo

The leadership of the Peasant Populists and Christian

approved

to

of

The cabinet was

to

the

party

status

as

nation,

Seimas,

members

asked

members

of

was

Prime

to

the

the

opposition,

unofficial.9

Minister

enter

Cernius

Further,
stated

new

though
in

his

that the

6v1adas Minge la, "Gen. Jonas Cerni us: 65 m. amziaus sukakties
proga" ("General Jonas Cernius: On the Occasion of His Sixty-Fifth
Birthday"), Karys, June-July 1963, p. 188.
7owen J.C. Norem,
Viltis, 1967), p. 157.

Timeless

8Merkelis, p. 526.
9Audenas, pp. 127-130, 139.

Lithuania,

2nd

ed.

(Cleveland:
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cabinet would operate within the framework drawn by the president. 1O
In accordance with the professed desire of Prime Minister Cernius to
work within the lim"its of the constitution and to establish a close
relationship with [the Seimas], the Seimas, constituting almost
entirely members of the Nationalist Party, gave the new Government
"unconditional support." No disposition was prevalent to permit the
emergence of any controversies between the opposition and the
Government party on the future course of the new Government.
Formation of a united patriotic front was not, therefore, attempted
as a procedural device for the ~vernment -- at least during the
first weeks of the administration. 1
The composition of the

Cerni us cabinet was interesting.

Of

course, the inclusion of the opposition was definitely a departure from
established practice.

For example, all were startled at the inclusion

of Dr. Leonas Bistras, a Christian Democrat.

He had only recently been

exiled from Kaunas to the provinces for his political activity.
was serving in the sensitive post of education minister. 12
displayed

remarkable

balance:

two

Christian

Democrats,

Now he

The cabinet
two

Peasant

Populists, one Nationalist, one Voldemaras faction Nationalist, and one
who was considered non-partisan, Foreign Minister Juozas Urbsys.

What

10M. Maksimai tis, 11 Tautininku fasistine diktatura" ("Nationalist
Fascist Dictatorship"), in Burzuazijos diktaturos Lietuvoje valstybiniai
teisiniai aspektai
(State and Legal Aspects of the Bourgeoise
Dictatorship in Lithuania), ed. H. Miskinis, et al. (Vilnius: Lithuanian
SSR Academy of Sciences, 1976), p. 87.
See also 11 Army man forming
Lithuanian cabinet," The New York Times, 28 March 1939, p. 11;
"Lithuania forms coalition cabinet," The New York Times, 29 March 1939,
p.15.
11 u.s. House of Representatives, pp. 154-155.
12 stasys Rastikis, Kovose del Lietuvos: Kar io atsiminimai (In
the Battles for Lithuania: A Soldier's Reminiscences) (Los Angeles:
Lietuviu dienos I Lithuanian Days, 1956), I, p. 557.
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is relevant
including

for

this

Cerni us.

study is the
Brigadier

inclusion of four military men,

General

Kazys

Skucas

was

interior

minister, Brigadier General Kazys Husteikis was defense minister, and
Divisional General Jonas Sutkus was finance minister.
allowed to remain

in the regular army.

reserve not long ago.

Husteikis was

Sutkus had retired to the

Cernius and Skucas were required to retire to the

reserve prior to accepting their political appointments.

Yet, Cernius

continued wearing his uniform while prime minister. 13
That there was a link between the military and government is
obvious.

What is problematic, though, is the four generals' political

classification.

Juozas

Audenas,

who

served

as

Peasant

Populist

agriculture minister in the subsequent Herkys cabinet, writes that the
four generals were de facto Nationalists, since they served as army
officers in a military which helped maintain the regime.

US Minister to

Lithuania Owen Norem classifies them as non-party ministers. 14
be a question without a definite answer.
with Norem.

This may

This author, though, agrees

Granted the men were officers, but there were many who were

at least informally members of the opposition.

A commission does not

necessarily mean that an officer is politically of the same stripe as
the civilian leadership.
commander-in-chief.

This does not impugn his loyalty to the

It is perhaps safest to classify the four generals

as non-political, leaving open at least the possibility of some sort of

1

~erkelis, p. 526; Rastikis, I, pp. 554, 557.

1 4Audenas, p. 130; Norem, p. 157.
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latent political affiliation.
One writer characterizes the appointment of the Cernius cabinet
as a psychological breakthrough.
for the new government.

There was a great deal of enthusiasm

Various ministers began traveling the country

in an attempt to bring the government and citizenry closer together
following

the

decline of trust

and

confidence

in

the

Nationalist

People began feeling more free and at ease with regard to

regime.

political matters.

Strictures on the media were loosened, permitting it

to more honestly chronicle the public mood.
with them great demands.
benefits

were

also

However, great hopes bring

While it was a popular cabinet, certain

expected,

especially

in

the

area of political

freedom. 15
B. PROBLEMS FOR CERNIUS
Unfortunately for Cernius and the nation as a whole, the cabinet
would almost constantly be troubled with domestic and international
crises.

The nation was forced to adjust to the economic dislocation

which emerged following Germany's ultimatum.
twelve

thousand

absorbed.

refugees

from

the

In addition, approximately

Klaipeda

Territory

had

to

be

Cernius also had to maneuver through the troubled continental

politic al situation.

Despite external pressure, he was charged with·

executing a policy of strict neutrality. 16
Another problem was constructed by Berlin and Moscow:
15Audenas, pp. 109, 149-150.
16u.s. House of Representatives, pp. 154-155.
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When German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop signed the famous RussoGerman Non-Aggression Pact in Moscow on August 23, 1939, the public
announcement of the pact made no mention of a secret protocol signed
between the two parties the same day.
By terms of this secret
protocol the Bal tic area, including Finland, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, and the entire territory of the Polish Republic, was
partitioned between the u.s.s.R. and Nazi Germany.
The northern
boundary of Lithuania provided the dividing line between the two
spheres of interest.
The Vilnius area was recognized as part of
Lithuania. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and the Polish territories east
of the line of the rivers Narev, Vistula, and San were declared the
sphere of influ~nce of the u.s.s.R., whereas Lithuania and the Polish
territories west of these rivers would constitute the German sphere
of influence.
The ultimate fate of Poland was also sealed in this
secret protocol, which provided that "whether the interests of both
parties make the maintenance of an independent Polish state desirable
can be determined only in the course of further political developments." •• • Later Germany traded [Lithuania] away • • • to • • •
the u.s.s.R. 17
This opened the way for Poland's dissolution.

On 1 September 1939 the

German blitzkrieg began swallowing that country.

The Red Army moved

into the Polish-occupied Vilnius territory on the 17th of that month.
Ten days later, the two powers carried out the "fourth partition" of
Poland according to the terms of the secret protocol.

Lithuania was

irmnediately

absorbing

interning

mobilized,

albeit

Polish refugees and

temporarily,

and

began

military personnel.

and

In October, the

Kremlin placed pressure on Kaunas to sign a mutual assistance pact,
allowing the establishment of four Soviet bases in Lithuania..
tiny country, this was a two-edged sword.
under

the

provisions

territory -- the

of

the

territory for

pact,

On the one hand, Lithuania,

received

which it

For the

most

had been

of

the

Vilnius

fighting nineteen

17Bronis J. Kaslas, "The- Lithuanian Strip in Soviet-German
Diplomacy, 1939-1941," Journal of Baltic Studies, 4, 3 (Fall 1973), 211.
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years.

On the other hand, the Soviet bases were Trojan horses in the

subsequent occupation of the country. 18
Prime Minister Cerni us also had his share of domestic politic al
difficulties.
and loyal.

President Smetona admired Cernius because he was obedient

However, the president also felt that Cerni us was too weak-

willed for the post of prime minister.
friction
Smetona

among
felt

Smetona,

that

the

Christian

Bizauskas was too partisan.

There was also the ex;pected

Nationalists,
Democratic

and opposition ministers.

Deputy

Prime Minister

Kazys

Peasant Populist Agriculture Minister Dr.

Jurgis Kriksciunas desired too much land reform as far as the president
was concerned.

Kriksciunas was able to receive cabinet approval for a

land reform project -- a project rejected by Smetona as too radical.
Christian

Democratic

Education

Minister

Dr.

Leonas

especially disliked by Smetona and the Nationalists.

by

Cernius

or

Deputy

Education

Minister

was

Bistras was one of

the toughest political opponents the regime possessed.
even to receive official reports from Bistras.

Bistras

Smetona refused

They were given either

Kazimieras

Masiliunas,

a

1 ~or accounts of these events see Auden as, p. 150; Sta sys
Rastikis, Iv kiai ir zmones: Is mano uzrasu (Events and Personalities:
From My
tes , ed. Bronius Kviklys (Chicago: Akademines skautijos
leidykla I Ac,a~emic Press, 1972), P.• 44; Ras~ikis, Lietuvos likimo
keliais: Is mano uzrasu (On 1tti~ Roads of Lithuania's Destiny: From !'!Y
Notes), ed. Jonas Dainauskas (Chicago: Akademines skautijos leidykla I
Academic Press, 1982), p. 425. , Many officers and .citizens did not
understand why• Lithuania did not invade and' take back the Vilnius
territory in 1939 when Poland was attacked and Berlin was urging Kaunas
to move. This, though, would have violated ~etona' s policy of strict
neutrality.
. See Vaclovas Sliogeris, Antanas Smetona: Zmogus ir
val st bininkas.
Atsiminimai (Antanas Smetona: Person and Statesman.
Reminiscences) (Sodus, MI: Juozas J. Bachunas, 1966), pp. 135-13 •
11
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Cernius attempted

Nationalist.

unsuccessfully to mediate.

Of the

opposition, the president did not complain only of Peasant Populist
Justice Minister Dr. An tan as Tamosai tis.

Finally, Smetona stated that

Finance Minister General Jonas Sutkus was a weak manager of domestic and
foreign economic matters. 19
The

Nationalist

Association

actively campaigned

Cernius cabinet from its very inception.
then

had

automatically

Association.

assumed

the

against

the

Every prime minister until

leadership

of

the

Nationalist

Cerni us, however, was not a Nationalist and thus deemed

unacceptable for the position.

The Nationalists also complained that

the government had insulted and treated them shabbily.

It was this

opposition from the ruling party that ultimately sealed the fate of
General Cernius' cabinet. 20
On
minister.
asked

10

November

1939

General

Sutkus

resigned

as

finance

The president was able to capitalize on this new weakness and

Antanas

Merkys

to

quietly form

government resigned on 21 November.

a new cabinet.

The

Cernius

Merkys presented his cabinet to the

president for confirmation the following day. 21

Thus ended the cabinet

19Audenas, pp. 130-131; Rastikis, I, pp. 557-558, 631.
20Audenas, pp.
130-131; Juozas Jakstas, "Tautos pazangos
partijos-Lietuviu tautininku sajungos istorijos bruozai 1916-1940" ("An
Historical Sketch of the National Progress Party-Lithuanian Nationalist
Association
1916-1940"),
in
Tautines
min ties
keliu:
Lietuviu
tautininkijos istoriniai bruozai (Path of National Thought: Historical
Sketch of Lithuanian Nationalism). Eds. Jonas Puzinas and Jonas Pranas
Palukaitis.
(Chicago: American Lithuanian National Association, 1979),
pp. 147-148; Rastikis, I, pp. 557-558.
21Audenas, p. 132.
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of

the

four

generals.

The

only

cabinet

to

be

headed

up

by

a

professional military man was beset by such intense domestic and foreign
challenges that it would last only eight months.
C. THE CABINET OF ANTANAS MERKYS
Reserve

Lieutenant

government service.

Colonel

Antanas

Merkys

19 June

not

new

to

He received his law degree from the University of

Kiev and served as an officer in the czarist army.
until

was

1920 he held several posts

including that of minister.

From 12 March 1919

in the defense ministry,

After retiring from the military he served

in the government of the Klaipeda Territory.

He returned as defense

minister following the 1926 coup and served in that post until 8 August
1927.

Afterwards,

consultant

to

the

he served as governor of the Klaipeda Territory,
Council

of

State,

mayor

of

Kaunas,

and

Seimas

deputy. 22
The

Merkys

cabinet,

the

final

government

of

independent

Lithuania, would have been composed solely of Nationalists had Smetana
had his way.

However, General Rastiki s declared that the opposition

must be included in this government as well.

Smetona, though annoyed,

viewed this as a serious threat and decided to once again place the
cabinet upon a broader politic al base.
intervention

on

Rastikis'

part.

Two

Thus another case of politic al
military

men

were

included:

Brigadier General Kazys Musteikis continuing on as defense minister and

22A.
Maziulis,
"Antanas
Merkys,"
Lietuviu
(Lithuanian Encxcloeedia), 1959, vol. 18, p. 255.

Enciklopedija
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Brigadier General Kazys Skucas remaining as interior minister. 23
1bere

was

one

problem

with

Merkys'

Government of Societal

Consolidation (Visuomenes konsolidacijos vyriausybe).

Merkys was not

well liked by either army officers or the Nationalists.

nie government

was neither supported by society nor consolidated by it.

However,

Smetona also realized that Merkys would succeed in eliminating Rastikis,
as the previous chapter described. 24
1be final cabinet meeting of independent Lithuania took place
during

the

presiding,
Moscow.
Skucas

night of
for

the

14-15

June

government

1940.
was

The

president

considering

an

himself

ultimatum

was
from

The ultimatum included a demand for the arrest of General
for

allegedly ordering

the

kidnapping

of

Red

Army soldiers

stationed in Lithuania, though it was apparent that they had themselves
deserted.

Another point of the ultimatum was permission to allow an

unlimited number of Soviet troops into Lithuania for the purpose of
"guaranteeing" the Soviet-Lithuanian mutual assistance pact.

Finally,

the Kremlin called for the formation of a government acceptable to it.
General

Rastikis

minister.

was

invited

to

the

meeting

and

appointed

prime

He began forming a government, but word soon arrived from

Moscow that Rastikis was unacceptable.
2 3Audenas, pp. 132-133; Merkelis, pp. 561-562.
24Jonas Augustaitis, Antanas Smetona ir jo veikla (Antanas
Smetona and His Work) (Chicago: Chicago Lithuanian Literary Society,
1966), p. 102; Merkelis, pp. 561-562; Rastikis, Ivykiai ir zmones, pp.
45, 47. See also Leonas Sabaliunas, "Lithuanian Politics Under Stress:
Ideological and Poli tic al Developments Before the Soviet Occupation,"
Lituanus, 14, 3 (Fall 1968), 29-42.
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What is more

important

for

this

study is the behavior of

Rastikis and Commander-in-Chief Divisional General Vincas Vitkauskas.
They stated that since there were already Soviet bases in Lithuania, and
that tanks and troops were massing on the border, it would be futile to
fight.

Both advised that the ultimatum be accepted as a means to

contain damage. 25

This is ironic, considering the martial rhetoric

emanating from the military leadership all through the independence
period, including Rastikis' speeches. 26

The president, while urging to

fight, also did not wish to invite opposition from his own military
during the crisis.

The cabinet decided that the president should leave

the country and turn presidential power over to

Prime Minister Merkys.

The Red Army began occupying Lithuania on 15 June 1940.

Merkys

was forced two days later to name communist sympathizer and journalist
Justas Paleckis as new prime minister and de facto president.

Paleckis

was the puppet who assisted in rigging the elections of a People's Diet
which petitioned Moscow for membership in the Soviet Union.

Thus -- at

bayonet point -- Lithuania became the fourteenth Soviet Republic.

The

Lithuanian army became the People's Army, later the 29th Territorial
Corps of the Red Army.

It became evident that Vitkauskas, whose brother

was mistak7n1y shot for alleged bolshevik activity in 1919, and who had
always been identified with the progressive movement, was disloyal.

2

He

~usteikis, pp. 105-107.

~or examples see Meldutis Laupinaitis, As kaltinu: Trilogija
(I Accuse: Trilogy) (Sao Paulo, Brazil: Author, 1954), p. 18; Merkelis,
p. 518.
2
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assisted the Red Army in its occupation of Lithuania and participated in
the new regime's power play.27
D. CONCLUSION
To

this day,

the behavior of the military leadership during

Lithuania's hour of need provokes the anger of soldier, officer, and
civilian.

Many feel

that politics sucked the life-blood out of the

military

establishment,

symbolic

opposition

to

rendering
the

it

incapable

Soviet occupation.

of

executing

To use

even

Huntington's

nomenclature, the societal imperative had drawn attention and resources
away from the functional imperative.

There had always been a great deal

of rhetoric regarding patriotism and preparation for war, but when it
came to time to fulfill those promises, the military leadership proved
it possessed a lack of will, though many in the ranks were willing to
fight.

Poli tic al intervention into the military sphere and vice versa,

while not the only factors in the impotence of the Lithuanian military
in June 1940, were certainly contributing ones.
a novel manifestation.

This was certainly not

General Rastikis, during the Polish ultimatum of

March 1938 and the German ultimatum of March 1939, also urged acceptance
2 7rn a questionnaire which officers were required to complete
upon occupation, Vitkauskas stated that he had been a candidate for
membership in the Communist Party.
See Stasys Rastikis, Kovose del
Lietuvos: Kario atsiminimai (In the Battles for Lithuania: A Soldier's
Reminiscences) (Los Angeles: Lietuviu dienos I Lithuanian Days, 1'957),
II, 74.
For Vi tkauskas' memoirs see his "Paskutiniai burzuazijos
valdymo metai Lietuvoje" ("The Last Years of Bourgeoise Rule in
Lithuania"), Svyturys (Beacon), 15 January 1958, pp. 11-12; "Ta
neuzmirstama vasara" ("That Unforgettable Su111Der 11 ) , Svyturys (Beacon),
30 June 1960, pp. 11-13, 15 July 1960, pp. 10-12.
They are mainly
polemic in tone.
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in

place of

armed

politico-military

opposition. 2 8

link

"consumed
necessary

One
part

commentator
of

for

the

writes

limited

dealing

the

martial

and

intellectual

resources

dangers. " 2 9

Smetona had been surprised at Rastikis' and Vi tkauskas'

advice during the final cabinet meeting.

with

that

international

His biographer concludes that

the military had been rendered passive by the Nationalist regime
including
especially

the

surprised

angry

president

denunciation.

himself.30
He

states

Laupinaitis gives an
that

officers

parading and displaying medals, but did not wish to fight.

relished

According to

him, the army was decorative and generals existed merely for parades and
The "straw" generals were deserters. 31

representation.
Would

it

have

been

feasible

for

Lithuania

to

fight?

One

parallel example may be found in the Finnish-Soviet War of 1939-1940.
The Finns opposed a Soviet invasion.

Despite the fact that Finland

emerged in the Soviet sphere of influence, with foreign and domestic
policy dictated in large measure by the Kremlin, and that it lost a
portion of its territory, it still remains a separate country.

In his

2 8see, for example, Robert A. Vitas, "The Polish-Lithuanian
Crisis of 1938: Events Surrounding the Ultimatum," Lituanus, 30, 2
(Summer 1984), 62-65.
2 9Thomas Remeikis, "The Impact of Internal Poli tics on Response
Capabilities of the Lithuanian Regime to International Challenges, 19381940," in Second Conference on Baltic Studies: Summary of Proceedings,
ed. Rimvydas Silbajoris, et al. (Norman, OK: Association for the
Advancement of Baltic Studies, 1971), p. 66.
30Merkelis, p. 577.
31Laupinaitis, pp. 24-25, 30, 41-42.
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memoirs, Finland's Marshal Carl Gustav Mannerheim reports that 24, 923
soldiers and

700 civilians lost their lives.

25, 623 for a rounded-off figure of 26, 000. 32

The total killed was
During the first Soviet

occupation, 36,000 Lithuanians were either murdered, tortured to death,
or exiled to the

east~rn

regions of the Soviet Union.

Just from a

numerical point of view, it may have been worthwhile for Lithuania to at
least symbolically oppose the Soviets, while taking into consideration
different political and topographical circumstances.

Nevertheless, this

remains a problematic and controversial question among conunentators to
this day.33
The

author of this study does not advocate

Lithuanian nation.

suicide for

the

In the face of a deliberate effort by the USSR to

destroy Lithuania, it could hav.e done so relatively easily.

It would

have been foolish to oppose the Red Army to the last drop of blood in a
re-enactment of the Margiris syndrome.

Margiris was a grand duke of the

Lithuanian duchy who, along with his men, chose to commit suicide in his
burning castle at Pilenai rather than surrender to the Crusaders in
1336.

If

contemporary

Lithuanians

would

have

seen

that

continued

opposition would only hurt the country, the sensible course would have
been surrender following a decent interval.

This for three reasons: 1)

Pure honor for the nation and its military.

2) The Red Army had not yet

32 P. Zilys, Suomiu-sovietu karas 1939-1940 (The Finnish-Soviet
War 1939-1940) (Brooklyn: Karys, 1967), pp. 159-160.
33For a discussion of Bal tic military preparations see Edgar
Anderson, "Military Policies and Plans of the Baltic States on the Eve
of World War II, 11 Lituanus, 20, 2 (Summer 1974), 15-34.
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fully recovered from the Stalinist purges of the 1930's.
weak.

It was still

That is why Stalin attempted to forestall Hitler's inevitable

attack for as long as possible, and when Hitler did attack, his initial
victories were not that difficult.
territory.

3) Lithuania was defending its own

Soviet enlisted men, literally prisoners in their own army,

could not have mustered the same level of morale as the Lithuanians.
Keep in mind that they commenced fighting fiercely only after their own
Russian

soil

had

been

In a word,

violated.

Lithuania should have

developed a strategy for "sensible" opposition, opening the possibility
for success, but without inviting suicide.3 4
As was stated in chapter three, the military both saved and
destroyed

the

strengthened

nation
it.

The

in

the

ties

coup.

The

politics,

the

1926
with

ties

with

gendarme

society

role,

and

participation in political adventurism destroyed its martial will and
spirit.

Consequently,

military

schizophrenia

rendered

the

nation

defenseless at a time when it required defense most.

3 4on 30 November 1985 the author of this study presented a
paper, 11 Kariuomenes vaidmens teoretiniai aspektai prezidento Antano
Smetonos laikais" ("Theoretical Aspects of Military Affairs Under
President Antanas Smetona"), at the Fifth International Lithuanian
Symposium on Science and Creativity, Chicago.
I am indebted to the
discussant at the political science panel on independent Lithuania, Dr.
Leon as Sabaliunas of Eastern Michigan University's political science
department, for helping me clarify my thoughts regarding the Margiris
syndrome, in particular, and the issue of Lithuanian opposition, in
general.
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HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
The Lithuanian people, like the Latvians, are descendants of one
of the eastern branches of the Indo-European race, and their language,
which is the oldest spoken tongue in Europe in terms of its granrnatical
forms, is closely related to Sanskrit, Greek and Latin. It is assumed
that it was the ancestors of the present Lithuanians and Letts who are
mentioned by ancient historians, as early as Herodotus, as inhabiting
the eastern shores of the Baltic and engaging in trade, particularly in
amber, with other peoples.
The name of Lithuania first appears in history in a German
chronicle of 1009, but it was not until 1236 that the numerous
principalities of Lithuanian peoples were united under the rule of King
Mindaugas. The chief force promoting their unification was the external
threat posed to the Lithuanian tribes by the incursion into their ar~a
of the German Knights of the Sword early in the 13th century.
After
victories had been won over the Knights at the battle of Siauliai
(1236), and over Ruthenian princes and Tartar hordes, Mindaugas was
baptized a Christian in 1251, and, two years later, he was crowned King
of Lithuania by a papal emissary.
His conversion, whose principle
motive was to take from the Knights their claim to being the bearers of
Christianity into a pagan region, did not bring the German invasions to
a halt, and following the apostasy of the King the nation was not to
become Christian for another century.
A period of disorder followed the assasination of Mindaugas in
1263, but Gediminas ( 1316-1342) succeeded in reuniting the state, and
founded his capital of Vilnius at the confluence of the Neris and
Vilnele rivers.
Gediminas maintained a defensive policy against the
Teutonic Knights, who continued their pressure from the west, while
extending the Lithuanian state in the east to Kiev, Pskov, and
Novgorod.
Under the joint rule of Kestutis and Algirdas, the latter
defeated the Tartars in 1362, and secured Lithuanian control of Kiev and
Podolia, although he failed to capture Moscow.
In 1386, Algirdas' son, Jogaila, was elected to the throne of.
Poland on condition that he marry the Polish Queen Jadwiga. Thus began
the personal union of the two countries under the Jagellonian dynasty
which lasted until 1572.
At the same time, Lithuania finally adopted
Roman Catholicism (1387). While Lithuania was under the direct rule of
Jogaila's cousin, Vytautas the Great (1392-1430), a Lithuanian-Polish
force crushed the Teutonic Order at the great battle of Tannenberg
(1410), with the important result that Lithuania, in contrast to the
territories to the north, was spared domination by the "German Barons"
who were the descendants and heirs of the Knights.
The medieval
Lithuanian empire now reached its height, including the upper Volga and
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Oka rivers, and Smolensk, Vyazma, Mozhaisk and Kursk, with a population
of some five million people. During this reign, Christianity became an
integral part of the Western European cultural and religious community,
but, at the same time, the diverse Lithuanian state was notable for its
religious and linguistic freedom.
During the 16th century, however, Lithuania lost a number of her
eastern provinces to the rising power of Muscovy, and this new danger
impelled her to seek a closer association with Poland, with whom, to
that time, she had been joined only in a personal union. By the Pact of
Lublin ( 1569), Lithuania ceded her Ukrainian territories to Poland, and
recognized Courland and Latgalia as being a oondorniniUm of the two
states; each, however, retained its separate government, armed forces,
treasuries and law courts.
The Lithuanian state knew a considerable
degree of prosperity in the 16th century, and the Pact of Lublin
provided a short•lived security, but increasingly the Lithuanian
nobility, imitating the example of their peers in Poland, tended to
acquire more and more rights at the expen.se of the central authority of
the state. Partly because of the internal weakness of the LithuanianPolish Commonwealth, it was defeated by the Russians in a long war which
ended with the Peace of Andrusovo (1667), by which Lithuania lost the
province of Smolensk.
Despite the attempts of some Lithuanians to break the connection
with Poland and form new relations with Sweden, the Lithuanian state
tended increasingly to become the junior partner in the commonwealth,
and the Lithuanian nobility became ever more polonized and divorced from
their own nation.
The weakness of the joint state·· bacame constantly
more apparent during the 18th century, and, in the first partition of
Poland ( 1772), important portions of eastern Lithuania were lost to
Russia. Despite the last-minute .efforts of the Commonweal th to reform
itself, the second partition of Poland took place in 1793, costing
Lithuania more eastern territory, including a small part of "ethnographic" Lithuania. By the final partition of 1795, Russia seized the
whole of Lithuania, except for the territory south of the Nemunas River,
the provinc·e of Suvalkai, which was taken by Prussia, but which, in
1815, was also assigned to Russia.
Five major revolts occurred in Pol and and Lithuania in the
succeeding 120 years, the most important being those of 1831 and 1863.
Beginning with Nicholas I, an ever more drastic policy of russification
was applied to Lithuania: schools and monasteries were closed; the
Lithuanian system of law was replaced in 1840' with the Russian Code; in
1865 the printing of books in Latin characters was banned; the Catholic
Church, some of whose clergy had been active in the rebellion of 1863,
was attacked directly and. indirectly.
But these very attacks on the
Lithuanian language and national character only impelled the population
to cling to them more ardently, and, towards the middle of the century,
there began a 11 ter ar y and cultural renaissance based on books
smuggled into Lithuania from across the German frontier. Then, as was
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so often the case in eastern and central Europe, cultural nationalism
soon led to nationalist political manifestations.
From the beginning, the resistance of the peasantry -- which
formed the overwhelming mass of the population - was focused and led by
a number of I,.ithuanian Roman Catholic priests, who resisted both the
russification of the country and the attempts of many priests and
members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy -- including both Poles and pro ...
Polish persons of Lithuanian origin - to polonize the Lithuanian church
and people.
In addition, as a result of the emancipation of the
peasants in the Suvalkai area in 1807, and in the rest of the country in
1861 and 1863, a new type of national intellectual leader began to
emerge from among them. Prior to 1865, the leaders of the rebellion. had
been largely polonized noblemen who joined with their associates in
Poland proper in efforts to restore in some form the Polish-Lithuanian
union-and their own privileges within it.
The new leaders, however,
were social reformers as well as nationalists, who aimed at agral"ian
reform, the democratization of .Lithuanian society, and ,the defense .of
the Lithuanian national culture against both russification and
polonization. Among this .group were Dr. Jonas Basanavicius ( 1851 ... 1927) •
whose magazine Ausra (Dawn) ap,peared in 1883 in Tilsit, Dr. Vincas
Kudirka (1858-1899), and the Rev. Juozas Tumas (1869-1933).
It is therefore very important to note that as increasing
amounts of the land in Lithuania passed into the hands of the peasantry
during the nineteenth century, and as the Lithuanian nobility, .fearful
of reform, increasingly identified its cause and interests with the
socially conservative nobles of Poland, the importance of the. noble
class in Lithuania dw,indled, and . the national movement developed apart
from them.
As will be seen below, when independence was at last
established, the nobility in effect retired from Lithuania into Poland,
allowing the establishment of the new Lithuanian state on the democratic
and reformist bases envisioned by the nationalist leaders of the late
nineteenth century.

To an even greater extent than elsewhere, it is significant that
the national movement in Lithuania received important assistance and
inspiration from Lithuanians living abroad, and particularly from the
large number in America.
Political parties emerged in Lithuania at the end of the
nineteenth century, and first manifested their desire for an autonomous,
democratic, ethnographic Lithuania, within the Russian Empire, during
the Revolution of 1905.
It was not until 1917, however, that this
program was capable of realization, and then in the midst of a most
complex situation including war, revolution and counter-revolution, the
Lithuanian leaders were able not only to win autonomy but actually to
establish an independent republic. Their success, however, was due in
large measure to the successive collapses of the Russian and German
empires, and to the intervention of the Western allies, and it was
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limited from the first by the Polish seizure of Vilnius, which destroyed
all hopes for cooperation between the two states, and by the occupation
of Klaipeda (Memel) at the expense of Germany in 1923.
A democratic republic, however, was established after the war,
on the political basis of a liberal constitution and a multi-party
system, on which parliamentary government maintained itself for several
years, and on the economic basis of an agrarian reform {1922) which, by
partitioning the large estates -- owned in many cases by polonized,
often absent nobles - for the benefit of 1 andless peasants, and those
with small holdings, in effect provided that the country would be a
nation of small farmers.
In addition, the State assumed the
responsibility of providing for the economic welfare of its citizens.
In 1926, however, a military and conservative coup d'etat set aside the
constitution in favor of an authoritarian regime, first under Professor
Voldemaras, and later under President Antanas Smetana.
These
governments suppressed all other parties and established regimes which,
at least in vocabulary, borrowed considerably from the contemporary
German and Italian models.
The increasingly dangerous international
situation, which after 1936 involved the withdrawal of Great Britain and
France from effective participation in the affairs of eastern and
central Europe, left Lithuania and the other Baltic states -- and
eventually Poland herself in the hands of Germany and the Soviet
Union.
When these two states divided eastern Europe between them in
August and September, 1939, the fate of Lithuania, which was finally
assigned to the Soviet zone, was sealed, though the U. s. s. R. did not
actually seize and annex the country until the Allied defeat in the West
in June, 1940, permitted her to do so without fear of retaliation or
resistance from any quarter • • • ~
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THE FOUNDATION OF THE LITHUANIAN STATE
The political history of modern Lithuania began, with the
establishment of political parties, even before there was an independent
Lithuanian state and, in fact, it can perhaps be dated from the Grand
Assembly which met at Vilnius on December 4-6, 1905, during the Russian
revolution of that year. The 2000 delegates at the Assembly represented
all parts of the country as well as the already exis;;,ing politic al
parties, including the Christian Democrats, National Democrats, Liberals
or Progressives, and Social Democrats. This body proclaimed as the goal
of the national movement the establishment of ethnographic Lithuania as
an autonomous state within the Russian Empire, which was to be
reorganized on a federative basis. Vilnius, they stated, was to be the
capital, and the Parliament was to be elected by general, secret, direct
ballot, in which women would be entitled to vote.
This program fell far short of achievement in 1905, and even
more so in the years of reaction which followed in the Russian Empire,
but the Imperial Duma provided a training ground for Lithuanian, as for
other minority leadership, and provided also a focus for the evolution
of parties and other agencies which contributed to the growth of
national sentiment. The actual reestablishment of the independence of
the Lithuanian state was to come, in effect, largely as a by-product of
the First World War. But, if the principal causes to that end were the
successive defeats of the Russian and German Empires, and the
establishment of a Bolshevik regime in the former - events occurring
independently of the wishes or actions of the Lithuanian people - a
significant factor in the winning of independence was the determination
of the leaders to achieve as much of their prewar program as the
circumstances permitted.
The nucleus from which the Lithuanian independence movement was
to grow was the Central Committee of Relief for War Sufferers, which was
organized in 1914 with the consent of the Imperial Russian Government,
and which included such men as Martinas Yeas, a member of the Duma, and
Antanas Smetona.
By September, 1915, however, the German armies had
occupied most of Lithuania, and the three years of their occupation
witnessed both the economic and military devastation of the country, and
some attempts at cultural germanization in order to bring it permanently
within the orbit of the Reich. One of the first results of the German
occupation was the division of the Relief Cormnittee into two branches,
one of which established itself at Petrograd, the other, including
Smetona, remaining at Vilnius.
The latter worked at first to soften the rigors of the German
occupation, and al so to oppose the efforts of those Poles who, in their
representations both to the Allies and to the Central Powers on the
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subject of Polish independence or autonomy, sought to perpetuate the
Polish-Lithuanian union to the disadvantage of Lithuania. As early as
1916, the Vilnius Cormnittee memorialized the German authorities, not
only for the redress of specific grievances, but also setting ·forth
their claims for an independent, ethnographic Lithuania. These efforts
met with no success at first, but, during 1917, the Germans, noting the
failure of the Provisional Russian Government to come to an agreement
with the Lithuanian nationalists • • • , apparently decided to make use
of the latter for their own purposes, and permitted a national movement
to develop within the country.
On September 18, 1917, a broad
conference of more than 200 Lithuanians, selected by the leaders of the
nationalist movement for their loyalty to that cause, met by invitation
- in default of elections - at Vilnius, under the presidency of Dr.
Basanavicius. A Taryba (National Council) of 20 members was named, with
Smetona as its President, and, despite the German occupations a
resolution was adopted to the effect that Lithuania should become an
independent democratic state within her ethnic frontiers, and that a
Constituent Assembly should be summoned.
If, however, Germany would
recognize the Lithuanian state, the latter would then consider entering
into some special relationship to the German Empire since, it was
stated, "the interests of Lithuania, in normal times, are rather in the
direction of the West than the East or South." On December 11 , under
the pressure of the military situation, the Taryba, which by then had
become the focus of national sentiment within Lithuania, dropped its
demand for a Constituent Assembly, and• asked for German assistance and a
"perpetual and solid alliance" with the Empire, including a customs and
monetary union.
During the early part of its existence, meanwhile, the Petrograd
branch of the Relief Cor1111ittee had occupied itself with extending
material aid to its compatriots in Russia, and with the setting up and
coordination of cormni ttees in Sweden, the United States and elsewhere
which, if they.originally were engaged in charitable activities, soon
began to develop in a political direction. After the March Revolution
of 1917, a Lithuanian National Council at Petrograd decided, despite the
demands by extremists for complete independence and the calling of a
Constituent Assembly, to seek a rapprochement with the Provisional
Russian Government. The latter, however, was less conciliatory to the
Lithuanian national movement than to those of Finland, Estonia and
Poland, and when the Bolsheviks finally suppressed the Lithuanian
Council, a conference, attended by representatives of all except extreme
Left-wing parties, met at Voronezh to replace it. This body recognized
the Taryba at Vilnius as the supreme organ expressi 'l/e of the general
will of the Lithuanian people.
But, in the more free atmosphere of
revolutionary Russia it went far beyond the Taryba in proclaiming the
goals of the national movement: the Lithuanian demand for independence,
based both on historic state right and on the general trend towards
self-determination, should be brought before the Powers for recognition;
the frontiers of the state were outlined, including an outlet to the
Bal tic; and, while the rights of the future Constituent Assembly were
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reserved, they clearly called for a system of guarantees of civil
liberty, protection of national minorities, and universal, equal, secret
and direct suffrage based on proportional representation. This program
was important for several reasons: first, it synthesized the claims for
Lithuanian independence in terms both of state right and of selfdetermination; second, for the first .time it linked the Lithuanian
national cause to republicanism; third, its demands for civil liberties
went far beyond the claims which could be asserted by a Taryba existing
under German occupation; and fourth, it laid down the concrete bases of
peace. As compared to the projects for Letto-Lithuanian federation put
forth by groups in the United States, or monarchical plans emanating
from emigrants in Berne, it is striking that the Voronezh program laid
down the lines along which the Lithuanian national and constitutional
movement would, in fact, develop.
The Taryba itself soon discovered, however, that its policy of
conciliating the Germans, as expressed in the declaration of December
11, was not achieving the desired results for, according to the Treaty
of Brest-Li tovsk (signed on March 3, 1918, but known some time in
advance), the Bolshevik government had been obliged to cede Lithuania
and Courland to Germany, for future disposition by the Central Powers.
After much controversy, therefore, the Taryba, on February 16, 1918,
issued a new declaration which unequivocally proclaimed - rather than
demanded -- the independence of the country. But on March 23 the Ger.man
Government granted de jure recognition to the Lithuani.an state - on the
basis of the declaration of December 11. Recognition was not followed,
however, by any transfer of authority to the Taryba,. and, indeed, the
hollow nature of the gesture was soon shown in the German proposal to
establish a Hohenzollern prince on the Lithuanian throne.
After great controversy in the Taryba, and the withdrawal of
some of its members who objected even to a tactical departure from the
republicanism of the Voronezh program, that body, in connivance with the
clerical party in Germany -- which opposed too great an aggrandiz.ement
of the Protestant .house of Hohenzollern offered the crown . qf
Lithuania, on June 14, 1918, to Duke William of Urach, a prince of the
Catholic dynasty of Wurtemberg who was alleged to be a descendant of the
medieval Grand Duke Mindaugas.
T~ German General Staff, however,
prevented the Duke's acceptance of this invitation from being
implemented, but as military defeat came nearer in the West the
authority of the military waned, and on October 20 the new German
Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, informed the Taryba . that full
legislative and admin~~trati·ve power would be granted, ~ a Lithuanian
government as soon ~s it, could be formed, and that the. German forc.~s
would depart a& soon. as possible,. On November 2, therefore, the Taryba
withdrew the invitation to Duke William, leaving the form of Government
to be deqided by the future. Constituent Assembly. It is significant to
notE?ctha-ti t,here .was no monarchist party in Lithuania thereafter,
indicating that the episode of King Mindaugas II was merely the
expedient answer of the Lithuanian nationalists to the greater threat of
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a Hohenzollern monarch, and that it had no lasting popular or political
basis.
At the same time, the Taryba adopted a provisional constitution
whereby that body retained legislative power, but vested executive
authority in a directory of three persons: A. Smetona, J. Staugaitis,
and s. Silingas, who were to act through a Cabinet responsible to the
Taryba.
This constitution also provided a bill of rights which
established the absolute equality of all citizens without discrimination
because of sex, national origin, religion, or class. Six White Russians
and three Jews were added to the Taryba at this time, increasing its
membership to 29~
On November 5, the directors asked Professor
·Augustinas Voldemaras to form a non-party government, but when the
latter departed for the Paris peace conference later in November,
Mykolas Slezevicius succeeded him as Prime Minister.
By the armistice of November 11, 1918, the Allies had required
the Germans to maintain their forces in the Baltic states and elsewhere
to hold back the Bolshevik tide which, they feared, might otherwise fill
the vacuum left by the retreating Germans. The latter, however, began a
rapid ·and unauthorized evacuation, looting the countries they passed
through and attempting to oblige the new Bal tic governments to turn to
them for support against the Russians. By January 5, 1919, however, the
latter had reoccupied Vilnius, and during the next two months much of
the rest of the country, and the Lithuanian Government was obliged to
retire to Kaunas. As early as December 8, the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Lithuania and Belorussia, acting within Russia, had
established
a "Provisional
Revolutionary Workers Government of
Lithuania," under one Mickevicius-Kapsukas, and on December 22 the
Bolshevik government recognized the independence of Soviet Lithuania
under this group.
In the political propaganda and also in the literary creations
of the new Soviet regime in Lithuania, the assertion is constantly made
that the Soviet Lithuanian government of 1919 was a popular regime in
that country, that it was destroyed by foreign intervention, and that
the events of 1940 only restored a system which was deeply rooted in the
memories and wishes of the people. It is therefore important to observe
that the Vilnius Soviet Government of 1919 was maintained only by the
presence of the Red Army which, however, by acting in the name of that
government, attempted to transfer a war of foreign aggression into a
civil conflict. The measures taken by this government -- establishment
of local soviets, nationalization of land and industry - were not
popular in the territory under its control, and Bolshevik personnel was
so scarce at Vilnius that it was necessary to include Mensheviks in the
government.
On February 20, the Lithuanian Soviet Government apparently conceding the unreal nature of its existence
voted to
merge with Belorussia, and the Polish reconquest of Vilnius in April put
an end to the Provisional Revolutionary Workers Government.
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Though some attempt was made even in 1919 to blame this failure
on the strength of the Poles and other extraneous factors, a
considerable polemic ensued in Izvestia and elsewhere on the causes for
the collapse of the Soviet regime in Lithuania. Among other factors, it
was said that there had been no real control even of the city, too
little internal government, too little Cheka activity in a region filled
with counter-revolutionaries, too small a proletariat - and what there
was was too moved by nationalist currents. The Red Army was accused of
arousing distrust because of "its disorderly requisitions." In short,
the reality of 1919 was far indeed from the political and literary myth
which has been assiduously cultivated since 1940 in an attempt to vest
the latter regime with a historical and legal continuity which it did
not possess.
One of the first acts . of the Voldemaras government had been to
issue a call for a popular militia, and even befor.e the Germans had
entirely left the country many peasants brought out the weapons which
they had collected during the battles of 1915. The resulting units were
commanded by Lithuanian officers who had served in the Russian Army, and
by a few Prussian Lithuanian officers.
General mobilization was
proclaimed in ~arch, 1919, but the new Lithuanian army was able only
slowly to resist the oncoming Red Army.
By the end of 1919, under
pressure from these Lithuanian units, which won an important battle over
the Red Army at Griva, near Daugavpils, and from Polish forces to the
south, the Red Army had been driven from most of Lithuania, and on
July 12, 1920, peace was signed between the two states in the Treaty of
Moscow. The R.S.F.S.R. proclaimed again that, since
·
•
• all peoples have the right to free self-determination,
including the right of full secession from the State of which
they were a part, Russia recognizes without any reserve the
sovereignty and independence of the State of Lithuania with all
juridical consequences resulting from such recognition, and
voluntarily and forever renounces all sovereign rights possessed
by Russia over the Lithuanian people and territory.
The fact that Lithuania was ever under Russian sovereignty
does not place the Lithuanian people and their territory under
any obligation to Russia.
The precise meaning to the Soviet leaders of such a declaration had
already received some demonstration in the events of early 1919. But
having found the military or political seizure of Lithuania impossible
in the circumstances of 1919 and 1920, the Bolshevik regime granted a
fairly generous treaty to the new Republic, including the payment of
three million gold rubles, and the cession of the Vilnius area to
Lithuania. In addition, the two parties undertook to prevent activities
on their respective territories which aimed at the overthrow of the
government of the other.
The

defeat

of

the

Bolsheviks

during

1919 had

not entirely
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cleared Lithuania of foreign forces, for Polish, German adventurer and
White or anti-Bolshevik Russian troops continued to occupy and ravage
parts of the country.
The Lithuanian forces inflicted a number of
defeats on these German and White forces in November, 1919, but they
were ultimately withdrawn to East Pr-ussia only after the intervention of
an Allied military mission in December.
A more serious threat was the Polish army which, having fought
with the Lithuanians against . the Bolsheviks, had seized Vilnius in
April, 1919.
The Poles, however, were driven from the city by the
Russians in the summer of 1920, and the SO·•Het Government then
transferred the area to Lithuania by the Treaty of Moscow. Under the
auspices of the League of Nations, Poland and Lithuania agreed, on
October 7, to· accept a settlement which assigned Suvalkai to the former
and Vilnius to the latter.
But two days later, an ostensibly
unauthorized Polish force under General Zeligowski seized Vilnius and
established an "independent Republic of Central Lithuania," which, after
a Polish-conducted plebiscite in 1922, joined the Polish state. After
fruitless negotiations and proposals for compromise, the Conference of
Ambassadors, on March 15, 1923, finally accepted the status quo in the
Vilnius area. The Lithuanian government, however, ref'used not only to
accept this decision, but even to establish diplomatic relations with
Poland, which would have implied acceptance.
The Polish-Lithuanian
frontier therefore remained practically closed until 1938, and no
Lithuanian government dared to consider proceeding to a normalization of
relations. As a result, Lithuanian foreign policy was burdened with a
"permanent" antagonist from the beginning, and was therefore the more
obliged to turn to Germany or the Soviet Union as a makeweight against
Poland.
At the same time, attempts at closer relations between the
three Bal tic states foundered on Latvian and Estonian fears of becoming
embroiled in the Lithuanian quarrel with Poland, and hopes for a
regional entente or bloc to include not only the three states, but
Finland or Poland or both, broke, at least in part, on the same
obstacle.
The settlement of the Latvian-Lithuanian frontier, which had
been left to the parties by the Treaty of Moscow, occasioned no serious
difficulty, and was decided by a court of arbitration, under the
presidency of Sir James Simpson, in March, 1921.
By the Treaty of Versailles, the Germans had ceded the territory
of Klaipeda (Memel) to the Allied [sic] for ultimate disposition. But,
while the latter were still discussing its statute and future relations
with Lithuania, whose sole important outlet to the sea it was, a
pro-Lithuanian group within the city, with "volunteer" support from
across the frontier, rose and seized control of the territory from the
small French garrison which held it in the name of the Allies - on the
same day, it should be noted (January 10, 1923), on which French forces
entered the Ruhr.
After further negotiations, the Allies, as in the
case of Vilnius, accepted this fait accompli, although the Memel
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Convention of 1924 granted a certain
territory, under international guarantee.

degree

of

autonomy

to

the

Though the Lithuanian state had been recognized by Germany as
early as 1918, and by the R.S.F.S.R. in the treaty of 1920, the Allies
had hesitated officially to sanction the disruption of the Russian state
while they still entertained hopes for its restoration under a nonBolshevik regime.
By 1921, however, such hopes were dwindling rapidly
and, with the establishment of the Lithuanian frontiers at least de
facto by that time, there was little reason to continue to deny
recognition. On September 22, 1921, therefore, the three Baltic states
were admitted to the League of Nations. On July 28, 1922, the United
States became the first of the major Powers to recognize Lithuania de
jure, and, on December 20, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan did
the same.
From the above account, it can be seen that, if the Lithuanian
nationalist leaders pursued their goal of independence with skill and
dexterity in an almost incredibly complicated situation, their final
success was due, above all, to the fact that the intervention of the
western Allies, who were relatively disinterested in the par.ticular
disputes of the area, provided a balancing force against the local
contending forces: Russian, German, Polish. The very existence of the
Lithuanian state was menaced by all of these latter states, and,
considering the disparity of strength between it and any of them, its
continued existence would depend on the maintenance of the Allied
"presence" as a counterweight to the uneasy three-sided balance of the
interested parties.
The preservation of the Lithuanian state,
therefore, in the same way as its creation, would be a by-product of the
general international situation in Europe and, in particular, of the
maintenance of the status quo system erected in 1919 and 1920.
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FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS, 1922-1926
A. FOREIGN POLICY
Even before the three Baltic states had fully established their
independence from Russia, it was evident that, because of their size,
or1g1n and geographical location, they would confront many common
problems of foreign policy. It therefore seemed equally clear that they
could best meet problems by some degree of cooperative action. As early
as 1918 Estonian leaders had proposed the formation of a series of
groupings to maintain the freedom of the Bal tic Sea and to provide for
common defense, and later the three Baltic republics and Finland
attempted, without success to pursue joint peace negotiations with the
R.S.F.S.R. The first Baltic conference was held at Helsinki in January,
1920, attended by representatives of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
and Poland, and it considered the co-ordination of foreign policy,
common defence, and the neutralization of the Baltic Sea. In August,
the same agreed to adopt a draft arbitration convention and to set up a
permanent Council of Plenipotentiaries to co-ordinate their policies.
At this point, however, there emerged the Vilnius dispute
between Poland and Lithuania, as outlined in the preceding chapter, and
for Lithuania this quarrel became the principal concern of their foreign
policy.
Despite the failure of attempted compromise solutions at
Geneva, the annexation of the area to Poland in 1922, and the
acquieseence of the Conference of Ambassadors in 1923, the government at
Kaunas stubbornly refused to accept or recognize the loss of the
territory.
A technical state of war therefore continued to exist
between Poland and Lithuania; diplomatic relations were not established
between them; and their common frontier remained practically closed.
Meetings continued to be held among representatives of Finland, Poland,
Estonia and Latvia, and the later [sic] two states signed a Treaty of
Defensive Alliance in 1923, but, since Lithuania refused to enter into
any type of understanding which implied her renunciation of the Vilnius
area, while the other Bal tic states were unwilling to be drawn into an
agreement which might involve them in difficulties with Poland, the
Vilnius dispute effectively destroyed the prospects, not only for the
greater "Baltic Union" of Powers, but even for an effective entente of
the three republics themselves.
At

the same time the Vatican's recognition of the Vilnius
~rchdiocese as a Polish ecclesiastical province in 1925 was a severe
blow to the clerical Lithuanian government and had important domestic
political repercussions, as will be seen below.
In addition the
continuation of strained relations with Poland tended to draw Lithuania
closer to the u.s.s.R. -- with whom Lithuania had no common frontier --
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despite the fact that fear of that state was the principal factor
tending to unify the policies of the two other Baltic republics, Finland
and Poland.
The major achievement of the Slezevici us .cabinet of 1926
was a conclusion of a Treaty of Non-Aggression with the Soviet Union, by
which the latter reaffirmed its recognition of Vilnius as a Lithuanian
territory.
A second problem which tended to isolate Lithuania from her
irrnnediate neighbors was the question of Klaipeda or Memel, the port and
territory ceded by Germany to the Allied Powers in the Treaty of
Versailles, and garrisoned by them, pending final disposition, until
1923. It was originally understood that the territory would be ceded to
Lithuania, despite the preponderance of Germans in the city, but, as the
Allies continued to hesitate, Lithuanian opinion, already exasperated by
the loss of Vilnius, became insistent on a favorable settlement of the
Klaipeda question. When, therefore, it was rumored that a free city on
the model of Danzig, might be established, a rising of Lithuanians took
place on January 10, 1923 - the day on which the French entered the
Ruhr. Within five days, the French garrison was overwhelmed and a Diet
was summoned which established a local government and voted the union of
the territory with Lithuania. The Allies, in effect, accepted this fait
accompli, and the Lithuanian government, while rejecting a conventIOri
which granted to Poland special rights .in the port, eventually signed
the Memel Convention of Hay 17, 1924. By this the Allied Powers ceded
the Memel Territory to Lithuania, and the latter agreed with them that
the region should be governed by a Directory responsible to a papularly
elected Diet, and by a Governor appointed by Kaunas who could veto those
laws adopted by the Diet which he considered to transgress its
autonomous authority or to be contrary to the Lithuanian Constitution.
Since the Diet was al ways controlled by a German majority, it is not
difficult to understand that this arrangement let [sic] to constant
frictio_n between it and the Governor, and that the latter, responsible
to Kaunas, more than· once acted in .a manner which seemed to overstep the
autonomy granted to the territory. The gravity of such incidents then
depended on the extent to which the German government was able or
inclined to assert a protective interest in its co-nationals in Memel.
It is clear from this brief account that the freedom of action
of Lithuania in foreign affairs was severely limited, even beyond the
measure imposed by her size aqd general geographical pasi tion, by the
special quarrels which more or less definitively cut her off from both
Poland and Germany.
In addition, the Vilnius dispute stood in the way
of the cooperation of the three Baltic republics, with each other, which
seemed dictated by their common pasition between Germany, Poland and the
Soviet Union, and also of the cooperation of the three republics with
Poland, as seemed implied by their common dangerous position between
Germany and u.s.s.R. Thus. the problems of Lithuania stood at the heart
of the w~akness and disunity of a region whose only hope of survival and
independence, in the long run, depended on cooperation and stability;
and, if this was not immediately seen during the 1920's, when the pawer
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of Great Britain and France could, in effect, maintain the central
European states despite their proximity to the temporarily weakened
Germany and Russia, the re-emergence of the latter two states in the
1930's, at the expense of the West, would demonstrate the ultimate
consequences of these local disputes.
Finally, as will be seen, the
situation of Lithuania nearly surrounded by enemies meant that foreign
policy was inextricably intertwined with domestic, and that the already
strong national feeling of a new liberated people was magnified greatly
in the face of three powerful and hostile neighbors.

B. POLITICAL PARTIES
It had been intended in November 1918, that an elected
Constituent Assembly should adopt the definitive constitution of the
country, but the war against the R.S.F.S.R. in 1919 forced the temparary
abandonment of this plan, so that on January 17, 1919, a Provisional
National Conference, made up of some 200 delegates from throughout the
country, met at Kaunas, to which the Lithuanian government had been
driven, and validated the decisions of the incumbent government.
In
addition, they laid plans for a Constituent assembly, and elected eight
more members -- mainly from the working class - to the Taryba, which
then numbered 37 and included representatives of practically all
national and class groups in the state, including the Belorussians and
Jews, though the Poles refused to participate. On April 4, the Taryba
modified the provisional constitution to abolish the directory of three,
and then elected Antanas Smetona as the first President of Lithuania.
It will be remembered that as early as the Grand Assembly of
1905, there were already in existence several Lithuanian political
parties, of which the most impartant was the Christian Democrats, the
National Democrats or Populists, and the Social Democrats.
These
parties remained in existence through the war and, though the
provisional government of 1919 and 1920 usually included representatives
of all parties except the Communists, certain differences began to
appear as the situation became more stable, and the elections to the
Constituent Assembly approached.
Since it is the interplay of the
parties which comprises the political history of the country during the
first years of its existence, it will be useful to consider briefly
their basis and composition.
The oldest and most important Lithuanian party was the national
and clerical Christian Democratic Party, founded in 1890.
Its main
element was the peasantry, but it included also voters of all classes,
and particularly a large number of Roman Catholic clergy, who formed in
many cases its local leaders among the peasants.
The party had long
defended Lithuanian ecclesiastical fights against the Polish and
polonized clergy, and continued to defend them against lay and socialist
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forces during the period of independence. The Christian Democrats were
strongly anti-Conununists, but moderately democratic in policy and
favored agrarian reform in the early 1920's, though they insisted on the
sanctity of private property and the right of the expropriated
landowners to compensation.
But they also supported the right of
workers to organize and strike. The party's prewar anti-Polish bias, of
clerical origin, later exacerbated by the Vilnius situation, strongly
colored its views on foreign policy in the period of independence. The
leaders of the party included Bistras, Dr. Karvelis, and Father
Krupavicius.
Closely allied to the Christian Democrats, and forming a
parliamentary bloc with them until 1926, were the Peasant Union, led by
MM. Stulginskis, Miksys and Petrulis, and the Federation of ,Labor
founded in 1919, and led by Drs. Ambrozaitis and Milciu:;i,. and MM.
Radzevicius and Kasa,kai~is. Both, parties were largely off-shoots of the
Christian Democrats, designed . to dr.aw into the orbit of the latter
voters from other classes ·and elements of the population than the
peasantry.
The Federation included isome non-socialist workers and a
number of small landowners and settlers.
The Populist or People's Socialist Party, formed in 1902, as the
Lithuanian Democratic Party, was based largely o~ the same social
cl9sses as the Christian Democrats, and shared the national and social
policies of the latter. They differed, however, in that they took a lay
view of problems affecting the relations of Church and State.
Their
lea~e17s included MM. Grinius, Slezevicius and Staugaitis.
Associated for a time with this party in a "Liberal" bloc were
the Peasant Party and tbe Nationalists, the latter of which, including
former President Smetona and Juozas Tubelis, emerged into separate
existence only in the elections ~f 1926.
The Social-Democratic Party, led by M. Kairys and Professor
Cepinskis, was also of pre-war origin, and was associated with the
Second Internationale.
It represented urban workers primarily -thereby limiting its influence in a predominantly agrarian country and its policy included plans for the nationalization of banking and
industry.
The Communist Party had only a brief legal existence in
Lithuania after the war.
It won a few seats in the 1922 Seimas under
the name of the Labor Rally, but was soon declared illegal and remained
so until June, 1940.
It should not be forgotten,
between the parties in 1920, that, with
all of them were in effective agreement
a republican form of government; some
economic affairs; agrarian reform; and

however, after an enumeration
the exception of the Conununists,
on a number of essential points:
measure of state paternalism in
a nationalist outlook of foreign
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affairs.
The first Lithuanian elections were held on April 14-16, 1920,
when deputies were chosen to the Constituent Assembly on the basis of a
system of proportional representation • • • •
The success of the conservative agrarian party, the Christian
Democrats, is not surprising in the Lithuania of 1920, though it seems
clear that the influence of the Social Democrats extended considerably
farther than the very small urban proletariat. The 112 members of the
Seimas included ten lawyers, ten writers, eight physicians, seven civil
employees, six army officers, three engineers, three representatives of
the Cooperatives, three artisans, twenty-two farmers, thirty professors
and priests, and ten other.s. But a striking feature of this Seimas and
its successors was the absence of members of the noble class, either in
a party of their own, or as leaders of other parties, due to the fact
that the largely polonized nobility of Lithuania had, by 1920, largely
chosen to become absorbed in the Polish state. Their absence meant that
the proponents of agrarian reform controlled nearly every seat in the
body.
The new Seimas put forth a provisional constitution which
President Smetona proclaimed on June 1O, and the existing government
thereupon transfered its powers to .the Seimas. The latter then named
Kazys Grinius as Prime Minister, and. Aleksandras Stulginskis, its own
presiding officer, as Acting President of the Republic. 'Ibis government
remained in office until the adoption of the permanent constitution on
August 1, 1922, and its.promulgation•a week later.
The principal strictly legislative work of the Constituent
Assembly was the agrarian reform law; largely the work of the Christian
Democrats and Populists, which. was adopted on February 15, 1922 • • • •
The primary task of the Assembly, however, was to draw up the definitive
constitution of the State, and this it completed in two years.

C. THE CONSTITUTION OF 1922 AND THE ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT
The Constitution beginning with words, "In the name of the
Almighty God," proclaimed that Lithuania was an "independent democratic
Republic" with the "sovereign Government" of the state "vested in the
people."
All citizens are equal before the law, none were to receive
special privileges, and all were guaranteed that no right should be
"restricted because of race, creed or nationality." Freedom of worship
and conscience were accorded, and no one's religion or convictions shall
"form the basis for justification of an offense or for refusing to
perform public duties."
'lbe clergy, however, were exempted from
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military obligations. Freedom of speech and press, of assembly "without
arms and without disturbances of the public peace," and freedom to form
"societies and associations" if there [sic] were not "contrary to the
penal laws" were all guaranteed. Any citizen could petition the Seimas
(Parliament) and legislation could be initiated by the people. Property
rights were guaranteed and property "may be condemned, in the manner
prescribed by the law, only in the event of public need."
The Seimas, whose membership would be fixed by the law, was to
be elected according to proportional representation for three years, by
general, direct, equal, secret ballot.
In an emergency, the President
of the Republic could extend the life of the Parliament with the consent
of the latter. The Seimas enjoyed the usual legislative authority, and
could declare and end war, but the executive could act independently in
the event of undeclared war against Lithuania. Subject to confirmation
by the Seimas, the President, acting with the Cabinet, could declare or
rescind a state of emergency.
In this case, the constitution provides
for the "temporary" suspension of the main civil rights, though against
[sic] subject to parliamentary confirmation.
The President of the Republic was elected by secret ballot of an
absolute majority of the Seimas, for three years, and was ineligible to
more than two successive terms.
The President 11 invited" the Prime
Minister to form a Cabinet, and could ask the Seimas to re-consider any
law, unless the latter had declared it to be urgent by vote of two-third
of all the members. The President could also dissolve the Seimas, but
was then obliged to face re-election by its successor, which had to be
chosen within sixty days.
He was also commander-in-chief of the armed
forces of the Republic.
The Cabinet Ministers were jointly and severally responsible to
the Seimas, and could be overthrown on a vote of "no confidence." The
Cabinet was to draft proposed laws, and any member, if he disagreed with
his colleagues, could submit a separate opinion in writing to the
Seimas.
The complete independence of the judiciary was fixed and
irrevocable.
No decision of the Supreme Court was subject to modification except by judicial authority, but the courts were required to
"pass upon the legality of acts proceeding from the administration," and
"no law which is contrary to the Constitution shall have force."
In
addition, "All citizens are equal before the Courts."
In addition to these general governmental features, it was
provided that minorities could autonomously administer the affairs of
their national culture, including education, charity, and mutual aid,
and that they had the right to elect bodies to do so, and to impose dues
upon their members to meet these ends. They could also call upon the
national treasury for their share of funds allotted for education and
charity.
Education of children was declared the "supreme right and
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natural duty" of the parents, and all schools were to be placed under
state supervision.
Religious education was made compulsory in the
schools, with instruction in the religion of the student, but schools
established for children of parents not belonging to any religious
organization were exempt from this requirement.
Further, the State
Treasury would support private religious schools.
The Lithuanian economy "shall be so regulated" as to afford
employment to all citizens. In addition, "There shall be established by
law bureaus of agriculture, commerce and industry, labor and other
bureaus, whose cooperation with the
State government for the
standardization of the economic life shall be prescribed by law".
"The principle of private ownership shall be made the basis for
the management of land."
The State was obliged to protect workmen during illness, old
age, in cases of misfortune, and when unemployed.
The structure of government laid down in this constitution
resembles closely those of the other two Bal tic states, each of which
has a unicameral legislature largely from reasons of economy which, in effect, was intended to form the preponderant weight in the
administration. The regime, therefore, was to be democratic in that all
organs were poll tic ally responsible to the Seimas, yet conservative in
that judicial control and other checks were provided against abuse of
power.
In the areas of religious and educational policy, no state
church is provided for, but the interests of the preponderant Roman
Catholic Church are fully protected through compulsory religious
education, state subsidy to all schools, and the absence of provision
for a civil register of births,· marriages and deaths.
The elaborate
bill of rights is drawn in part from the Weimar Constitution, and, like
the similar portion of the latter, it represented the work mainly of a
clerical party which sought to safeguard religious liberty while
providing for a broad program of social and humanitarian reform. The
Lithuanian constitution, therefore, has been called a "de-socialized
version of the Weimar constitution," in that it foreshadows a benevolent
regime of Christian state socialism based on individual initiative in
industry and individual land tenure in agriculture.
The state is
therefore commited at the same time to the defense of the rights of
property, and intervention in the economic system to the extent of
according protection to the working class against the perils of that
system.
Many of the actual organs of administration of the Lithuanian
government, however, had already come into existence before the adoption
of the Constitution of 1922.
Among these was the Cabinet, whose
membership, according to the Constitution, was to be fixed by statute,
but which usually included these departments: National Defense (always
held by a mill tary officer), Interior (with control of the police and
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the administrative machine), Finance, Agriculture, Education, Justice,
Communications and Foreign Affairs.
Early cabinets also included
special Ministers, in charge of Jewish and White Russian affairs.
The judiciary had been assigned important powers by the
Constitution in regard checking abuses of authority on the part of the
administration, but the organization of the courts and the system of law
were carried out only very slowly in Lithuania.
In 1919, the newlycreated district courts, or tribunals of first instance, were empowered
to apply the imperial Russian Code, and the translation of the latter
was begun.
But it was only in 1925 that the Supreme Court was created and
the principle, if not the actual use of the jury system was introduced
into the country. At the same time, the Petrulis ministry appointed a
commission of jurists to revise the criminal statutes on the basis of
the Swiss code.
The translation of the Russian statutes and their
modification continued throughout the period of independence but, in
fact, no complete and autonomous Lithuanian code was ever evolved.
The Constitution made considerable provision for organs of local
self-government, based on democratic elections, which were endowed with
authority to impose taxes for local expenditures. These provisions were
implemented by a statute of 1925 which divided the country into 20
districts (later 23, when the Klaipeda Territory was integrated into the
administrative system) w1 th an average population of 100, 000.
Each
district was subdivided into about 15 communes, and these, in turn were
At each level, a council composed of
composed of "seniunijas."
representatives elected by the constituent units was in charge of the
affairs of the division in question. But the Constitution provided that
the functions and competences of these bodies was to be fixed by law,
their activities were to be supervised and coordinated by the central
administration, and ·any disputes between them and the latter were to be
settled by t.he courts.
Therefore, despi. te. the pyramid of elected
councils, the central administration, through its appointed "prefects,"
effectively controlled the · district administration.
As wo_uld be
demonstrated by the cotip d·'etat of 1926, when the new government easily
established its authority throughout the country by gaining control of a
few central offices in the capital, the administrative system was highly
and thoroughly centralized in the organs at Kaunas.

D. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
• • • In the Constituent Assembly, where the Christian Democrats and
their allies controlled an absolute majority of the seats, they
nevertheless had shared power in most of the cabinets of the period with
the liberal group, and had cooperated with the latter both in the
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adoption of the agrarian reform act and the drafting of the
Constitution. With the completion of these two basic acts, however, the
Christian Democrats tended to become more conservative, and new issues
came to the fore - such as popular insistence on a speedy solution of
the Klaipeda question -- which made difficult the attempt of the
Christian Democrats to govern alone in the first constitutional
Seimas. As a result, new elections were held in the spring of 1923.
The small gains of the Christian Democratic bloc permitted it to
maintain its conservative regime through most of the normal three-year
life of the second Seimas.
But in the elections of May, 1926,
restiveness at long one-party control, an econonic depression, and,
above all, nationalist discontent at the failure of the incumbent party
to prevent the Vatican from concluding a concordat with Poland which
recognized Vilnius as a part of the Polish ecclesiastical province,
combined to bring about the defeat of the Christian Democrats.
A new coalition of the Populist bloc and the Social Democrats
now assumed power, and the outstanding event of this regime was the
Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression concluded on September 27, 1926,
with the Soviet Union. The domestic policy of the government, however,
was less successful and raised a series of important enemies against
it.
Thus, the dismissal of a number of Christian Democrats from the
civil service aroused both that party and the opponents of a "spoils
system;" reductions in the military budget alienated the army officers;
changes in the mode of state payment to the clergy were not well
received by the latter; increasing toleration of Communist activity
alarmed all conservatives; and concessions made to the minorities, on
whom the cabinet relied for its bare parliamentary majority, and
particularly to the Poles on educational affairs, raised the hostility
of nationalists many of whom had turned against the Christian
Democrats in the election precisely because of their inability to deal
with the Polish question. As a result, a number of army officers, with
at least the tacit consent of many Christian Democrats, on the pretext
of an imminent Communist rising brought about a coup d'etat on the night
of December 16-17 1926, which, while it preserved the constitutional
forms, brought to power the Nationalist Party, a small group of
conservative landowner[s] and industrialists, led by the "elder
statesmen" Smetona and Voldemaras.
The former, who had left his
academic chair at the University of Lithuania to enter the Third Seimas
as one of the three representatives of the new party, then became
President of the Republic; the latter became Prime Minister.
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INDEX TO CIVIL-MILITARY LEGISLATION IN INDEPENDENT LITHUANIA
Vyriausybes z1n1os (Government News) was published in Kaunas by
the Chancellory of the Cabinet (Ministru tarybos kanceliarija). It was
the official organ which published all legislation, presidential acts,
and directives from the various ministries and agencies.
It is the
reference for all acts cited herein.

I.

STATES OF AWARENESS, READINESS, ANO EMERGENCY
A.

Special State Defense Statutes
Ypatingi valstybes apsaugos istatai
Number
4
Statute
42

55
126
255
287
418
430
487
653
1100

5
10
20
23
40
41
49
73
156
B.

Statute Eliminating the State of War
Karo stovio panaikinimo istatymas
Number
20
Statute
243

105
229

c.
o.
E.

823
1489

State of Readiness Statute
Sustiprintos apsaugos istatymas
Number
Statute
194

1318

State of War Statute
Karo stovio ivedimo aktai
Number
242
Statute

1582

Statute to Defend the State and Nation
Tautai ir valstybei saugoti istatymas
Number
Statute
3044
437

240

241

F.

Amendment to the State of Readiness Statute
Sustiprintos apsaugos istatymo pakeitimas
Number
456
Statute
3142
557
3873
450
3142
194
1318

G.

Acts of the President of the Republic--State of Readiness
Respublikos Prezidento aktai~Sustiprinta apsauga
Number
Statute
4504
627
671
4950
649
4734
637
4643

H.

A..mendment to the Special State Defense Statutes
Y"'patinguju valstybes apsaugos istatu pakeitimas
Number
4
Statute
42
5
55
10
126
20
255
23
287
40
418
41
480
49
487
73
653
156
1100
287
1885
450
3138
450
3140
532
3698
557
3872

I.

Aunendment to the Statute to Defend State and Nation
T.autai ir valstybei saugoti istatymo papildymas
Number
437
Statute
3044
684
5092

J.

Alroendment to the State of Emergency Statute
N.epaprastojo meto istatymo pakeitimas
Number
194
Statute
1318
450
3143
3873
557
644
4701
662
4849

K.

Neeutrality Statute
Neeutralumo istatymas
Number
632

Statute

4535

242

L.

Acts of the .President of the Republic-Defense
Respublikos Prezidento aktai--Gynimo metas
Number
671
Statute
4950
677
5011

M.

Acts of the President of the Republic-Neutrality
Respublikos Prezidento aktai-Neutralumas
Number
660
Statute
4839

N.

Acts of the President of the Republic--State of Readiness
Respublikos Prezidento aktai--Sustiprinta apsauga
Number
637
Statute
4643
649
4734
671
4950

o.

Statute Governing the Economy During a State of Emergency
Nepaprastuoju metu tautos ukiui tvarkyti istatymas
Number
661
Statute
4840

II. MILITARY CONSCRIPTION
A.

Calling of Volunteers for National Defense
Pasaukimas savanoriu i krasto apsauga
Number
1
Statute
3
1

4

B.

Conditions for Entry into the National Defense
Salygos istojimo i Lietuvos krasto apsauga
Number
1
Statute
5
5
58

C.

Instruction for Calling Volunteers
Instrukcija savanoriams saukti
Number
Statute

6

D.

Instructions for Calling the Military
Kariuomenes saukimo instrukcijos
Number
4
Statute
43
112
1019

E.

Calling of Novices to the Military
Naujoku saukimas kariuomenen
Number
4
Statute

50

243
F.

Provisional Statutes for the Calling of Novices
Laikini naujoku saukimo istatai
Number
13
Statute
159
46
458
56
531

G.

Regulations for Calling and Accepting Novices
Naujoku saukimo ir emimo taisykles
Number
15
Statute
190
39
415
331
2269
394
2697

H.

Statute of Military Conscription
Karines prievoles istatymas
Number
57
Statute
91
109
146
168
196
250
284
298
323
406
431
538

533
760
843
1056
1181
1330
1651
1834
1988
2204
2803
2987
3734

I.

Statute for the Calling of Novices
Naujoku saukimo istatymas
Number
45
Statute
456

J.

List of Physical Disabilities
Ligu ir kuno trukumu sarasas
Number
57
Statute

538

K.

Statute Governing the Calling of Males Born 1902
Vyru gimusiu 1902 m. saukimo kariuomenen istatymas
Number
109
Statute
845

L.

Statute for the 1926 Novice Contingent
1926 metu naujoku kontingento istatymas
Number
221
Statute
1448

M.

List of Recruiting Stations
Naujoku saukiamuju nuovadu sarasas
Number
353
Statute
2411

244

N.

List of Clergymen Exempt from Conscription
Dvasininku, kurie atleidziami nuo karines prievoles, sarasas
Statute
2203
Number
333
2528
370

o.

Amendment to the Statute of Military Conscription
Karines prievoles istatymo pakeitimas
Nun,iber
14 6
Statute
105 6
284
1834
406
2803
431
2987
538
3734
661
4842

P.

Amendment to List of Clergymen Exempt from Conscription
Dvasininku, kurie atleidziami nuo karines prievoles, saraso
pakeitimas
Number
503
Statute
3493

Q.

Statute Concerning the Military Requisitioning of Animals
Naturaliniu karo prievoliu istatymas
Number
431
Statute
2983
469
3287
513
3556

R.

Amendment to the Regulations Governing the Care for Indigent
Families of Conscripted Males
Karine prievole atliekanciu vyru beturtems seimoms aprupinti
taisykliu pakeitimas
Number
551
Statute
3836
567
3935

s.

Amendment to the Military Service Statute
Karines tarnybos istatymo pakeitimas
Number
561
Statute
3893
4047
582
4967
673

T.

Amendment to the Statute Concerning the Military Requisitioning of Animals
Naturaliniu karo prievoliu istatymo pakeitimas
Number
431
Statute
2983
469
3287
513
3556
661
4841
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III.

IV.

STUDENT CONSCRIPTION
A.

The Calling of Schoolboys to the Military
Moksleiviu pasaukimas kariuomenen
Number
2
Statute
12
3
12

B.

Provisional Regulations Governing the Training and Service of
Student Recruits
Laikinos aspirantu rekrutu, tarnybos ir mokymo taisykles
Number
259
Statute
1674

c.

Regulations Governing the Service of Student-Recruits
Kariunu-aspirantu tarnybos taisykles
Number
358
Statute
2443

D.

Student Service Statute
Aspirantu tarnybos istatymas
Number
358
Statute
420
420
461

2443
2909
2914
3226

E.

Reserve Junior Lieutenant Course Statute
Atsargos jaunesniuju leitenantu kursu istatymas
Number
487
Statute
3403

F.

Amendment to the Student Service Statute
Aspirantu tarnybos istatymo pakeitimas
Number
259
Statute
1674
358
2443
420
2009
420
2914
461
3226
568
3948

RESERVE PERSONNEL
A.

Reserve Officers and Military Managers Statute
Istatymas apie atsargos karininkus ir karo valdininkus
Number
22
Statute
272

B.

Regulations Governing Reserve Officers Exercises
Atsargos karininku pratimu taisykles
Number
261
Statute
1687
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v.

COURTS-MARTIAL
A.

B.

c.

VI.

Provisional Army Court Statutes
Laikini armijos teismo istatai
Statute
Number
10
273

130
1768

Amendment to the Provisional Court Statutes
Laikinuju kariuomenes teismo istatu pakeitimas
Number
10
Statute
130
273
1768
459
3199
463
3249
634
4593

Military Leadership Statute
Kariuomenes vadovybes istatymas
Number
465
Statute

3259

SOLDIERS IN POLITICS
A.

VIII.

62
103
985
1767

MILITARY ORGANIZATION
A.

VII.

Military Court Statutes
Karo teismo istatai
Number
Statute
5
8
23
273

Statute Prohibiting Soldiers from Political Activity
Draudziamasai istatymas dalyvavimui kariams politikoje
Number
5
Statute
63

ESPIONAGE
A.

Provisional Statute Governing the Dissemination of Military
Information
Laikinosios vyriausybes isakymas del ziniu platinimo apie
kariuomene
4
Number
Statute
52

247
IX.

LAND REFORM AND THE MILITARY
A.

Statute Providing Land to Soldiers
Istatymas kariskiams zeme aprupinti
Number
8
Statute
95
15
189
23
284
40
425
47
465

B.

Amendment to the Land Reform Statute: Military Invalids
Association
Zemes reformos istatymo pakeitimas: Karo invalidu sajunga
Number
602
Statute
4210

c.

Amendment to the Land Reform Statute: Lithuanian rlational
Guard
Zemes reformos istatymo pakeitimas: Lietuvos Sauliu Sajunga
Number
559
Statute
3888
602
4210

D.

Amendment to the Land Reform Statute: Military Volunteers
Zemes reformos istatymo pakeitimas: Kariai savanoriai
Number
640
Statute
4656

X. NATIONAL GUARD OF LITHUANIA
A.

Lithuanian National Guard Statute
Lietuvos Sauliu sajungos istatymas
624
Number
70
Statute
71
637

B.

National Guard Statute
Sauliu sajungos istatymas
Number
166
Statute
490

1154
3423

XI. CIVIL DEFENSE
A.

Statute for Protection Against Air Attack
Istatymas apsaugos nuo pavojaus is lektuvu
Number
479
Statute
3358
493
3445
517
3598

248

B.

Regulations Governing the Establishment of Decontamination
Teams
Taisykles degazuotoju komandoms steigti
Number
517
Statute
3597

c.

Compensation for Expenditures Associated with the Statute for
Protection Against Air Attack
Islaidu, susijusiu su Istatymu apsaugos nuo pavojaus is
lektuvu vykdymu, apmokejimas
Number
623
Statute
4442

D.

Amendment to the Statute for Protection Against Air Attack
Istatymo apsaugos nuo pavojaus is lektuvu pakeitimas
Number
479
Statute
3358
'-'
493
3445
517
3598
606
4247

E.

Regulations Governing the Organization of Air Surveillance
Teams
Orinio puolimo sekeju bureliams organizuoti taisykles
Number
542
Statute
3767
Regulations Governing the Acquisition
Equipment
Degazuotoju turtui isigyti taisykles
Numper
616
Statute
4360

of

Decontamination

G.

Regulations Implementing the Statute for Protection Against
Air Attack
Istatymui apsaugos nuo pavojaus is lektuvu vykdyti taisykles
Number
517
Statute
35 98
647
4719

H.

Regulations Governing Shelter Construction
Sleptuvems rengti taisykles
Number
647
Statute
4720
543
3777

I.

Amendment to Regulations Governing Farm Shelters: AntiAircraft Protection
Trobesiu
pastogems
laikyti
taisykliu
pakeitimas:
Prieslektuvine apsauga
Number
551
Statute
3837
647
4721
673
4971
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XII.

ARMS FUND
A.

XIII.

Arms Fund Statute
Ginklu fondo statutas
Number
494
502

Statute

3447
3488

B.

Postal Tariff Amendment: Arms Fund
Pasto tarifo pakeitimas: Ginklu fond as
Statute
Number
535
3723

c.

Amendment to the Arms Fund Statute
Gin kl u fondo statuto pakeitimas
Statute
Number
494
3447
4539
633

D.

Regulations Implementing the Arms Fund Statute
Ginklu fondo statutui vykdyti taisykles
Number
502
Statute
3488
651
4752

CIVIL CONTROLS AND CENSORSHIP
A.

Motion Picture Censorship Statute
Kinofilmu cenzuros istatymas
Number
390
Statute
2673

B.

Amendment to the Motion Picture Censorship Statute
Kinofilmu cenzuros istatymo pakeitimas
Number
466
Statute
3265
617
4374
644
4695

c.

Levies on Motion Picture Censorship and Advertising
Kinofilmu cenzuros ir reklamos rinkliava
Number
413
Statute
2861
415
2882
3056
438

D.

Instruction Implementing Motion Picture Censorship
Kinofilmu cenzurai veikti instrukcija
Number
464
Statute
3258

250
E.

Statute for the Punishment of Participants and Accomplices in
Foreign Organizations or Organizations of Occupied Lithuania
Organizaciju, sudarytu okupuotoje Lietuvoje ar svetimose
valstybese, dalyviams ir ju padejejams bausti istatymas
Number
304
Statute
2033
313
2115

F.

Association Statute
Istatymas apie draugijas
Number
15
Statute

G.

Press Statute
Spaudos istatymas
Number
17
197
232
510

Statute

185

210
1339
1510
3538

H.

Amendment to the Association Statute
Draugiju istatymo pakeitimas
Number
15
Statute
185
522
3626
527
3662
541
3760
557
3870
583
4054

I.

Regulations Implementing the Association Statute
Taisykles draugiju istatymui vykdyti
. Number
553
Statute
3843

J.

Regulations Amalgamating Similar Associations
Artimus tikslus turincioms draugijoms jungti taisykles
Number
573
Statute
3992
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MILITARY PROVISIONS FROM THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 1928 AND 1938
In total, Independen_t Lithuania lived under five Constitutions
promulgated in 1918, 1920, 1928, and 1938.
The latter two were
promulgated by the Smetona regime following the 1926 coup. The Constitution of 1928 contained more paragraphs for the president than for the
then-defunct Seimas, illustrating the presidential, not parliamentary,
democracy which Lithuania lived under. It should also be noted that the
military answered only to the president, not to any legislative oversight organ in addition to the chief executive.

CONSTITUTION PROMULGATED 15 MAY 1928
III. The Seimas
33.

The consent of the Seimas is required to begin or end war.
Military operations can be begun without the consent of the Seimas
if an enemy country declares war on Lithuania or an enemy, without
declaring war, violates Lithuania's borders.

34.

In case of war, armed rebellion, or other dangerous disturbances
in the State, the President of the Republic, on the reconunendation
of the Cabinet, can implement a state of war or another special
state in the entire State or parts thereof, temporarily halt
constitutional guaranties of civil rights (12 [inviolability of
the person], 13 [inviolability of residence], 15 [free, private
post and communication], 16 [speech and press], 17 [assembly], 18
[association] paragraphs), and take measures to resist or
eliminate danger, using armed force, if necessary.

IV.

The Government

50.

The President of the Republic appoints and removes all senior
officers and civil officials, whose appointment and removal is
mandated to him by law.

55.

The President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of all the
armed forces of the Republic.
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V. The Judiciary
70.

Appropriate courts try soldiers for violations in
conjunction with official service.
Extraordinary courts may be
established only in case of war or a state of war.

VIII. Life of the Republic
76.

All citizens of the Republic participate in the defense of its
territory according to the law.

77.

Armed forces are organized to defend the Republic. The organization, recruitment, type, and term of service of the armed forces
are defined by law. Protection and maintenance by the State are
guaranteed to families of soldiers or to soldiers themselves, who
lost their health or lives in connection with military service.
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CONSTITUTION PROMULGATED 12 MAY 1938
XVIII. The Defense of the State
133.

All citizens defend the State.
The bulwark of defense is the military.

134.

Citizens are appropriately prepared to defend the State.
The national economy is managed in conjunction with the needs of
State defense.

135.

The President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces.
The structure of the armed forces, the organization and authority
of its leadership are determined by law.

136.

The President of the Republic appoints and removes the Commanderin-Chief of the Army.
Sui ts brought against the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in
connection with an official violation can be done so with the
consent of the President of the Republic.

137.

There is established alongside the President of the Republic a
State Defense Board to decide State defense matters.
The composition and authority of the State Defense Board is
determined by law.

138.

During a period of State Defense (Valstybes gynimo metu), State
defense matters are managed by orders of the President of the
Republic, which have the force of law.
While not yet changed by order of the President of the Republic
during such a time, laws regarding State defense matters are still
in force.
An order of the President of the Republic requires the signature
of the Prime Minister.

139.

When there is a threat to public order or State defense, an
extraordinary state - State of Readiness (Sustiprintas valstybes
apsaugos metas) or a State of Defense (Valstybes gynimo metas)
may be declared in the entire State or a portion thereof.
An extraordinary state is declared and revoked by the President of
the Republic on recommendation of the Cabinet.

140.

A declaration of an extraordinary state brings with it the
authority to restrict or halt civil rights enumerated in the
section dealing with citizen rights and obligations, except the
right enumerated in § 20 [freedom of conscience]; the authority to
use extraordinary means to defend the State and to place
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extraordinary duties upon the residents.
Extraordinary courts can be established
extraordinary state.

by

law

during

an

141.

Mobilization, war, and peace are decided by the President of the
Republic upon recommendation of the Cabinet.
When the Seimas is functioning, the matter of peace requires its
consent.

142.

Courts-martial try regular army soldiers and civilian accomplices
for violations.

143.

The state protects and maintains soldier~ who lose their health in
connection with military service, and also the families of
soldiers who lose their lives or health in connection with
military service.
In cases determined by law, the State maintains citizens who lose
their health in connection with participation in the defense of
the State, and also the families of those citizens who lose their
lives while participating in the defense of the State.
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SENIOR CIVIL AND MILITARY OFFICIALS

PRESIDENTS
1.
2.

3.
4.

Antanas Smetona
Aleksandras Stulginskis
Kazys Grinius
Antanas Smetona

4
19
7
19

April 1919
June 1920
June 1926
December 1926

19
7
17
15

June 1920
June 1926
December 1926
June 1940

26
12
12
7
22
22
18
3
25
14
17
24
24
27
21
17

December 1918
March 1919
April 1919
October 1919
June 1920
February 1922
June 1924
February 1925
September 1925
June 1926
December 1926
September 1929
March 1938
March 1939
November 1939
June 1940

PRIME MINISTERS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

1.
8.
9.
1o.
11 •
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Augustinas Voldemaras
Mykolas Slezevicius
Pranas Dovydaitis
Mykolas Slezevicius
Ernestas Galvanauskas
Kazys Grinius
Ernestas Galvanauskas
Antanas Tumenas
Vytautas Petrulis
Leonas Bistras
Mykolas Slezevicius
Augustinas Voldemaras
Juozas Tubelis
Vladas Mironas
Jonas Cernius
Antanas Merkys

11
26
12
12
7
22
22
18
3
25
14
17
24
24
30
21

November 1918
December 1928
March 1919
April 1919
October 1919
June 1920
February 1922
June 1924
February 1925
September 1925
June 1926
December 1926
September 1929
March 1938
March 1939
November 1939

DEFENSE MINISTERS
1. Augustinas Voldemaras
2. Silvestras Zukauskas
3. Mykolas Velykis
4. Antanas Merkys
5. Povilas Zadeikis
6. Pranas Liatukas
1. Antanas Merkys
8. Kostas Zukas
9. Jonas Simkus

11
19
24
16
21
10
23
19
7

November 1 918
December 1918
December 1918
March 1919
August 1919
October 191 9
February 1920
June 1920
April 1921
257

19 December 1918
24 December 1918
16 March 1919
21 August 1919
1o October 1919
23 February 1920
19 June 1920
7· April 1921
4 February 1922

258
1o.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Balys Slizys
Teodoras Daukantas
Leonas Bistras
Juozas Papeckys
Antanas Merkys
Teodoras Daukantas
Augustinas Voldemaras
Jonas Variakojis
Balys Giedraitis
Petras Sniuksta
Stasys Dirmantas
Stasys Rastikis
Kazys Musteikis

4
20
25
15
19
11
6
24
28
13
2
24
5

February 1922
June 1924
September 1925
June 1926
December 1926
August 1927
October 1928
September 1929
June 1930
June 1934
November 1935
March 1938
December 1938

20
25
15
19
11
6
24
28
13
2
24
5
17

June 1924
September 1925
June 1926
December 1926
August 1927
October 1928
September 1929
June 1930
June 1934
November 1935
March 1938
December 1938
June 1940

COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

1.
8.
9.
1o.
11.
12.

Silvestras Zukauskas
Pranas Liatukas
Silvestras Zukauskas
Jonas Galvydis-Bikauskas
Kostas Zukas
Kazys Ladiga
Silvestras Zukauskas
Juozas Kraucevicius
Juozas Stanai tis
Silvestras Zukauskas
Vacant
(Chief of Staff
Stasys Rastikis
Vincas Vi tkauskas

27 May 1919
7 October 1919
23 February 1920
7 October 1919
23 February 1920
14 June 1920
14 June 1920
7 July 1920
7 July 1920
7 April 1921
1 August 1920
5 October 1920
6 October 1920
29 May 1921
29 May 1921
11 February 1922
11 February 1922
5 June 1923
26 January 1928
5 June 1923
31 December 1934
26 January 1928
the senior uniformed officer)
1 January 1940
1 January 1935
1 January 1940
17 June 1940

CHIEFS OF STAFF
1~
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

1.
8.
9.
1o.
11 •
12.
13.

Jurgis Kubilius
Pranas Liatukas
Edvardas Adamkavicius
Silvestras Zukauskas
Mykolas Velykis
Stasys Nastopka
Maksimas Katche
Birontas
Konstantinas Klescinskas
Maksimas Katche
Jonas Gricius
Juozas Radus-Zenkavicius
Jonas Gricius

23
24
4
26
29
7
13
21
23
13
7
6
29

November 1918
December 1918
March 1919
April 1919
May 1919
October 1919
July 1920
August 1920
August 1920
April 1921
October 1922
November 1923
February 1924

4
4
26
27
7
13
21
23
13
7
6
29
7

December 1918
March 1919
April 1919
May 1919
October 1919
July 1920
August 1920
August 1920
April 1921
October 1922
November 1923
February 1924
May 1925

259
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Kazys Ladiga
Jonas Gricius
Kazys Ladiga
Kazys Skirpa
Teodoras Daukantas
Povilas Plechavicius
Petras Kubiliunas
Jonas Jackus
Stasys Rastikis
Jonas Cernius
Stasys Pundzevicius

7
16
19
22
24
11
10
7
21
1
30

May 1925
September 1925
October 1925
July 1926
December 1926
August 1927
February 1929
June 1934
September 1934
January 1935
March 1939

16
19
22
24
11
10
7
21
1
30
17

September 1925
October 1925
July 1926
December 1926
August 1927
February 1929
June 1934
September 1934
January 1935
March 1939
June 1940
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